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Abstract 
Economic theory typically assumes that n1onetary policy is set by a single policy-
n1aker. However, the reality of n1onetary policy decision-maldng is very different. 
Monetary Policy Comnnttees (MPCs) are responsible for setting the short-term 
interest rate in most countries across the world, and up until very recently, econo-
nlists paid little serious attention to this fact. In light of this finding, this thesis 
( i) addresses the current dissonance between the theory and reality of monetary 
policy decision making and ( ii) assesses the empirical evidence on monetary pol-
icy committee voting, with emphasis on the voting behaviour of Bank of England 
MPC men1bers. The thesis contains four core chapters. 
In Chapter 3 I extend the game-theoretic literature on jury decision making 
to include the case of a n1onetary policy committee faced with making a binary 
choice under simple majority rule. I gauge the extent to which decision outcomes 
are a function of the amount of effort put into the decisions by individual n1embers 
when paying attention is not costless. The game builds on Mukhopadhaya (2003), 
and is of the 'contribution' variety proposed by Rasn1usen (2001). 
In Chapter 4 I present a boundedly-rational n1odel of how monetary policy 
con1mittees are able to reach decisions on the interest-rate. I draw upon Morris 
DeGroot's (1974) characterization of consensus formation in groups and DeMarzo, 
Vayanos and Zweibel's (2003) notion of persuasion bias. Monetary policy con1IDit-
tees are shown to reach agreement even when the views its members are initially 
diverse. The n1odel potentially explains the stylised facts of how n1en1bers of the 
United States Federal Open Market Committee, European Central Bank Govern-
ing Cotmcil and Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee reach a decision on 
the interest-rate. 
Chapters 5 and 6 constitute en1pirical analyses of MPC voting behaviour, and 
investigate the voting behaviour of n1embers of the Bank of England Monetary 
Policy Committee over the first five years of its being. This encompasses the 
entire spell for which the MPC was chaired by Sir Edward George. Using vot-
ing data obtained from Minutes of n1eetings, I show that as a group, internally 
appointed MPC n1e1nbers (insiders) on average prefer lower interest rates than 
external appointees (outsiders). Ordered logit analysis den1onstrates that insid-
ers and outsiders are n1otivated by different concerns when setting interest rates. 
Asy1nn1etric policy preferences exist for the two groups. Insiders are found to dis-
sent significantly less often than outsiders, with the n1ajority of dissents cast by 
the forn1er group being on the side of tightness. For outsiders, the reverse is shown 
to be true, with the n1ajority of dissents being for looser policy. 
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Part I 
Introduction 
1 
Chapter 1 
Overview, Scope and Objectives 
This thesis endeavours to coherently analyse aspects of the forn1ulation of mone-
tary policy by con1nlittee, a research agenda with n1otivations which are straight-
forward enough. Monetary Policy Committees (MPCs) are responsible for the 
fornllllation of n1onetary policy in most countries across the world, a phenonl-
enon which has up tmtil very recently been neglected at the groves of Academe.1 
Although great advances have been n1ade in developing the policy rules based 
literature [see Taylor (1999) and Woodford (2003)], understanding the relation-
ship between the independence of a monetary institution and macroeconomic per-
formance [see Grilli et al (1991), Alesina and Sumn1ers (1993) and Cukierman 
(2002)] and developing n1odels of credibility [see Barro and Gordon (1983a, b), Ro-
goff (1985) and Walsh (1987)] little energy has been devoted to comprehending 
the role of conlmittees in fornllllating monetary policy. The credibility literature 
serves to reinforce this point. Although the emergence of such literature over the 
past three decades has revolutionised the way economists think about monetary 
policy - consider how since the publication of highly influential papers by Kydland 
and Prescott (1978) and Barro and Gordon (1983a, b) the notion of time-consistent 
n1onetary policy has rooted itself firnliy in n1odern n1acroecononlic discourse - over-
looked in these contributions is the reality that policy is often deternlined by a 
conmlittee, and not a single individual. Barro and Gordon (1983a, b), for instance 
refer to the n1onetary authorities as 'the policyn1aker', a title whose singular form 
epitonlises the in1plicit assumption of monetary policy being under the aegis of a 
unitary agent. 
Fortunately, the institution of comnlittees as devices for setting monetary pol-
icy is feature of central banks which has not escaped the attention of all econo-
1Shakespeare, W. (1595): Love's Labour's Lost, I. i. 13. 
2 
nusts. Professor Alan Blinder, an acaden1ic economist and once Vice-Chairman 
of the Board of Governors of the United States Federal Reserve Board explicitly 
recognized this when delivering the 1996 Robbins Lecttu·es at the London School 
of Econon1ics, 2 asserting that 
" ... the theoretical fiction that n1onetary policy is made by a single in-
dividual maximizing a well-defined preference function n1isses son1ething 
important." 3 
His recommendations with respect to this theoretical deficit were clear-cut: 
" ... monetary theorists should start paying some attention to the nature 
of decision n1aking by committee, which is rarely mentioned in the academic 
literature." 4 (emphasis added) 
By paying son1e attention to the nature of decision n1alcing by conlmittee, this the-
sis addresses the current dissonance between the theory and reality of n1onetary 
policy decision n1alcing. 
Two chapters of this thesis pick up the 'theoretical gauntlet' thrown down by 
Blinder. In Chapter 3 I build on recent work in the political economy arena on 
jury decision n1alcing (see for exan1ple Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Feddersen 
and Pesendorfer (1998) and Mukhopadhaya (2003)). Much of this work has a ba-
sis in Condorcet's Jury Theorem5 (CJT hereafter). CJT asserts that when faced 
with choosing between two n1utually exclusive alternatives under simple n1ajority 
rule, a group of individuals is n1ore likely to n1ake a better decision than a solitary 
individual. However, CJT has a far broader scope than its nan1e suggests, and 
its application to jury trial outcon1es is but one area of decision n1aldng where the 
theory may be applied. This is despite n1ost of the recent literature focusing on 
outco1nes in a judicial setting. 6 I extend the gan1e-theoretic literature on jury 
decision n1aldng to include the case of a n1onetary policy con1n1ittee faced with 
n1aldng a binary choice under sin1ple majority rule. I gauge the extent to which 
decision outcon1es are a function of the an1ount of effort put into the decisions by 
individual men1bers when paying attention is not costless. The gan1e builds on 
2These lectures are now published as the monograph Central Banking in Theory and Practice 
(1998). 
3Blinder (1998), p.22. 
4Ibid. 
5 As distinct from Condorcet's paradox of voting. 
6 In this sense, the adjective jury is a misnomer. 
3 
Mukhopadhaya (2003), and is of the 'contribution' variety proposed by Rasmusen 
(2001). 
In contrast to Chapter 3, in Chapter 4 I present a boundedly rational model of 
how n1onetary policy comnrittees are able to reach decisions on the interest-rate. 
I draw upon Morris DeGroot's (1974) characterization of consensus formation in 
groups and DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zweibel's (2003) notion of persuasion bias. 
In1plicit to both approaches is the use of Markov chains to model how n1en1.bers of 
a group or co1nmittee are able to reach a consensus. I den1onstrate how n1en1bers 
of a n1onetary policy conmlittee are able to reach agreen1ent even when the views 
of n1en1bers are initially diverse. The n1odel potentially explains the stylised facts 
of how n1en1bers of the United States Federal Open Market Committee, European 
Central Bank Governing Council and Bank of England Monetary Policy Conunit-
tee reach a decision on the interest-rate. Central to n1y rationalization of how 
n1en1bers of a n1onetary policy comnlittee reach an agreen1ent is the suggestion 
that son1e n1embers pay more attention to - and effectively weight - the opin-
ions of son1e individuals more than others in course of MPC deliberations. Most 
pertinently, n1y approach gives pronlinence to the role of consensus formation in 
MPC decision making: this is because n1any monetary policy comnlittees arrive 
at a decision through reaching a consensus, and not through taking a formal vote. 
However, the n1odel can still be used to make sense of instances where decisions 
are n1ade through a formal vote. 
However, during the course of n1y research I have deliberately tried to strike a 
balance between the theory and practice of n1onetary policy - accordingly, not all 
of this thesis is of theoretical bent, and one would be far fron1 correct to infer that 
the lack of theoretical underpinnings for monetary policy forn1ulation by conunit-
tee is n1atched by an equally poor showing of empirical studies of the phenon1enon. 
The last two chapters therefore constitute empirical analyses of MPC voting be-
haviour. There exists a considerable body of work which ventures to ascertain 
the deternlinants of voting behaviour of the United States Federal Open Market 
Conlffiittee (FOMC). This literature is typified by the use of the FOMC voting 
record to ( i) estin1ate n1mnbers' reaction functions and ( ii) test for partisanship 
between different types of mmnbers. The reaction function literature usually in-
volves the estin1ation of anything fron1 Taylor-style rules [Taylor (1993)] to n1ore 
broadly specified reaction functions for FOMC members using lin1ited dependent 
variable analysis. The partisanship literature attempts to n1easure the influence 
4 
of members' backgrounds and career characteristics on voting behaviour.7 Again, 
this second strand of empirical enquiry relies heavily on limited dependent variable 
analysis.8 Con1mon to all of this literature is the notion that a men1ber's type-
in the case of the FOMC Board member or Bank President - is a significant deter-
minant of voting behaviour. For this reason it is commonplace for most en1pirical 
studies of FOMC behaviour to test for differences in the policy preferences of these 
groups. 
Despite the substantial body of FOMC studies, literature examining the vot-
ing behavioln· of monetary policy con1n1ittees other than the FOMC is son1ewhat 
less con1n1on. The dearth of studies is on the one hand attributable to the fact 
that even when voting takes place, votes are sin1ply not published: n1any central 
banks sin1ply lack transparency in this area. On the other hand, where the vot-
ing record is in the public don1ain - as is the practice with the Monetary Policy 
Comnlittees of the Bank of England and Bank of Japan respectively - the period 
for which voting data is available has previously contained too few observations 
to warrant any meaningful analysis, especially in the econon1etric sense of the 
word.9 The absence of 'non-FOMC' studies is an issue directly addressed in this 
thesis. Enough data now exists to facilitate a n1eaningful study of the voting 
behaviour of the Bank of England's Monetarl.J Policy Committee (BoEMPC), a 
body given operational responsibility for setting interest rates to meet a Govern-
nlent inflation target of 2.5 % RPIX inflation.10 Accordingly, Chapters 5 and 6 
investigate the voting behaviour of MPC men1bers over the first five years of its 
being. This encon1passes the entire spell for which the BoEMPC was chaired by 
Sir Edward George,11 namely the period June loth 1997- 6th June 2003. In all, 
this an1ounts to 7 4 n1eetings, 12 a period over which MPC n1en1bers cast 642 votes. 
7The distinction between the reaction function literature and partisanship literat'ttre is made 
by Meade and Sheets (2002). The current author believes this to be a sensible way of classifying 
the different approaches. 
8Logit and pro bit analysis of the binary, multinomial and ordered variety are most commonly 
used. 
9 For some monetary institutions, committees were only granted responsibility for setting 
interest rates relatively recently. In the case of the Bank of England the MPC was established 
in 1997. Monetary policy came under the aegis of a committee in Japan in 1998. 
10Tllis target was changed to 2% CPI inflation in January 2004 by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Gordon Brown MP. 
11 During this period, Sir Edward George also presided as Governor of the Bank of England. 
In July 2003 Sir Edward George was replaced by Mervyn King as both Governor of the Bank 
and chairman of the MPC. 
12 Also included are votes cast in the special MPC meeting held on September 18th 2001, which 
followed the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre. 
5 
Using voting data obtained fron1 Minutes of n1eetings, I show that as a group, in-
ternally appointed MPC n1embers (insiders) on average prefer lower interest rates 
than external appointees (outsiders). Amongst other things, ordered logit analysis 
demonstrates that insiders and outsiders are n1otivated by different concerns when 
setting interest rates. Insiders are fo1md to dissent significantly less often than 
outsiders, with the n1ajority of dissents cast by the former group being on the side 
of tightness. For outsiders, the reverse is shown to be true, with the majority of 
dissents being for looser policy. 
6 
Part II 
Literature 
7 
Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
It is only up until very recently that econonlists began paying serious attention to 
n1onetary policy decision n1aking by conmuttees. As stated in the introduction, 
the number of studies devoted to examining n1onetary policy forn1ulation by coin-
mittees is n1eagre con1pared to the literature on policy rules, tin1e-consistency and 
central bank independence. Accordingly, this literature review reflects the reality 
that the study of MPCs is in its infancy. It assmnes an eclectic character, consider-
ing literature which is not geared specifically towards n1onetary policy conmlittees. 
Indeed, the study of how groups reach decisions and how best to aggregate col-
lective preferences is a research enterprise which has received n1uch coverage in 
the social and collective choice literature. As a monetary policy conmlittee is an 
example of a group - albeit one charged with n1aking a collective decision on the 
interest-rate- it is arguably necessary to make reference to such literature during 
the course of this review. 
Ft·on1 a historical perspective, the study of how groups n1ake decisions can be 
traced back as far the Marquis de ｃｾｮ､ｯｲ｣･ｴＧｳ＠ (1785) Essai sur l'application de 
l'analyse a la probabilite des decisions rendues pluralite des viox or Essay on the 
Application of Analysis to the Probability of Majority Decisions. This work is 
probably best known for the paradox of voting, which has received n1uch coverage 
in the social choice literature, and den1onstrates how collective preferences can 
be intransitive (or cyclic) even when individual voter preferences are not. To 
illustrate the voting paradox, suppose that the governn1ent decides to delegate 
n1onetary policy to a group of three people, a, b and c, who n1ust collectively 
set the interest-rate. Assun1e that each me1nber may choose fron1 three policy 
alternatives: the interest-rate n1ay either be increased (J), decreased (D) or left 
unchanged (U), relative to its level in the previous period. The first step involves 
8 
Ordi11al mt1kings 
Preftrellce Increase (I) No change (U) Decrease (D) 
Member ordedng 
a I>-U>-D 1 2 3 
b U>-D>-I 3 1 2 
c D>-I>-U 2 3 1 
FIGURE A: 
MONETARY POLICY PREFERENCES FOR MEMDERS a, bAND c. 
each n1ember ordinally ranking their policy preferences over the three alternatives, 
as depicted in FIGURE A. For exan1ple, consider n1en1ber b who prefers no change 
(U) to a decrease (D) in interest rates, which is in turn preferred to an increase 
(I). More formally this ordering can be expressed as U >- D >- I, where · ">-" 
n1eans strongly preferred to. Now define the group policy choice as the alternative 
which beats all others in a series of pairwise majority votes. Looking to FIGURE 
A, it is evident that a n1ajority of members - a and c - prefer an increase ( J) in the 
interest-rate to no change (U). Further, no change (U) is preferred to a decrease 
(D) by a n1ajority of n1embers, a and b. Finally, a majority of members, band c, 
prefer a decrease (D) to an increase ( J). This entails that the group preference is 
captured by the ordering I >- U >- D >- I, which is clearly intransitive: I >- D and 
D >- I cannot hold simultaneously. Thus in this exan1ple, setting the interest-
rate is characterised by the absence of an alternative which defeats all others in a 
pairwise competition. Such 'failure to identify a Condorcet winner leads straight 
to the heart of problenlS of social choice', 1 or in context of this exan1ple, failure 
to deternline the interest-rate. Further work has been done in this general area. 
DeMeyer and Plott (1970) and lliker (1982) show that when individual preferences 
are strongly ordered the probability of there being no Condorcet winner is an in-
creasing function of group size and the number of alternatives under consideration. 
This in1plies that when groups are large, or faced with n1any choices, it is n1uch 
n1ore difficult to reach a decision. According to Shepsle and Bonchek (1997), for 
a group of n n1en1bers faced with choosing between m alternatives, 
" ... we cannot rely on the n1ethod of majority rule to produce ... [in a tran-
sitive sense] what the group "wants," especially if there are no institutional 
mechanisn1s for keeping participation restricted (thereby keeping n small) 
1 Hargreaves-Heap et al (1992), p.301. 
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or weeding out some of the alternatives (thereby keeping m small)." 2 
This point can be related to the composition of monetary policy conunittees. In 
a monetary policy conmlittee, n and m are typically small - the Bank of Eng-
land's MPC has 9 men1bers, as does its counterpart at the Bank of Japan. The 
US FOMC has 12 voting n1en1bers and the ECB Governing Councill8 n1en1bers, 
although this is anticipated to increase as a result of EU enlargen1ent. F\uther, 
the nun1ber of alternatives to choose fron1 is somewhat restricted due to the nature 
of the decision. Qualitatively speaking, n1en1bers have three choices: to tighten, 
loosen, or leave interest rates unchanged. Taken together, this might in1ply that 
the probability of MPC reaching an in1passe is very sn1all. Yet once we allow for 
weak preference orderings, the probability of no Condorcet winner arising turns 
out to be a decreasing function of group size. Jones et al (1995) find that for 
a three n1ember comnlittee faced with choosing between three alternatives, the 
probability of no Condorcet winner arising is 0.336 as opposed to 0.056 when only 
strong preference orderings are pernlitted. Perhaps n1ost famously, Arrow's (1951) 
celebrated 'in1possibility' theoren1 can be viewed as a generalization of the voting 
paradox. 
Yet the applicability of these results to monetary policy n1aking should be 
treated with caution. Although n1onetary policy committees reach decisions by 
n1ajority rule, the choice of interest-rate is not detern1ined by choosing the alter-
native which defeats all other interest rates in pairwise co1npetition. In this sense, 
the paradox of voting nlight be construed as at best a useful theoretical device for 
examining how monetary policy comnlittees reach a decision. 3 I therefore do not 
pursue the voting paradox further in the course of this thesis, despite its undeni-
able impact on the theory of social choice. 
However, in addition to discovering the paradox of voting, Condorcet also de-
veloped what is now lmown as Condorcet 's Jury Theorem ( CJT hereafter), which 
argues that under certain conditions, the institution of majority rule produces so-
cially superior outcon1es to those n1ade by any individual in isolation.4 Interest 
in the theoren1 has recently blosson1ed in light of in1portant contributions (see 
2Shepsle and Bonchek (1997), p.55. 
3 Second, a theoretical criticism can be levelled: the studies cited above do not allow for the 
assumption that the interest rate preferences of MPC members might be single-peaked (Black 
(1957)). Single-peakedness rules out the possibility of no Condorcet winner arising, and is a 
necessary condition for Atfedian Voter Theorem to hold. 
4CJT owes its 'rediscovery' in the modern era to Black (1957). 
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Austen-Snrith and Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)) which apply 
techniques fron1 game-theory that subsequently undermine son1e of the core as-
sumptions underpinning Condorcet's result. Perhaps n1ore pertinently the game-
theoretic contributions that follows Condorcet 's senlinal analysis 'makes a strong 
case for decision n1aking in conmlittees,' to quote Gerling et al (2003).5 Such 
findings presun1ably have in1plications for the study of monetary policy, given the 
near ubiquity of MPCs as vehicles for setting interest rates. CJT therefore forms 
the basis of the n1odel developed in the next chapter. 
For clarity of exposition, the review is partitioned into four broad sections. In 
Preliminary Concepts, I turn to the social choice literature [Black (1958) and 
Riker and Ordeshook (1973)] to provide a definition of ( i) what a committee is and 
( ii) simple majority voting, the latter being the mechanisn1 by which n1any MPCs 
reach a decision. In Surveys of Monetary Policy Committees the findings 
of three surveys of monetary policy frameworks are reviewed, namely Courtis and 
Weller (2001), Fry et al (2002) and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003). These studies shed 
light on the scope and diversity of MPCs across the world regarding their size, the 
method by which decisions ru·e arrived at, voting rights and n1e1nber con1position. 
Theory Based Literature pulls together theoretical contributions which include 
extensions to the n1onetary policy ga1nes literature [Sibert (2003)] and other mod-
els geared specifically towards how MPCs n1ake decisions [Cothren (1988), Waller 
(2000) ru1d Gerlach-Kristen (2004)], the jury games literature [Austen-Sn1ith and 
Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), Wit (1998) and Mukhopadhaya 
(2003)] and other more general theoretical approaches to modelling how commit-
tees and groups are able to reach an agreen1ent. In Empirical Based Literature 
studies ofMPC voting behaviolu· [Belden (1989), Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990), 
Tootell (1991a, b), Gildea (1990), Meade and Sheets (2002) and Gerlach-I(risten 
(2004)] are analysed, particularly those which exanline the voting behaviour of 
n1en1bers of the United States Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). I now 
turn attention to defining son1e prelinlinary concepts which are en1ployed through-
out the thesis. 
5 Gerling et al {2003), p.41. 
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2.1 Preliminary Concepts 
2.1.1 What is a Monetary Policy Committee? 
In 'The Theory of Committees and Elections', Duncan Black (1957),6 a pioneer of 
formal political theory defines a committee as follows: 
Definition 1: A committee: 'Any group of people who arrive at a decision by 
means of voting. The job of ... [a] committee is to choose either a motion or a candi-
date.'7 
Here, motion is taken to n1ean the following: 
Definition 2: A motion: 'Any proposal before a committee which it may adopt 
or reject by a method of voting. '8 
The focus of this thesis is with committees whose sole task is to set monetary 
policy. In practice Monetary Policy Committees (MPCs) are faced with a reaching 
a decision on the short-term interest-rate.9 Where formal votes are talcen, the 
motion tabled before an MPC typically pertains to the choice of an appropriate 
interest-rate for the economy. As an example, consider the motion tabled before 
the Bank of England Monetary Policy Comnuttee in August 2002. During the 
meeting, the Governor of the Bank and Chairman of the MPC 
" .. .invited [MPC] n1embers to vote on the proposition that the Bank's 
repo-rate should be n1aintained at 4%." 10 
The comnuttee then voted unanimously in favour of the proposition. As all 
members were in favour of leaving repo-rate unchanged the n1otion tabled by the 
Governor was passed, and UK interest rates were left at 4%.11 
6 0ther prominent contributions are Riker and Ordershook (1973), Arrow (1963), Mueller 
(1989), Plott (1967) and McKelvey (1967). 
7Black, D. (1957) : The Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge University Press, 
p.l. 
8Ibid., p.2. 
9The Bank of England MPC, for example, have the task of setting the rate on repurchase 
agreements, more commonly referred to as the repo rate. 
10 lvfinutes of Monetary Policy Committee Meeting, August 2002, paragraph 28. 
11 The vote on the interest-rate is typically not unanimous. 
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Yet Black's general characterization of a con1nlittee- in1plicit to which formal 
voting takes place - is too restrictive to encompass the way in which decision 
is arrived at for some MPCs. Precluded in much social choice literature is the 
possibility of groups arriving at a decision thought reaching a consensus, a decision 
n1echanisn1 used by a sizable nun1ber of MPCs. This is because social choice 
and forn1al political theory is geared toward electorates and situations where a 
formal voting n1echanis1n is in place. C?nsider the fornllllation of 1nonetary policy 
by n1en1bers of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, in which 
it is claimed no forn1al vote is taken; rather, all men1bers reach a consensus,12 
with n1en1bers' opinions reportedly converging on a single interest-rate.13 •14 This 
assertion has a basis in nlm1erous answers provided by the first President of the 
ECB, Win1 Duisenberg, to questions fielded at the routine ECB press conferences 
which follow n1onetary policy decisions n1ade by the Governing Council. Remarks 
n1ade on February 3rd 2000 reflect this: 
"First, there was no forn1al vote. Again ... .it was a consensus decision." 
(emphasis added) 
In light of this, it is n1ore apposite to define a n1onetary policy committee as follows: 
Definition 3: A Monetary Policy Committee (MPC): 'Any group of peo-
ple to whom monetary policy is delegated who arrive at a decision on the short term 
interest-rate by means of voting or consensus. The job of a monetary policy commit-
tee (MPC) is to choose the short-term interest-rate.' 
12 I thank Nick Vidalis and Marco Catenaro at the ECB for helpful discussions relating to this 
matter. 
13This is in spite of ECB statutes stating that decisions taken by the GC on the short term 
interest rate are to be taken using the mechanism of simple majority rule. Simple majority rule 
is outlined in Definition 4. 
14In light of this, Riker and Ordeshook (1973) might be seen as providing the archetypal 
definition of a committee decision, namely, 
"{1) a solicitation by the chairman of individual members' opinions and prefer-
ences, and (2) an announcement by the chairman of that alternative which, on the 
basis of some generally approved rule of decision, he has picked out to be the choice 
of the collectivity. One can describe an abstract committee in which a motion is 
formulated by some member; the other members carry through private calculations 
to determine whether or not they wish this motion to be the social choice; they vote 
yes if their calculations lead them to favour the motion, otherwise they vote no; and 
finally, the chairman uses some rule of decision which combines the individual yeas 
and nays to decide whether or not the motion is to be the social choice., {Riker, 
W. H. and Ordeshook, P. C. {1973): An Introduction to Positive Political Theory, 
Prentice Hall: New Jersey, pp.79-81) 
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Having defined what an MPC is, I now turn to a closer examination of the decision 
rules typically en1ployed by monetary policy comnuttees. For n1any central banks 
where n1onetary policy is delegated to a committee, simple majority voting is the 
statutorily prescribed decision mechanism of choice. This is certainly the case with 
the BoEMPC- a sin1ple n1ajority of votes supporting a repo-rate of 4% would have 
been sufficient for the Chairman's motion to be passed.15 
2.1.2 Simple and Absolute Majority Voting (SMV) 
SMV is a straightforward forn1 of voting whereby the alternative with a sin1ple 
n1ajority of votes wins. It is defined it as follows: 
Definition 4: Simple Majority Voting: A system of voting where for a motion 
to be passed requires at least half of the members of the committee to cast votes in 
favour of it. For an 7n member committee, at least mtl members (odd m) or w- + 1 
members (even rn) must support a motion for it to be passed. For even 7n, in the 
even of a tie, the chairman has the casting vote. 
Noted here is the distinction between simple majority voting (SMV) and absolute 
n1ajority voting (AMV). The latter treats abstentions as votes ragainst a motion, 
whereas SMV treats abstentions as non-votes. Specifically, define absolute major-
ity voting as follows. 
Definition 5: Absolute Majority Voting: A system of voting where for a motion 
to be passed requires at least half of all committee members to cast votes in favour 
of it. Any uncast votes are classified as votes against a motion. For an m member 
committee, at least mil members (odd m) or w- + 1 members (even m) must support 
a motion for it to be passed. For even 1n, in the even of a tie, the chairman has the 
casting vote. 
Should all men1bers of an MPC not be present at a given meeting, much central 
banking legislation also stipulates that a quorum of n1en1bers is required for a 
15 Similar rules apply to court cases. In some US states such as California, jm·ors must be 
unanimous in their verdict that a defendant is innocent or guilty in criminal cases- for example, 
when an individual is charged with felony and misdemeanor. Failure to reach a unanimous 
decision results in a "hung" jury, with the case being dismissed. The prosecutor is then free to 
take the case to com-t again if he or she holds the view that a retrial will result in a conviction. 
However, civil cases require a majority verdict, and as long as three-quarters of the jurors are in 
agreement with each other a verdict can be reached. This is equivalent to a 'qualified' majority. 
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decision to be taken. Assuming that enough members are present to n1eet the 
fulfilln1ents of the quorum, a simple majority is then required for a motioil to be 
passed. However, where theory is developed in this thesis, it is assumed that ( i) all 
men1bers of a n1onetary policy are present, and ( ii) abstentions are not permitted. 
Further, to the best knowledge of the author, no men1ber of an MPC has ever 
abstained fron1 voting. In the context of this thesis the difference between SMV 
and AMV is thus rendered inm1aterial.16 
2.2 Surveys of Monetary Policy Committees 
Presented in this section are the results of three surveys of n1onetary policy franle-
works, notably Courtis and Weller (2000), Fry et al (2000) and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2002). This literattn·e reveals the scope and diversity of MPCs across the world 
with respect to their size, the n1ethod by which decisions are arrived at, voting 
rights and member suffrage, and their con1position. 
2.2.1 The Near Ubiquity of Monetary Policy Committees 
In a survey of 69 central banks, Courtis and Weller (2000) find that monetary pol-
icy decisions are don1inated by con1mittees. Only four central banks are found to 
delegate monetary policy to a single central banker, nan1ely Israel, New Zealand, 
Oman and Qatar. It is worth noting the diverse nature of the countries in the 
sample. Included are cotmtries n·o1n the richest industrialized nations (United 
States, United Kingdon1, Japan) to son1e of the poorest developing nations (Sri 
Lanka, Sierra Leone, Botswana). Further, the institution of committee cuts across 
different political systems. States which might be classified as dictatorships and 
one party systen1s (Pakistan, China, Kazakhstan, Libya), sultanates or entities 
ruled by a single royal house or family (Jordan, Kuwait, Bhutan) and liberal west-
ern style den1ocracies (United States, UI<:, Denn1ark, Australia, Japan, Poland) all 
delegate n1onetary policy to conmlittees of one forn1 or another. Monetary policy 
con1mittees then virtually constitute the rule and not the exception. 
2.2.2 Not all Monetary Policy Committees are the Same 
Courtis and Weller report considerable variation in the size of MPCs. FIGURE 
2.1 and FIGURE 2.2 reveal the extent of this variability. In FIGURE 2.1 the 
16For a synthesis of the differences between absolute and simple majority voting, the reader is 
referred to Dougherty and Edward (2002). 
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DI TRIB UTION OF MP BY IZ E 
largest MPC is shown to be the Governing Council of the European Central Bank 
comprising 18 members· the smallest is the Sri Lankan Monetary Board which 
contains three members. FIGURE 2.2 shows the size distribution of MPC . Most 
committees (41) contain between 6-10 members with a corresponding median and 
mean committee size of 7 and 7.4 member re pectively. Yet MPCs exhibit con-
siderable heterogeneity according to other criteria. Fry et al (2000) report that of 
79 countries where monetary policy is delegated to a committee the majority of 
committees make decisions through respective members reaching a consensus as 
distinct from through the application of a formal voting procedure such as SMV.17 
Specifically, 43 committees arrived at an agreement through consensu whereas 
36 applied a formal voting procedure. Further, out of those countries where deci-
sions are determined by a formal voting procedure only six publish the individual 
voting patterns of its member _1 19 
17 Con ider the distinction betw en th European Central Bank Governing Council and the 
Bank of England MPC. 
1 In addition to the UK th se countries are Japan Korea Poland Sweden and the United 
States. Other countries uch as the Czech Republic publish oting pa terns but individual 
member are not identified. 
19 To under tand how MPCs function it i al o fruitful to examine central bank tatute . Some 
previous empirical studies have u ed central bank statute to gauge the degree of independence 
enjoyed b a monetar institution and associated macroe onomic benefits (see Grilli et al (1991) 
Ale ina and Summers (1993) and Cukierman (2002)) . Are urring finding i that ountries with 
a higher degree of central bank independence enjo ceteris paribus lower inflation with no ost 
to output growth . Yet statute are also useful in so far as th reveal the pr ci nature and 
modu operandi of a monetar policy committee . A ur or glance at statute from different 
central banks indicates that committees differ in t rms of ize member compo ition m thod 
of appointment and the voting right afforded to diff rent member t pe . According! one 
17 
The internalness and externalness of MPC men1bers is also a consideration 
that should be borne in mind when examining n1onetary policy comn1ittees. The 
nine men1ber Monetary Policy Conlmittee of the Bank of England comprises five 
n1en1bers en1ployed fron1 the ranks of its staff - often referred to as insiders - and 
four experts from outside the bank n1ore popularly known as outsiders, appointed 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. In relation to this point, the BoEMPC is 
not unique in so far as it contains external men1bers. Schmidt-Hebbel (2002), in 
a survey of 18 n1onetary policy conlmittees folnld that five countries- Australia, 
Hungary, Poland, South l{orea and the UK- contain external members, or out-
siders. F\.1ll results of the survey are reproduced in TABLE 2.1. For example, in 
the case of the nine n1en1ber Reserve Bank Board (RBB) of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia, outsiders comprise the n1ajority of RBB n1embers: six out of the nine 
individuals serving on the RBB are external n1embers chosen by Theasurer. The 
remaining three ex-officio n1en1bers are the Governor and the Deputy Governor -
who hold positions of Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the RBB respectively -
and the Secretary to the Department of the 'Treasury. 20 
Suffrage is also restricted in some MPCs: not all members are afforded the 
same voting rights. The 19 member strong US Federal Open Market Comnlittee 
(FOMC) practices a systen1 of rotation: voting is restricted to twelve n1en1bers, 
even though all19 n1embers actively participate in FOMC n1eetings. Seven n1en1-
bers - nan1ely n1embers of the Federal Reserve Board - are granted permanent 
voting rights. The ren1aining five votes are allocated to the twelve Federal Re-
serve Bank Presidents. The president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is 
granted a pern1anent voting right due to the significance of New York as a world 
financial centre. The ren1aining four votes rotate an1ongst the presidents of the 
eleven residual banks on one-yearly ternlS. The precise structure of the FOMC is 
stylised in FIGURE 2.3 (overleaf). The systen1 of rotation employed by the FOMC 
shares n1uch in conm1on with that adopted by the European Central Bank Gov-
should not be unsurprised to discover that the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee, 
European Central Bank Governing Council and United States Federal Open Mro·kets Committee, 
despite having some similarities, also differ in many respects. For completeness, details of the 
legislative framework of the Bank of England is discussed in Chaper 5. For a comparison of 
the legislative frameworks and structures of the United States Federal Open Markets Committee 
and the European Central Bank's Governing Council see Cecchetti and O'Sullivan (2003). 
20The Secretary to the Department of the Treasury is a senior civil servant, not to be confused 
with the Treasurer. The Treasurer is typically a elected member of the Australian government 
who holds a position equivalent to the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer in the UK, or Minister 
for Finance in other countries. 
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MPC comEosition: vadous countdes 
Number of Outside 
Country members tnembers? 
Australia 9 Yes 
Brazil 8 No 
Canada 7 No 
Chile 5 No 
Colmnbia 7 No 
Czech Republic 7 No 
Hungaty 8 Yes 
Iceland 3 No 
Mexico 5 No 
Notway 7 No 
Peru 7 No 
Poland 10 Yes 
South Africa 7 No 
Soud1 K.orea 7 Yes 
Sweden 6 No 
Switzerland 3 No 
Thailand 7 No 
UI< 9 Yes 
Source: Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) 
TABLE 2.1. 
PRESENCE OF OUTSIDERS ON MPCs, 
SELECTED COUNTRIES 
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District Bank Pre idents 
Chairman of the FOMC pills ! President of Four members sit on 
six other board members appointed ! the Federal a rotating basis 
ｾ＠ the Sen ale after nomination ! Reserve Bank from 11 remaining ｾ＠ the President ! of ew York distritt reserve banks ＢＭＭｾＭｾｾ Ｍ ｾｾ＠
Federal Reserve Open 
Markets Committee: 
12 members 
Simple Majority Rule 
Monetary Policy Decision: 
Interest rate adjusted 
to meet Sec.2A of the Federal 
Reserve Act 
FIG URE 2.3: 
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erning Council in anticipation of an enlarged Eurozon .21 Highlighted in FIG RE 
2.3 i the rol of the FOMC in relation to it policy objectiv s and additionally 
appointment procedur s for its members. Inclusion of thi information und r-
score a pertinent me age. All MPC invariably make policy within a broader 
context of particular policy obj ctiv s. In relation to this as rtion Section 2.A 
of the Federal Re erve Act stipulate the objectiv of monetary policy to b the 
achievement of conomic growth in line with the conomy potential to expand 
a high level of employmen , stable prices and moderat long-term intere t rate . 22 
On tentativ ly conclude therefore that in spite of the ubiquitou natur of MPC 
their ize structure and the corresponding beha i ur of their memb rs may vary 
sub tantially from on country to th next. Certainly where minutes of me t-
ing ar, availabl it can be readily ob erved that diss nt i mor ommonplac in 
om committee than oth rs. Thi is particularly vident when one contrast the 
frequency of dis ent voting betwe n member of the Bank of England Mon tary 
Policy Committ e and FOMC r pecti ely and i di cu ed in later chapt r . I 
now turn to the examination of th Theory Based Literature. 
20 
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2.3 Theory Based Literature 
The theoretical literature is partitioned into two distinct categories - ( i) strate-
gic and ( ii) non-strategic approaches to modelling conm1ittee decision n1aking. 
Strategic approaches are typified by the assumption of rational agency, and use 
techniques developed in ｧ｡ｾｮ･＠ theory to n1odel the behaviour of n1en1bers of a 
committee. Non-strategic approaches are characterised by ad-hoc behavioural as-
sunlptions on the part of individuals. As non-strategic approaches are relatively 
n1ore straightforward, I turn to then1 first. 
2.3.1 Non-Strategic Literature 
Condorcet's Jury Theorem (CJT) 
CJT produces a very general result that when a group of voters uses maJ·ority rule 
to n1ake a decision, it is n1ore likely to make a better decision than any individual 
voter. A corollary of the theory is that as the size of the group tends to infinity, 
its judgmental competence approaches perfection. As such, CJT has a far broader 
scope than its name suggests, and its application to jury trial outcon1es is but one 
area of decision making where the theory n1ay be applied. 23 On the one hand, the 
theory can be viewed as a stylized argun1ent for democracy in providing a formal 
underpinning for the institution of majority rule in a den1ocratic society. 24 The 
argun1ent goes that if groups make better decisions than individuals, and better 
decisions lead to in1proved welfare, then democracy - through the conduit of ma-
jority rule - is preferable to political systen1s where suffrage is either non-existent 
or highly restricted.25 Coupling this with the propensity to delegate responsibil-
ity for decision making to con1nuttees and boards across an array of institutions, 
public bodies and organizations suggests that the scope of CJT is highly enconl-
passing. This is especially true when one considers that where con1nuttees are 
charged with such responsibilities, n1ajority rule is quite often the decision mech-
anisnl of choice. In this sense, decision n1aking by a n1onetary policy co1nmittee 
represents but one area where CJT nught be fruitfully applied. 
23In this sense, the adjective jury is a misnomer. 
24 The question of what makes majority rule desirable is one which has received considerable 
attention from political philosophers, social choice theorists and economists in recent times. As 
a defining feature of modern democratic countries, majority rule is inextricably bound to the 
very notion of democracy itself in the sense that to be democratic is to submit de facto to the 
will of the majority. In The Social Contract, Rousseau (1762) famously spoke of the "General 
wmn) where the view of the majority is that which necessarily best serves society. 
25 For example, autocracy, plutocracy or dictatorships. 
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A Formal Statement of CJT 
CJT has inspired a vast literature in the political science arena. It is a powerful 
yet sin1ple theoren1. However, the proofs on which it is based are pm·ely statistical 
[Grofn1an (1978), Boland (1989), Karotkin and Paroush (2003)]. F\uther, virtu-
ally all variants of CJT assun1e dichoton1ous choice, a practice which this analysis 
restricts itself to.26 What follows is a formal statement of CJT in its sin1plest forn1. 
Envisage a defendant in a court case, who is either innocent (I) or guilty (G) 
of comnutting a crin1e. A j = (1, 2 ... J) n1en1ber jtn·y is faced with deciding the 
fate of the individual. Each n1en1ber j n1ust choose to either acquit (A) or convict 
(C) the defendant27 and makes their decision on the basis of a private signal, ai 
(acquit) or ci (convict), which is n1ore likely accurate than not. Specifically, write 
that 
Pr(cjiG) = Pr(ajil) = p E G• 1) (2.1) 
Essentially, n1ember j votes to acquit if she receives signal ai and convict upon 
receiving signal Cj. This obtains because each men1ber prefers to malce the correct 
decision. CJT asserts that the probability of a group n1aking a correct decision by 
majority rule increases n1onotonically with J. Assunung odd J, the probability of 
the jury reaching a correct verdict under 1najority rule is characterised by [Miller 
26 A rare exception to this is Goodin and List (2001), who generalize the dichotomous choice 
model (through applying a generalisation of the binomial distribution) to the case of m ｾ＠ 2 
alternatives, noting that 
"What extensions and elaborations of the Condorcet jury theorem have almost 
invariably preserved .. .is the binary choice form." (p.284.) 
They go onto assert that this is even true of Young (1988, 1995) who whilst broadening the 
theorem to accommodate multichotomous choice situations, does so through using a mechanism 
of pairwise voting. However, Goodin and List, apply their model to a plurality voting setting-
used in contests which are more commonly called "first past the post" systems- finding that CJT 
is still valid provided that the probability of members choosing the 'correct' option is strictly 
greater than the probability associated with any other alternative. Accordingly, as n tends to 
infinity, the judgemental competence of the group approaches infallibility which is entirely in 
keeping with the dichotomous choice model. In much the same way as the binary logit model 
is seen as a special case of the multinomial logit model, the model of CJT under dichotomous 
choice is arguably best seen as a special case of the more general multichotomous CJT model. 
However in Goodin and List, as in CJT in its simplest form, no consideration of rationality is 
examined. 
27This example could also apply to any group or committee faced with choosing between two 
alternatives. 
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Juom ... IENTAL ACCURACY AS A FUNCTION OF INCREASING JURY SIZE UNDER CJT 
(1986)]: 
(2.2) 
Fro1n a n1athematical perspective, (2.2) is just an application of the Binonlial dis-
tribution.28 Assigning a value of p = 0.7 CHART 2.1 confinllS that PJ is monoton-
ically increasing in J and linlJ-oo PJ = 1. Specifically, for J = 31 members 
P31 > 0.99. The probability that at least half of all jury n1en1bers votes makes the 
correct decision, PJ, is greater than the probability of any jury n1en1ber n1aking the 
correct decision in isolation p. For all other values of p ¢:. [0, 0.5) his property does 
not hold. For p E [0, 0.5), PJ is n1onotonically decreases in J and limJ-oo PJ = 0. 
F\1rther, if p = 0.5, PJ = 0.5 V J. CHART 2.1 plots results for p = 0.3 and 0.5. 
N u1nerous criticisnlS can be levelled at the version of CJT outlined above. A 
practical in1plication of CJT is that it is desirable to expand the size of, for in-
stance, a n1onetary policy conu1littee indefinitely, a clearly dubious finding. This 
28 In developing CJT, McLennan (1998) describes Condorcet as having presented a precursor 
to the law of large numbers, demonstrating how 
" ... decisions made under majority rule are asymptotically perfect as the popu-
lation of voters becomes large." p.413 (emphasis added) 
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would in1ply that at 18 members, the ECB Governing Council is not large enough. 
Secondly, ignored by CJT is the fact that quite often interdependencies between 
men1bers of a conunittee exist. Minutes from n1eetings of the Bank of England 
Monetary Policy Conm1ittee, the US FOMC and the Bank of Japan MPC clearly 
show that its men1bers share inforn1ation and deliberate. In light of this, the as-
sun1ption that committee members vote independently of one another is unrealistic, 
as pointed out by Lahda (1995): 
" .. .independence requires that jurors do not confer with each other, remain 
in1mune to opinion leaders, lack sin1ilar experiences or training, and share 
no common infonuation." 29 
Votes will thus be correlated because in practice n1en1bers of a conunittee or group 
invariably comn1unicate with each other, are influenced by different ideas and 
opinions and share conunon information. For exan1ple, the policy preferences 
of two econonusts on an MPC who share very distinct views about the way the 
econon1y works may also hold very different views about the appropriate policy 
stance. However, Lahda finds that even when the independence assumption is 
relaxed, CJT still holds, a result which reinforces CJT. Sinlilar findings are also 
presented in Lahda (1992, 1993) and Berg (1993). Monetary policy corrunittees 
are often justified on the premise that commuinication between MPC n1en1bers and 
the associated pooling of inforn1ation associated with it leads to fewer n1istakes, 
son1ething which CJT completely neglects: yet the central result of CJT that 
groups n1ake better decisions than individuals has no basis in this presun1ption. 
Further, the n1odel of CJT presented here assun1es men1bers' signals are obtained 
at no cost: indeed, when inforn1ation acquisition is costly, son1e n1en1bers n1ay 
free-ride on the signals of others. This prospect is considered by Mukhopadhaya 
(2003) and Persico (2004), and discussed in the strategic literature. Both authors 
show that under costly inforn1ation acquisition, CJT does not hold. Finally, the 
most far-reaching and dan1aging criticisn1 en1a.nates from Austen-Smith and Banks 
(1996), who shed light on the sincere voting assun1ption implicit to CJT. Sincere 
voting says that n1embers of a group vote in exactly the same way to how they 
would in isolation, an assumption which is invalidated under most conditions once 
decision n1aking is modelled as a gan1e between rational players. Again, this point 
is discussed further in the strategic literature. 
29 Lahda (1995), p.354. 
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2.3.2 Consensus Formation and Markovian Updating 
One strand of literattu·e which nlight be applied to account for conm1unication and 
deliberation an1ongst MPC n1embers, but which is rarely mentioned is the work on 
consensus formation in groups associated with Morris DeGroot (1974).30 •31 I sug-
gest this literature is of some relevance to the formulation of monetary policy by 
committee, even though previous contributions have not to the best knowledge of 
the author exploited it to that end. Using the theory of Markov chains, DeGroot 
(henceforth DG) specifies the conditions under which consensus can be reached 
by n1en1bers of a group of individuals.32 Specifically, agents of a group or network 
update their beliefs in successive periods, using a procedure which I hereafter refer 
to as Markovian Updating (MU). Although originally envisaged as a mechanism 
for pooling individuals' subjective probability distributions, DG's n1odel is also ap-
plicable to situations where opinions are represented by point estin1ates. Here, 
the preferred interest-rate of a n1ember of a n1onetary policy co1nmittee can be 
construed as falling into this class of estimate. As the process which individuals 
use to update their beliefs is formally modelled and applied to a monetary policy 
con1mittee in Chapter 4, only the general features of the n1odel are described here. 
The theory of Markov chains lies at the heart of the DG approach. Each 
member of the group is assumed to (i) identify a subjective probability distribu-
tion for the value of some paran1eter, B, the value of which is unknown and ( ii) 
weight the opinions of all other group members, including herself. For a group 
of j = 1, 2, .... , J members, let Fj be the subjective probability distribution for 
n1ember j associated with her appraisal of e and by F[t) a J x 1 vector contain-
ing the subjective distributions corresponding to each group n1en1ber in period 
t = 1, 2, ... oo. Further, denote PJ,k as the weight placed on n1ember k's opinion 
by the lh men1ber. For each n1en1ber the sun1 of weights equals one such that 
J 
l:Pj,k = 1, PJ,k E (0, 1) (2.3) 
j=l 
Men1bers' weightings are then assigned to a j x j n1atrix P, where the elen1ent in 
30 A precursor to the work of DeGroot is found in the mathematical sociology literature on 
social networks, starting with French (1956). 
31 Recall that in the section on Surveys of Monetary Policy Committees how Fry et al 
(2000) find that most committees arrive at a decision through reaching a consensus. 
32 A highly readable introduction to the theory of Markov chains is found in Searle and Haus-
man (1970), Chapter. 8. 
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the lh row and kth colunm captures the weight placed on men1ber k's opinion by 
men1ber j. In other words, any given row contains a n1en1ber's weightings of the 
opinions of her peers. A shortconling, however, is that it provides a son1ewhat ad 
hoc approach to con1nlittee decision n1aking, lacking tractable microfoundations 
in as far as the allocation of opinion weights is ptu·ely arbitrary. However, in the 
language of Markov chains, P has all the characteristics of a transition matrix, as 
the elen1ents in each row are non-negative and sum to unity. DG then assun1es 
that starting from an initial period t = 0, n1embers revise their distributions in 
subsequent discrete deliberative rounds. In the first round of deliberation, nlenl-
bers' revised distributions are determined by the vector PF[o) =Fl11. In the second, 
third and nth deliberative rounds, revised distributions are given by PFl11 =Fl21, 
PFl21 =F[3) and PF[n-1) =F[n] respectively, noting here that PF[n-11 =F[n} n1ay also 
be expressed as pnF=F[nJ. Each consecutive deliberative round is characterised 
by n1en1bers revising their subjective distributions, a process which continues until 
all distributions F j in the vector F[t) converge to a unique limiting subjective dis-
tribution. Once this occurs, a consensus is said to have been reached. Essentially, 
in each deliberative round, all information is treated as new. 33 DG argues that in 
order for a consensus to be achieved, the n1atrix P n1ust have particular properties. 
By DG Theorem 2, it is clain1ed that if all the recurrent states of the Markov chain 
communicate with each other and are aperiodic, a consensus is reached. Alter-
natively, if two states of the chain consist of two disjoint sets of communicating 
states, or the states are periodic, a consensus is not reached.34 These conditions, 
it is attested, are both necessary and sufficient for a consensus to be reached. 
In a later paper, Berger (1981) shows that DG's conditions for reaching a 
consensus are sufficient, but not necessary. Berger demonstrates how within De-
Groot's fran1ework, whether consensus is reachable depends not only on P, but 
Fl01. For instance, if n1e1nbers' subjective probability distributions are identical 
from the outset, a consensus is reached irrespective of the properties of matrix P. 
Like DeGroot, Berger applies standard results frmn the theory of Markov chains 
in providing the necessary and sufficient conditions for consensus to be reached. 
His paper outlines how to check these conditions, and he shows how it is possible 
33It is noted here that although DG draws on the theory of Mm·kov chains, the iterative process 
underlying the dynamics of the model does not strictly follow a Mm·kov chain. Tllis is because 
when iterating the process, the matrix P capturing members' weights is post-multiplied by the 
vector F of members subjective assessments, as opposed to being pre-multiplied by a distribution. 
See for example the social mobility literature, such as Aebi et al (2003) and Theil (1972), Chapter 
5. 
34 Degroot (1974), p.l20. 
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to reach a consensus when the matrix P contains disjoint states of comn1unicating 
and periodic classes. 
Lehrer and Wagner (1981) are also notable for providing a formal model of con-
sensus which is virtually identical to DeGroot. More recently, Collignon (2001), 
Neilson and Winter (2003) and DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zweibel (2003) have redis-
covered this strand of literature. Collignon (2001) uses the model of Lehrer and 
Wagner (1981) to analyse the forn1ulation of collective policy preferences over a 
con1bination of n1onetary and fiscal policy in a European Monetary Union. Neil-
son and Winter (2003) construct a model of Jury deliberation with a theoretical 
basis in DeGroot. According to the authors, the focus on deliberation is particu-
larly apposite as in any jury trial 'it is the last task jurors face before a verdict is 
reached'. 35 
In many ways extending the work of DeGroot (1974), DeMarzo, Vayanos and 
Zweibel (2003)- hereafter DVZ- construct a n1odel where individuals' opinions are 
subject to persuasion bias. DVZ make explicit the fact that theirs is a 'boundedly-
rational' model of agency- in their set-up, individual belief formation is assun1ed 
not to follow martingales, unlike models which asstm1e full rationality. Previous 
work, such as DG does not explicitly recognise this, even though in their model 
group members fail to adjust for repetitions of inforn1ation at each round of the 
deliberation process, treating all inforn1ation as new. To illustrate the concept 
of martingales, consider the following example. Suppose that at the beginning of 
an MPC n1eeting, all n1embers exchange their views. Denote by W j,t n1ember j' s 
inforn1ation set at date t based on the exchange of inforn1ation in period t, and 
by Xj,t n1ember j's beliefs corresponding to the appropriate policy stance based on 
wj,t· More forn1ally, write that 
Xj,o = Pr(lnterest rate i 0 is best!Wo,j) (2.4) 
Assunling in subsequent periods that men1bers contribute no new inforn1ation, by 
the law of iterative expectations, E(xj,11Wj,1) = Xj,O· Expressed differently, the 
expected impact on member j 's policy stance of listening to n1embers in subsequent 
periods is zero. 
Applied to a n1onetary policy committee, persuasion bias says that in n1uch 
35 Neilson and Winter (2003), p.l. 
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that san1e way that newspapers sway readers toward their views over time - even 
when the political affiliation of a newspaper is con1mon knowledge - some members 
of a n1onetary policy con1mittee sway other 1nembers to their views, even when all 
men1ber's views are commonly known. Put another way, when trying to reach a 
decision on an issue, individuals are lmable to adjust for repetitions of information 
they receive, as is the case in DG - although DVZ go n1uch further than DG in 
justifying why this occurs. 
DVZ suppose that individuals are often n1embers of deeply intertwined social 
networks or groups. Consider two individuals, A and B, who discuss an issue 
an1ongst thmnselves having previously been independently influenced by another 
individual C. During the course of their discussions, if A fails to account for the 
fact that B also sought advice fron1 C, A is effectively double-counting the infornla-
tion given by C. Thus when listening to B, the problen1 facing A is adjust for any 
repetition of inforn1ation by disentangling B' s opinion fron1 that of C. Likewise, 
B is confronted with a sinular problen1 when listening to A. DVZ suppose that 
the situation confronting A and B constitutes a con1plex inference problen1, par-
ticularly when con1munication between A and B takes place over n1ultiple rounds. 
More generally, this problen1 will proliferate as the size, structure and con1plexity 
of the social network or group increases. Thus under persuasion bias, the demands 
associated with processing all inforn1ation is assun1ed to be computationally bur-
densonle to the extent that individuals con1prising the group resort to a simple 
'boundedly rational' heuristic to tackle a given inference problen1. Agents are 
consequently unable to adjust for repetitions of inforn1ation, and all inforn1ation 
is treated as new. Such failure to adjust, it is argued, can particularly account for 
'the effectiveness of airtin1e, propaganda, censorship, political spin, [and] n1arket-
ing'.36 
Persuasion bias entails two further phenon1ena: social influence and unidimen-
sional opinions. Social influence is the degree to which the opinions of n1embers of 
a group are a function of not only the accuracy of a n1en1ber's signal regarding an 
issue, but the extent to which one is connected within a social network, the latter 
construct being an area which has received considerable attention in recent years. 37 
By unidimensional opinions it is supposed that for any given n1ultidimensional is-
sue set, individuals' opinions are characterised by a unitary "left-right" spectrun1. 
36 DeN!arzo et al (2003), p.948. 
37 See for example Wasserman et al's (1994) text on social network analysis. 
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In tern1S of the forn1al model, DVZ construct a setting where a finite number of 
individuals n1ust estimate an unlmown para1neter B E JRL, where each dimension 
in JRL can be construed as a different issue. Assume that individual i's estimate 
of parameter e is given by the noisy signal 
(2.5) 
Individual j is assigned initial precision 1r?i by individual i, precision which applies 
to all con1ponents of j's error term, nan1ely 
0 [ ]-1 1rij = vari Ejl , l = 1, ..... ,£. (2.6) 
In other words, the greater the variance associated with j 's inforn1ation, the 
s1naller the associated precision. Now introduce qi,j which is a binary variable 
where 
{ 
1, 
qi,j = 0, 
if i listens to j; 
if i does not listen to j. (2.7) 
Information pertaining to individuals' initial signals is then communicated to each 
other through a social network, and men1bers update their views in contiguous 
deliberative rounds. Unlike DG, the weight which members of a conmlittee place 
on the opinions of others is deternlined by n1embers' precisions, and the precision 
assigned to another n1en1ber's information is a men1bers subjective assessn1ent. 
More forn1ally, for an1n n1en1ber group, the weight given by a n1ember c to the in-
m 
forn1ation of a n1ember k is given by ｱ｣ＬｫＱｲｾＬｫＯ＠ 2::: ｱ｣ＬｪＱｦｾＬｪﾷ＠ The sum of these weights 
j=l 
is necessarily one, and in line with in DG, these weightings are then assigned to 
m 
an 1n x m n1atrix T, where the weighting qc,k ＱｲｾＬｫ＠ / 2:::: ｱ｣ＬｪＱｦｾＬｪ＠ corresponds to the 
j=l 
elen1ent in the cth row and kth colunu1. Matrix T thus has the characteristics of 
a transition n1atrix, the elen1ents in each row being non-negative and sunm1ing to 
unity. Updating occurs through applying the updating rule 
(2.8) 
where xt is a matrix whose ith row is the vector ｸｾ＠ of agent i's beliefs in connnu-
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nication round t. This is generalizable to the following expression: 
(2.9) 
The process defined in (2.8) is then repeated over n1tlltiple communication rounds, 
with agents treating the inforn1ation in each round as new and independent. How-
ever, unlike previous n1odels of MU, DVZ allow agents to increase the weight given 
to their own beliefs over subsequent rounds of con1n1unication via the innovation 
At E (0, 1] (2.10) 
Assuming agents are strongly connected, beliefs are shown to converge over tin1e 
to a weighted average of initial beliefs. In other words, in the lin1it, a unique con-
sensus is reached by all agents. F\1rther, if At tends to zero too quicldy, consensus 
would not be reached as agents would stop listening to each other. 38 
It is perhaps useful here to compare the approaches of DG and DVZ. Although 
sharing key similarities, both approaches differ fron1 each other in two in1portant 
respects. Firstly, DG provides no theory as to why members of a conlmittee or 
group would choose to listen to the opinions of some men1bers and not others, or 
even why views on a partictllar issue - for example, which interest-rate to set -
might be diverse. There are no theoretical underpinnings so to speak, and mem-
bers a group are assumed to listen to - or rather 'weight' - the opinions of their 
peers in purely arbitrary fashion. In this sense, DG n1erely shows how consensus 
can be deternlined within the context of a particular iterative fran1ework. Second, 
the suitability of the DG model as a process by which agents update beliefs is jus-
tified merely on its being 'intuitively appealing' and 'sin1ple. '39 No other reasons 
are explored as to why MU is preferable to n1ore robust procedures for updating 
beliefs.40 This is a crucial observation given that n1odern econonlic n1odels typ-
ically assume full rationality on the part of agents. However, in DG, n1en1bers 
of group are asstm1ed to update their beliefs without adjusting for repetitions of 
inforn1ation: agents are en1phatically not endowed with being fully rational. 
DVZ flesh out the bones of some of these criticisms, particularly with respect 
38 i.e. T reduces to an identity matrix in the limit. 
39 DeGroot (1974), p.118. 
40When DeGroot published his paper in 1974, the so-called rational expectations 'revolution' in 
economics was well underway. Indeed, the seminal paper on rational expectations was published 
by Muth almost fifteen yeru·s earlier [See Muth (1961)]. 
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to the second. Agents are assun1ed to use MU because other methods of updat-
ing beliefs are computationally too burdensome to process. With respect to the 
first criticisn1, agents choose to listen to each other on the basis of whether they 
believe others' inforn1ation is useful: the sn1aller the variance associated with an 
individual's inforn1ation, the n1ore useful it is, and the greater its consequent role 
- and thus weight - in fornling individual beliefs. 41 This innovation clearly goes 
son1e way to 'nlicro-founding' the arbitrary nature of weighting n1en1bers' opinions 
in DG. However it turns out that in DVZ, the problem of who to pay attention to 
attention to is still arbitrarily detern1ined, and co1npared to DG, merely relocated. 
Yet this problen1 is perhaps not as problematic as it appears. In social life, people 
n1ay hold that only the views of son1e people are worth listening to. An excellent 
exan1ple of tllis is provided by DeMarzo at al (1999) , asserting that: 
" .... the econon1ist may disn1iss as out of hand the n1arket analyst who begins 
his argun1ent with chartist notions, whilst the chartist might in turn dis-
miss the views of anyone subscribing to "crazy" academic notions of market 
efficiency." 42 
Sinlilar argun1ents n1ay conceivably apply to men1bers of a monetary policy con1-
n1ittees with very different views on how the econon1y works. I now turn to 
theoretical literature which examines the forn1ulation of n1onetary policy by conl-
mittee. 
2.4 Monetary Policy Formulation by Members 
of a Committee 
I now turn to studies which specifically n1odel monetary policy forn1ulation as a 
game or a process between n1en1bers of a conm1ittee or group. Relatively few 
contributions to the theoretical literature explicitly consider the forn1ulation of 
n1onetary policy by conm1ittee, especially considering the predonlinance of MPCs 
as vehicles for setting policy in the real world. 43 However, the study of n1onetary 
41 A more comprehensive formal description of the model is provided in Chapter 4. 
42 DeMarzo at al (1999), p.4. 
43 Perhaps more surprising is that the pioneers of the monetary policy games literature - leading 
US based academic economists- instigated a research programme which pays scant attention to 
the reality of domestic policy making. Since 1913, US monetary policy has been delegated to 
the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC). Voting records of FO:tviC meetings clearly reveal 
that in terms of its composition, its members share differing tastes over inflation and output - the 
FOMC is emphatically not the 'single individual maximizing a well defined preference function' 
Blinder (1998) refers to. 
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policy con1n1ittees is now fast becoming a fertile research area. Some of the papers 
reviewed here build on the monetary policy games literature, particularly Sibert 
(2004) and Mihov and Sibert (2004).44 Yet not all approaches use an underlying 
theoretical framework with a basis in the n1onetary policy games literature. These 
'alternative' approaches are exemplified in contributions by Cothren (1988), Waller 
(2000) and Gerlach-I(risten (2004). I turn first to the contributions with a clear 
basis in the n1onetary policy gan1es literature. 
44Whilst recognising that decision making is determined by committee, many recent papers 
which have sought to analyse policy making by the ECB do not explicitly model the formulation 
of policy as a game or process between the members of a committee or group. This occurs 
even when it is explicitly acknowledged that policy does not fall under the aegis of a unitary 
agent. Following Rogoff {1985), Alesina and Grilli (1992, 1993) develop a simple one-shot model 
of inflation and output stabilization to examine the incentives for a country to join a monetary 
union, in particular EMU. A particular assumption they model is the prospect that 
'In the transitional phase, before monetary union, different countries will still 
have strong national and political identities, and it is therefore likely that the 
effects of common monetary policies will also be assessed on the basis of national 
welfare and preferences.' (Alesina, A and Grilli, V. (1991): The European Central 
Bank: Reshaping Monetary Policies in Europe. In Persson, T and Tabellini, G, 
eds. (1994): Monetary and Fiscal Policy - Volume 1: Credibility, M.I.T. Press, 
p.257.) 
Effectively, policy makers sitting on the Governing Council of the ECB are assumed to care only 
about the welfare of the citizens of the country they represent. Their findings are manifold. 
Firstly, the higher a country's inflation bias, the more it has to gain from joining a currency 
union in terms of monetary policy credibility. Secondly, the greater the differences in output 
variability between a country and a monetary union the more costly it is from a stabilization 
perspective to adopt a common currency, such as the Euro. Thirdly the costs of adopting a 
common currency increase as the correlation between economic shocks for a given country and 
a currency union become smaller. Lastly, in the absence of complete political integration in 
Europe, the composition and voting rules of the ECB Governing Council may lead to decisions 
which significantly misrepresent the preferences of the European median voter, especially if 
members of the ECB Governing Council are not independent from the political persuasions of 
those who appointed them. Close attention to the institutional design of the ECB is therefore 
imperative to its success. Similarly, von Hagen and Siippel (1994) model the decision maldng 
structure at the ECB, assessing its implications for inflationary and output stabilisation. Like 
Alesina and Grilli, they argue that 
' ... policy-makers in the union may look at monetary policy from two different 
perspectives: A unified one considering union-wide aggregates of output, employ-
ment, and prices as the relevant policy targets, and a regional or national one taking 
regional or national aggregates as targets.' (von Hagen, J. and Stippel, R. (1994): 
Central Bank constitutions for federal monetru·y unions, European Economic Re-
view 38, p.774) 
More recently, Hefeker {2003) examines the optimal institutional structure for a federal central 
bank, such as the ECB. In pru-ticular, the focus is on the conditions under which individual 
regions favour a monetary union to be structured in accordance with regional or common influ-
ences, or a combination of the two. 
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2.4.1 Extensions to the Monetary Policy Games Literature 
Using a n1acroecononric fran1ework with a basis in Barra and Gordon (1983a) and 
Backus and Driffill (1985), Sibert (2003) constructs a dynan1ic n1odel of reputation 
building when n1onetary policy is n1ade by a two n1ember con1nlittee. Members 
serve two-period overlapping terms, and a policy-maker's type is her own private 
inforn1ation. The n1odel analyses how son1e of the institutional features of central 
banks influence incentives to maintain a reputation, inflation and welfare. In1plicit 
to the n1odel is the assumption that unanticipated inflation provides a welfare gain 
- this is because assunling nonrinal wage contracts, real wages fall and en1ployment 
rises. All players are endowed with rational expectations, and the private sector 
updates its beliefs using Bayes' rule. Societal welfare is given by 
1 2 e 
--'lr + 'lrt- 7r 2 t t (2.11) 
where 7rt denotes period t inflation and Ｑｲｾ＠ is the public's expectation of period t 
inflation. The social welfare function is comn1on lmowledge, and the public lmow 
that a policymalmr n1ay be one of two types, hawks and doves. 45 Hawks are as-
sumed to care only for inflation, whereas doves wish to maxinlize societal welfare 
given in (2.11). For any given meeting, the senior policy n1aker always votes for 
her preferred level of inflation: hawks vote for zero inflation whereas doves for 
1r = 1. When votes are not in accord with each other - that is, when the junior 
policy maker disagrees with her senior- the chosen rate of inflation is assun1ed to 
be an exogenous compromise rate of 0 < 1r < 1. Essentially, the task facing the 
public is to deternline the policy-n1akers' types: however, because a policymaker's 
type is her private inforn1ation, doves n1ay behave as hawks in a ploy to build a 
reputation for inflationary toughness. 
Sibert firstly exanlines the incentives of opportunistic policy n1akers to build a 
reputation when they are n1en1bers of a conm1ittee, as opposed to setting policy 
unitarily. As a men1ber of a group, a policy n1aker has less influence in setting 
policy than if setting policy alone, and ceteris paribus, both the associated current 
benefit from voting to inflate the econonzy and the cost of her reputational loss 
are less. If the weight society places on the future is not overly high, it is optimal 
for MPC me1nbers to engage in building a reputation. However, the opposite 
holds when society cares sufficiently about the future and reputation building is 
'
15 The terminology is analogous to the distinction between hard-noses and wets in Backus and 
Driffill ( 1985). 
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not difficult. When n1embers disagree and the rate of con1promise inflation is 
such that a dissenting opportunistic policy maker achieves half her welfare gain 
from inflation, the expected welfare associated with con1n1ittees is higher. This 
is because con1pronlise causes inflation to be smoother and welfare is concave in 
inflation. Comnlittees thus produce sn1oother inflation paths than single policy 
1nakers. 
The second part of the paper focusses on the incentives for a dove to engage 
in reputation building when votes are published (i) in1mediately after voting has 
taken place and (ii) with a lag. When votes are published with a lag the incentive 
for an opportunistic policy n1aker to vote against inflation lessens, which decreases 
expected welfare. With a lag, the actions of previous conm1ittee n1en1bers has a 
marked effect on an opportunistic policy maker's propensity to vote against in-
flation. If a previous junior policy maker voted for inflation, this increases the 
likelihood of a subsequent junior of the san1e type voting against inflation. Fur-
ther, opportunistic policy makes always vote to inflate if the period following a 
vote against inflation by an opportunistic policy maker. 
A third part of the paper exanlines the effects of apportioning senior policy 
makers n1ore influence in setting compron1ise inflation than juniors. This is found 
to have the effect of reducing expected inflation. Junior policy n1akers are n1ore 
incentivised to engage in reputation building, as their vote will be n1ore in1portant 
in the subsequent period. Indeed, because the vote of a junior opportunistic policy 
maker receives less weighting, the cost of voting for zero inflation is also less, with 
a higher future expected gain in welfare. Placing more weight on the senior 
policy n1aker is found to increase expected welfare as long as juniors so1netime 
vote to inflate. Sin1ilar findings are also reported in Mihov and Sibert (2002), 
who develop a dynan1ic model of reputation building when n1onetary policy is set 
by a two n1ember comnlittee. 
2.4.2 Alternative Approaches to Decision Making by a Mon-
etary Policy Committee 
In Cothren (1988) n1onetary policy is n1odelled as gan1e between players of an 
MPC. Policy is deternlined by n1ajority rule in a comn1ittee of n > 1 odd nlem-
bers, each serving for n period tern1s. No two agents serve coincident tern1S. The 
results are similar to Barra and Gordon (1983a), even though policy is set by 
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finitely lived agents and wage setters do not feattu·e as gan1e participants. Build-
ing on Alesina (1987), Waller (2000) examines the extent to which a policy board 
n1agnifies or lessens policy uncertainty in a model where political parties n1ust bar-
gain over who to appoint to a monetary policy con1n1ittee. Sin1ulations indicate 
that delegating n1onetary policy to an independent yet accountable policy board 
results in n1ore stable and predictable monetary policy than would be produced by 
elected leaders.46 Faust (1996) shows how the historical developn1ent of the US 
Federal Reserve and present structure of the FOMC arises 'naturally' in a n1on-
etary econmny. This is achieved using an OLG framework with heterogeneous 
agency, a device which n1akes the identification of winners and losers fron1 sur-
prise inflation possible. Monetary growth is chosen by majority will. Policy is 
shown to not always result in excessive inflation, a result in line with results from 
the tin1e-consistency literature [Barro and Gordon (1983a), l(ydland and Prescott 
(1977)], even though the fran1ework is son1ewhat different. 
Meade and Stasavage (2004) n1odel the benefits of transparency in MPC deci-
sion making. Specifically, they investigate whether publishing detailed records of 
deliberations make 1nen1bers of a n1onetary policy cormnittee more disinclined to 
cast dissenting votes. Drawing on literature which n1odels the behaviour of group 
members when career concerns are present, their set-up contrasts the incentives of 
MPC mmnbers to dissent when deliberations occur in public and private settings. 
Meade and Stasavage model a three n1ember MPC faced with a binary choice, 
con1parable to the decision to raise interest rates or leave then1 unchanged. Each 
n1ember receives an informative private signal about the state of the econon1y, 
n1eaning that the co1nmittee is more likely to n1ake a correct policy decision when 
1nembers accurately reveal their information. 
Berk and Bierut (2003) address the in1plications for interest-rate setting when 
a subset of n1en1bers of a n1onetary policy conmlittee n1eet prior to a meeting and 
are able to reach an agreen1ent before voting takes place. In their analysis, con1-
nlittee size, voting rules and skill levels of co1nn1ittee me1nbers are all allowed to 
vary. Con1mittee size is detern1ined to be far less in1portant than the skill levels 
of n1en1bers in producing interest-rate inertia. Indeed, interest-rate setting by 
con1mittee is not necessarily more likely halln1arked by policy inertia, as recently 
suggested by Blinder (1998). Member's skill levels, however, are determined to 
be critical determinants of quality of decisions. 
46Waller (2000), p.306. 
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Gerlach-I(risten (2002) appeals to techniques used in Bayesian estimation to 
assess the benefits of deliberation an1ongst members of a monetary policy conl-
mittee. Using a reduced fonn backward looking Phillips curve and IS relation 
to describe the economy47 she finds that monetary policy con1mittees help reduce 
the uncertainty surrounding n1onetary policy decisions. Ultimately, the reduc-
tion in uncertainty leads the n1onetary authorities to respond more aggressively 
to changes in the rate of inflation. Specifically, the economy is described by the 
relation 
(2.12) 
where 'If denotes inflation, t is a tin1e suffix, T is the real interest-rate and e is a 
norn1ally distributed stochastic error. Uncertainty is modelled by allowing the 
coefficient at to vary randomly fron1 period to period, so the effect on n1onetary 
policy is not uniform. As at is not directly observable, the first two moments of the 
parameter are estimated by the single policy-n1aker as at = N(J.L1, af). Gerlach-
Kristen shows that the single policy-maker's reaction to inflation is contingent on 
their assessment of J.L1 and ｵｾＮ＠ As ｵｾ＠ increases so too does uncertainty. The 
greater the value of ui the less aggressively n1onetary policy reacts to inflation. 
In a n1onetary policy committee if ( i) n1en1bers con1municate their uncertainty 
to each other through revealing the n1oments of their distributions over at and 
( ii) Bayesian updating is used to aggregate 1nen1bers' views,48 the uncertainty 
surrounding the policy decision lessens, and monetary policy is shown to react less 
aggressively to inflation. I now turn to the jury-games literature. 
2.5 Jury Games Literature 
The literature on jury gan1es owes 1nuch to an in1portant paper by Austen-Sn1ith 
and Banks (1996), which re-exanlines CJT fron1 a gan1e-theoretic perspective. 
They cogently argue that when n1embers' preferences are outcon1e orientated, ra-
tional members of a jury or comnlittee would not necessarily vote the same way in 
isolation as they would in a group. The fran1ework developed by Austen-S1nith and 
Banks (hereafter ASB) is a very general one, which serves as the starting point 
for a nun1ber of subsequent papers (see Wit (1998), Feddersen and Pesendorfer 
(1996), McLennan (1998), Coughlan (2000), Dharn1alala and McAdanlS (2001), 
47The model is based on Martin and Salmon (1999). 
'
18The concepts discussed here are found in Maybeck, P. 8. (1979), Ch. 1, and Griffiths et al 
(1993), Ch.24. 
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Mukhopadhaya (2004) and Persico (2004)]. ASB define three different types of 
voting: 
1. Sincere voting: each individual j votes in the same way, irrespective of 
whether she is acting alone or a men1ber of a group. 
2. Informative voting: each individual j votes solely on the basis of a signal 
which is her own private inforn1ation. 
3. Rational voting: Given the voting strategy of everyone else, individuals vote 
to n1aximize their expected payoffs. Each individual j 's voting rule effec-
tively con1prises a Nash equilibriun1. 49 
Using the distinctions listed above, ASB draw attention to the fact that for Con-
dorcet's argument to hold requires that sincere voting is a Nash Equilibrium of a 
voting game under majority rule. Start with the fran1ework used previously to 
describe naive CJT. A jury of J individuals denoted j = {1, 2, ... , J} is asked to 
choose between the guilt and innocence of a defendant at a trial. j is assumed 
to be an odd number, and the set of alternatives is characterized by <I> = { G, I}. 
G denotes Guilty and I denotes Innocent. Each n1en1ber j n1ust vote to either 
acquit (A) or convict (C) the defendant, a decision which is n1ade on the basis 
of a private signal, aj (acquit) or Cj (convict), where Pr( Cj I G) = Pa E ( ｾＬ＠ 1) and 
Pr(aiii) =PIE ＨｾＬ＠ 1). On the basis of their respective signals, jurors cast their 
votes simultaneously, and the alternative which receives at least half of the the 
votes - h 2:: Jti - is adopted. It is also assumed that the prior probability of a 
defendant being guilty or innocent is given by Pr( G) = Pr( I) = 1r = ｾＮ＠ Further, 
all n1en1bers of the conm1ittee are asstm1ed to share identical preferences, nan1ely, 
they all want to make the correct decision. This entails that all committee n1en1-
bers prefer to choose A when I is true and choose C when G is true.50 Players' 
49 Similarly, for a monetary policy committee, the past behavior of the economy may lead to 
the prior belief amongst MPC members that the need to raise, loosen or leave interest rates 
unchanged is equiprobable. 
50 This assumption is not a straightforward as it seems. Certainly, it is hard to thinlc of 
circumstances any juror would choose to acquit when all of the evidence suggested a person 
was guilty. Voting guilty perhaps obviously constitutes the 'correct' decision in this context. 
However, in other situations defining the 'correct' decision is not so clear-cut. Dharmapala 
and McAdams (2001) consider a legislature where all members would chooose to ban smoking 
if it was shown to be harmful. Yet although smoking has been shown to be harmful, many 
people hold the view that it should not be banned, as individuals should be permitted to make 
an informed decision. It is noted that the negative externalities associated with smoking -
particularly inhaling second-hand smoke- make this argument increasingly harder to justify. 
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utility is outcon1e oriented, so that for each individual j E {1, 2, ... , J}, 
Uj(C, G) 
Uj(A, G) 
Uj(A, I)= 1 
- Uj(C,I) = 0 
and 
(2.13) 
Using Bayes' rule,51 individuals update their probabilities that a given state is 
true, which is captured by 
In1plying that 
Pr(G!c·) = 1fPa 1 1fPG + (1 -7r)(1- PI) 
Pr(J!ci) = (1- 7r)(1- PI) 
1fPG + (1- 7r)(1- PI) 
Pr(Gia ·) = (1- 1r)PI 
3 1r(1- Pa) + (1 -1f)PI 
Pr(Jjaj) = 1T'(1- Pa) 
1r(1- Pa) + (1- 7r)PI 
(2.14) 
(2.15) 
(2.16) 
(2.17) 
51 Bayes' rule shows how agents update prior beliefs in the light of new information. An agent's 
subjective expectation can be modelled as the conditional statistical expectation 
P(AIB)P(B) = P(BIA)P(A) 
which can be manipulated to yield 
or 
For the more general case we have 
where 
P(A) = P(AjB)P(B) 
P(BjA) 
P(AjB) = P(A n B) 
P(B) 
P(B!At)P(At) + P(BIA2)P(A2) + ... + P(BIAn)P(An) = P(B) 
or more succinctly 
n L P(BIAi)P(Ai) = P(B) 
i=l 
38 
Using this basic framework, ASB proceed to define the conditions 1mder which it 
is rational to vote sincerely, inforn1atively or both. Given the framework outlined 
above, for certain parameter values, the jury theorem as originally articulated by 
Condorcet emerges as a special case of ASB's general fran1ework, where it is shown 
that rational voting is not only sincere, but informative too. This occurs where 
( i) majority voting is the optimal method of aggregating members' private signals 
and ( ii) where 
PG 'If 1- PG 
-->-->---
1- PI 1- 'If PI 
(2.20) 
Setting Pr(ciiG) = PG = Pr(ajii) =PI = p, and assun1ing both states G and I 
are equally likely, (2.20) becon1es 
_P_ > 1 > 1-p 1-p p (2.21) 
When (2.21) is not 1net, sincere voting under majority voting is not rational. It 
does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. This leads then1 to conclude that 
"A satisfactory rational choice foundation for the clain1 that majorities 
invariable do better than individuals has yet to be derived" 52 
When all other men1bers of a con1mittee vote sincerely, ASB den1onstrate that any 
one individual has an incentive to vote against the advice of her private informa-
tion. Even when n1en1bers share comn1on goals, individuals are incentivised to 
vote strategically because their vote only malces a difference when ( i) it is pivotal 
and ( ii) the information contained in other n1en1bers' private signals is relevant to 
her decision. In ascertaining whether to vote 0 or A, each individual j is only 
concerned whether she is pivotal, in the sense that her vote is the decisive factor 
in deternlining the choice of the group as a whole. Such a structure is responsible 
for endogenously generating heterogeneous policy preferences an1ongst 1nen1bers. 
Subsequent papers have elaborated on the results in ASB. Wit (1998) argues 
that ASB neglect mixed-strategy equilibria, den1onstrating that the results of naive 
CJT are sustainable in equilibrhm1. To quote Wit, 
" ... a rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably 
'do better than individuals' is derived for the Austen-Sn1ith and Banks 
model." 53 
52p.34. 
53p.365. 
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Although the mixed-strategy game is characterised by multiple equilibria, it is 
possible to select a unique equilibrium for each parameter vector, by for instance, 
elin1inating weakly dominated strategies. The en1erging equilibria reinforce Con-
dorcet 's original conjecture that groups perform better than individuals. McLen-
nan (1998) is a generalization of Wit. He shows that when sincere voting results 
in the probability of a group making the correct decision n1onotonically converg-
ing to one as n tends to. infinity, such outcon1es are supported by Nash equilibria. 
In an hnportant paper, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) compare the implica-
tions of strategic voting for jurors under different decision rules. Contrary to 
the conventional wisdom, they find .that under unanimity rule, the probability of 
an n men1ber jury convicting an innocent defendant n1onotonically increases in 
n. For this reason, it constitutes an 'exceptionally bad rule'54 . This result is in 
stark contrast with the results for non-unanimous rules, including simple n1ajority 
rule. Consequently, if mistrials are to be avoided, then the requiren1ent that a 
unanimous decision be reached by jurors in trials should be dropped. Coughlan 
(2000) extends the set-up in Feddersen and Pesendorfer by considering real-world 
features of jury trials, and allows for ( i) the prospect of n1istrial and ( ii) comnlu-
nication amongst jurors. When either of these features is incorporated into the 
set-up, it no longer obtains that unanin1ous verdicts are inferior to those of the 
non-unanimous variety. 
Further extensions to the ASB framework have also been developed. Mukhopad-
haya (2003) and Persico (2004) both construct n1odels where costly huormation 
acquisition results in son1e jury members free-riding on the signals of others. This 
is in sharp contrast to ASB and previous contributions cited herein, all which as-
sume that men1bers' signals are obtained at no cost. Mukhopadhaya (hereafter 
M) retains the ASB framework, but restricts attention to the case where sincere 
and informative voting is rational. 55 Decision outcomes are shown to be function 
of the an1ount of effort put into the decisions by individual men1bers, the gan1e 
being of the 'contribution' variety proposed by Rasn1usen ( 2001). As a public 
good, costly information acquisition is under-supplied. Consequently, for given 
parameter configurations, an increasing jury size is associated with less accurate 
decisions. This generally occurs both in the presence of perfect and hnperfect 
signals.56 Persico (2004) focuses on the design of voting rules, with a view to 
54 Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), p.23. 
55 Refer to equation (2.20). 
56 i.e. when Pr(cjiG) = Pa = Pr(ajii) =PI= 1. 
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determining optimal committee design. A well designed conunittee it is argued, 
provides ( i) a good incentive for individual n1en1bers to pay attention to the ev-
idence upon which any decision is to be based and ( ii) facilitates the efficient 
gathering of information by comnlittee members. Persico shows the propensity 
for a con1nlittee to meet such criteria is a function of conmlittee size and the re-
spective voting rule en1ployed by the conm1ittee. For any given committee size 
n, voting rules which require larger pluralities to reach a decision are optin1al if 
and only if men1bers' private signals are sufficiently accurate. Consider the case 
of unanimity rule -construe this as a special case of where the size of a plurality 
required to overturn a decision is as large as the committee itself, n. The noisier 
n1en1bers' private signals, the less certainty surrounding the which alternative is 
correct. In ttu·n, this decreases the likelihood that any n1en1ber j will have a 
bearing on the outcon1e. Under unanimity, this occurs only when n - 1 men1bers 
have the san1e signal. Consequently, n1embers are less likely to invest in attaining 
information due to the expectation that their vote will not in1pact on the group 
decision. This finding is not dependent on the cost of information and other 
preferences. In ternlS of committee size, Persico n1akes n1uch the san1e point as 
M: if n1en1bers' incentives for acquiring inforn1ation decrease with an increasing 
committee size, there is an argt1n1ent for keeping committee sizes sn1all. 
However, the gan1e-theoretic literature on cormnittee decision n1aking suffers 
from the same criticisms that can be levelled at na1ve CJT. In relation to n1onetary 
policy, Gerling et al (2003) attest that much of the literature does 
" ... not seem to perfectly relate to the institutional set-up which governs 
. actual n1onetary policy decisions. One may just think of the literature that 
studies strategic voting in a set up where there is no communication among 
con1mittee men1bers. In n1onetary policy con1mittees con1n1unication cer-
tainly plays a n1ajor role." 57 
In spite of such criticisn1s, son1e norn1ative conclusions can be drawn fron1 the jury-
games literature. In Persico and M, when information is costly to acquire, a small 
con1nlittee is preferable to a larger one. This is because it is n1ore likely to make 
a correct decision. This suggests that MPCs should not be too big. Secondly, 
unaninlity rule is not preferable as a n1eans of reaching a decision (Feddersen and 
Pesendorfer (1998), Persico (2003)), as it leads to inefficient inforn1ation aggrega-
57p.40. 
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tion, especially in the presence of a noisy signal. Majority rule is perhaps more 
optimal as decision n1echanisn1 than unanimity for an MPC. 
2.6 Evidence Based Literature 
2.6.1 Studies of Bank of England MPC voting behaviour 
Due to the BoEMPC being in its infancy, e1npirical studies of insider-outsider 
behaviour are, as one n1ight reasonably expect, uncon1mon. Breedon and Cas-
tle (2002), Budd (1999) and Matthews (1999) all address the issue of individual 
voting behaviour, but are best described as detailed conm1entaries. A notable 
exception is Gerlach-I(risten (2003, 2004). Gerlach-Kristen (2003) provides a de-
tailed breakdown of insider-outsider behaviour based on the MPC's voting record 
for the period June 1997-April 2003. Her analysis evidences significant differences 
in the dissent voting behaviour of insiders and outsiders over the sample period. 
However, although she suggests highly plausible reasons as to why insider-outsider 
behaviour n1ay differ, her analysis is brief. In a subsequent paper, Gerlach-Kristen 
(2004) shows that the voting record of the MPC can be used to predict future 
changes in n1onetary policy. Using ordered logit analysis, results are shown to be 
robust to inclusion of variables pertaining to n1arket participants' expectations of 
future interest rates. F\u'ther, publication of Minutes of MPC n1eetings is seen to 
increase the transparency of n1onetary policy, as market participants are seen to 
respond to the voting inforn1ation contained in voting record. However reaction 
functions are not estimated for insiders and outsiders separately, son1ething which 
is pursued in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
2.6.2 Studies of other Monetary Policy Committees 
There exist a considerable nun1ber of studies examining the voting behaviour of 
n1en1bers of the United States Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The 
FOMC is a much older institution than its British counterpart, and has a cor-
respondingly longer voting record. Indeed, that the FOMC voting record spans 
decades, as opposed to just over six years, n1eans that one should perhaps not 
be surprised to that such studies are relatively abundant, when compared to say, 
studies of BoEMPC voting behaviour. 58 Meade and Sheets ( 2002) categorize the 
literature on FOMC voting as falling into two distinct categories - work nloti-
58 Canterbery (1967) and Yohe (1966) are the seminal contributions. 
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vated by the 'partisan theory of politics' and work falling in the 'reaction function' 
genre.59 Belden (1989), Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990) and Gildea (1990) ex-
emplify studies which fall into the forn1er class. In Belden (1989), the record of 
dissenting votes fron1 nlinutes of FOMC meetings is analysed with a view to iden-
tifying the political and economic factors affecting dissent. Bank presidents are 
shown to dissent more often than Board men1bers, with n1embers of the Board pre-
ferring to dissent on the side of ease. Further, the level of dissent is shown to vary 
under different FOMC Chairmen and uncertainty about the econon1ic and finan-
cial results of policy actions. A key conclusion of her study is the suggestion that 
dissent behaviour is a fm1ction of the appointn1ents procedure to the FOMC: Bank 
presidents are said to dissent for tighter policy n1ore often than Board men1bers 
because the nature of the appointlnents procedure makes then1 more independent 
of central government. Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990) posit that dissent voting 
is a function of the career backgrounds and experiences of FOMC men1bers. They 
report estin1ates obtained from binary pro bit analysis which favour the hypothesis 
that FOMC n1en1bers with career experiences and backgrounds 'closer' to central 
government prefer to cast dissenting votes on the side of ease, whilst those nlem-
bers whose experiences are relatively further from of central governn1ent are n1ore 
likely to dissent on the side of tightness. Specifically, Havrilesky and Schweitzer 
(1990) estin1ated a regression of the form 
(2.22) 
where Zi is a binary variable capturing a dissenting votes on the side of ease 
[ Zi = 0] and on the side of tightness [ ZJ = 1] respectively. xj is a n1atrix of ex-
planatory variables containing inforn1ation pertaining to both the type of n1en1ber 
responsible for casting the vote and their career backgTounds and experiences. 60 
Variables to proxy for an FOMC n1ember's 'career proximity' to central govern-
nlent based on n1en1bers' career characteristics, were constructed by calculating the 
difference between the n1ean yearly experience for that characteristic for a given 
59 The 'partisan theory of politics', as exemplified by Hibbs (1977) provides support for the 
hypothesis that left wing administrations are associated with relatively higher inflation and lower 
unemployment than right wing governments. 
60 Unlike the probit model which assumes that the error term follows a standard normal dis-
tribution, for the logit model, Uj is assumed to follow a logistic distribution given by 
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meeting and the number of years experience for that individual. 61 However, two 
n1ajor criticisms can be levelled at these studies. First is the charge that macro-
economic variables are not used to explain ｩｮ､ｩｶｩ､ｵ｡ｾ＠ voting behaviour. In this 
respect, omitted variable bias is a potential cause for concern in these studies. Sec-
ond, n1any studies restrict their datasets to include dissenting votes only, thereby 
ignoring any potential extra inforn1ation embodied in non-dissenting votes. 62 •63 
which n1ay shed further light on partisan behaviour. In is worth noting here that 
analysis of the FOMC voting record shows that dissenting votes typically con1prise 
a small proportion of all votes a cast at FOMC n1eetings. For exan1ple, Meade 
and Sheets (2002) report that over the period 1978-2000, of 2403 votes cast, only 
198 were classified as dissenting in nature. This amounts to about 8% of all votes 
cast. Chappell, Havrilesky and McGregor (1993, 1995) are notable for addressing 
both of these issues, and look for evidence of partisanship by estimating reaction 
functions for FOMC members based on both n1embers' career characteristics and 
economic conditions using all votes. Their n1ethodology has the advantage of 
making use of all of the information contained in members votes, as well as en-
abling a test of partisanship based on career experiences and backgrounds whilst 
controlling for economic conditions. Chappell, Havrilesky and McGregor (1995) 
find that where partisan behaviour does arise, it is invariably attributable to the 
appointn1ents procedure, concluding that 
" ... experience in government, particularly at the Federal Reserve Board, 
is associated with significantly stronger preferences for monetary ease ... Governors, 
who are presidential appointees, are more inclined are n1ore inclined to ad-
vocate easier policies than are District Bank Presidents. Among Bank 
Presidents there is notable variation by Banks, and among Governors, there 
are systematic differences related to the partisan affiliation of the appointing 
President." 64 
Tootell (1991a,b), Meade and Sheets (2002) and Chappell and McGregor (1998) 
can be said as falling into the 'reaction ftmction' camp. Such studies n1odel 
61 More formally, Havrilesky and Schweitzer constructed the variable xh,m,t = Xh,m,t- Xm,t, 
where Xh,m is the difference in the mean value for a given career characteristic m across all 
FOMC members present at a given meeting in period t, and member h's individual value for 
characteristic m. Therefore, just as the composition of the FOMC changes through time, so to 
do the mean career characteristics of its members. 
62 i.e. votes cast in agreement with the majority at each FOMC meeting. 
63 This is a detail acknowledged by Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990). 
64 Chappell, Havrilesky and McGregor (1995), p.130. Similar conclusions are also drawn in 
Chappell, Havrilesky and McGregor (1993). 
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the voting behaviour of FOMC members a function of the economic environn1ent. 
Using a n1ultinon1iallogit framework to estimate FOMC members' reaction func-
tions, Tootell (1991b) fails to find evidence in support of the hypothesis that the 
"FOMC policy votes of Federal Reserve Bank presidents are more 'conservative' 
than those of their Board Governor cotmterparts". The log-likelihood equation 
ratio test fails to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients of bank presidents are 
identical to those of governors. In other words, the voting behaviour of Reserve 
Bank Presidents is no different to Board members. Further; in a related paper 
Tootell (1991a) also fails to find support for the hypothesis that District Bank 
presidents set policy according to regional, and not national econon1ic conditions. 
In both papers Tootell (1991a, b) uses forward looking variables in the form of 
Greenbook esthnates of GDP growth and inflation as covariates- this is "because 
monetary policy affects the econon1y only with lags, the FOMC's expectations of 
GNP growth and inflation can be used to deternune its votes." Contrary to these 
findings, Meade and Sheets (2002) find evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
District Bank presidents set monetary policy with regional econon1ic conditions in 
mind. However, their results were obtained using ordered probit as opposed to 
the multinomiallogit estimation.65 In Andersson et al (2001), the authors find 
that the voting record of men1bers of the Swedish Riksbank's Executive Board 
have a bearing on investors' expectations of future moven1ents in the repo-rate. 
In a dynanuc setting, the minority view of Executive Board members is found to 
slightly impact domestic short-tern1 interest rates, signaling that n1arkets adjust 
monetary policy expectations in line with the minority view. The n1agnitude of 
the response is deternuned to be close to estimates reported for the BoEMPC re-
ported in Gerlach-Kristen (2004). The result of selected FOMC studies are shown 
in TABLE 2.1 and TABLE 2.2. 
2. 7 Experimental Literature 
Blinder and Morgan (2000) and Lon1bardelli et al (2002) provide experimental 
support to a growing contention that delegating monetary policy to a committee 
is preferable to a single central banker: sin1ply put, groups make better decisions 
65 Allen et al (1997) employ the multinomiallogit model to estimate FOMC reaction functions 
under different Chairmen for the period 1970-1985. Results indicate that the FOMC reacted 
quite differently when setting interest rates under Arthur Burns, William Miller and Paul Volcker 
respectively. This study does not rely on the FO:fVIC voting record, instead using the decision 
made by the FOMC each period as the dependent variable. Given the relative infancy of the 
MPC, a similar study for the UK is as yet infeasible. 
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than individuals. Blinder and Morgan set out to test the old adage that 'two 
heads are better than one' and designed an experiment with the formulation of 
n1onetary policy specifically in n1ind. Students at Princeton University - all of 
whom had previously had some exposure to n1acroeconomics - were asked to play a 
monetary policy game. Subjects were presented with a computer-sin1ulated econ-
omy which was prone to randon1 shocks. Details of the underlying specifications 
on the n1odel were elusive to participants, although the probability distribution 
governing the likelihood of a stochastic shock was common knowledge. The ob-
jective of monetary policy was to stabilize the economy in the face of such shocks 
through appropriate adjustn1ents to the interest-rate. Participants were given 
responsibility for the conduct of policy ( i) acting alone and ( ii) as part of five 
men1ber comnlittee. Conunittees were found to make better decisions that in-
dividuals, but required no n1ore inforn1ation to reach them. Further, decisions 
1nade by con1nlittees took no longer than those taken by individuals. To sun1 up 
Blinder and Morgan's findings, 
"If groups n1ake better decisions and require no n1ore information to do 
so, then two heads - or in this case, five- are indeed better than one. Society 
is, in that case, wise to assign 1nany in1portant decisions, like n1onetary 
policy, to comn1ittees." (p.44) 
Lon1bardelli et al (2004) replicate the Blinder and Morgan study using econonl-
ically literate undergraduate and postgraduate students from the London School 
of Econonlics. Participants were required to play a sin1ple n1onetary policy game, 
setting the interest-rate policy both on an individual basis, and collectively as 
men1bers of five n1ember comnlittees. As in Blinder and Morgan, policy set by 
con1mittee was found to be superior to that when set by players acting alone, and 
according to Lon1bardelli et al, attributable to the ability of players to pool in-
formation and learn fron1 one other. In short, their results strongly reinforce the 
findings of Blinder and Morgan. 
2.8 Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed a wide array of literature which is of relevance to de-
cision making by n1onetary policy conmlittees. Several avenues of enquiry have 
been pursued. I began by tlu·ning to history. The work of the Marquis de Con-
dorcet in the eighteenth century den1onstrates that the study of how groups reach 
decisions is not a new phenon1enon, especially when one considers that the paradox 
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of voting and the eponyn1ous Jury Theoren1 are over three hundred years old. The 
paradox of voting has been intensively studied, whereas CJT only began to receive 
considerable attention following an in1portant paper by Austen-Smith and Banks 
(1996). I then presented en1pirical evidence which confirmed the near libiquity 
of MPCs as vehicles for setting the interest rate. Monetary Policy Conm1ittees 
were shown to differ considerably in tern1s of size, n1ember composition, men1bers' 
voting rights and the procedure by which decisions are made. The conclusions 
fron1 the theoretical literature are nlixed. CJT in1plies not only that a group of 
individuals should be better at setting n1onetary policy than a single policy n1aker, 
but that the more one increases the size of an MPC, the n1ore likely it is to make 
a correct decision. This represents a particularly dubious clain1, especially given 
that fron1 a comn1on sense perspective, expanding the size of an MPC indefinitely 
could only hinder policy n1aking. 
The section on Theory Based Literature pulled together contributions in-
cluding extensions to the n1onetary policy gan1es literature, the jury gan1es lit-
erature and contributions n1odels geared specifically towards how MPCs make 
decisions. The findings were manifold, although not always in agreen1ent with 
each other. Conu11ittees produce smoother inflation paths than unitary agents 
(Sibert (2003), Gerlach Kristen (2004)) and it is preferable for votes to be pub-
lished in1mediately, as opposed to with a lag (Sibert (2003) ). Whereas the Jury 
Theoren1 suggests that an MPC should be as large as possible, once the assunlp-
tion of sincerity is unsheathed (Austen-Snlith and Banks (1996)), this is no longer 
the case, especially when inforn1ation acquisition is not costless (Mukhapadaya 
(2004)). This leads to the suggestion that the optin1al size of an MPC is sn1aller 
rather than larger. If one views an MPC as a network of individuals, then as-
sunling that extracting n1en1bers' signals is con1putationally too burdenson1e to 
process, it may be apposite to n1odel MPC decisions using a boundedly-rational 
approach, where information is treated as new in each period (DeGroot (1974), 
DeMarzo et al (2003)). This latter point shows how fron1 a methodological per-
spective, one does not have to adopt a fully rational approach to modelling MPC 
decision making behaviour. 
In Empirical Based Literature studies of MPC voting behaviour were re-
viewed, particularly those wllich exaxnine the voting behaviour of men1bers of the 
United States Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The literature suggests 
that it is not just economic conditions which determine how an MPC n1ember 
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votes. Factors such as career experiences, a men1ber's type (i.e. Board Governor 
or Bank President) and career incentives come into play. Further, it was shown 
that the voting record can be used as a predictor of future interest-rate changes 
(Andersson et al (2001), Gerlach-l(risten (2004)). Lastly, experin1ental evidence 
suggests that comnuttees nlake better decisions than individuals, implying that 
delegating n1onetary policy to a con1n1ittee works not just in theory but in prac-
tice too. I now turn to Part III, which develops theoretical models of n1onetary 
policy conunittee voting behaviour. 
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Selected FOMC Studies 
Econometric 
Study Genre methodology Variables 
Paired t-test 
Partisan 
Belden {1989) theory of Pearson's x
2 The record of dissenting votes from 
test of FOMC meetings; inrerest rare politics 
association 
Havrilesky 
Partisan The record of dissenting votes from 
and Binaty probit 
Schweizer 
themy of 
analysis 
FOMC meetings; interest rare; FOMC 
politics member career characteristics (1990) 
Havrilesky Partisan The rcrord of dissenting votes from 
and Gildea theory of 
Binaty probit 
FOMCmeetings; interest rate; FOMC 
(1991) politics analysis member career characreristics 
Estimation 
Period Aim 
Four questions arc poscd:(l) Arc policy preferences 
of reserve bank presidents differ from those of 
members of the Board? (2) Does uncertainty about 
1970:2- the economic and financial results of policy actions 
1987:11 affect the levd of dissent? (3) Is there a difference in 
the pattern of dissent under different chairmen? (4) 
Is there effective political influence on monetary 
policy makets? (p.432) 
To 'develop and test a theory that predicts !he voting 
of individual FOMCmemberswho dissent on !he 
side of tightness or ease', based on FOMC member 
career characteristics. The theory predicts that 'the 1960-1983 
more proximate the member's career chatacrcrisrics 
arc to central government, the greater the number of 
his or her dissenting votes on the side of ease'. 
(p.197) 
1960-1983 Rejoiner II) Bdden (1989). 
Findings 
We focus on five of the main conclusions drawn: (1) 
Bank presidents dissent more often for tighrer policy 
than board members. Dissents arc ovc.rwhclmingly 
fur tighrer policy compared with a more balanced 
record for Board membrs (2) Bank presidents arc 
less influential than board members in dererminiog 
monetary policy (3) Differences in voting under 
different chairmen mayrcflect differences in the 
a bill I}' of the Chairman to exercise control over the 
voting behaviour ofFOMCmembers (4) Increased 
eronomic uncertainty may heighren dissent (5) The 
data do not provide support for the political 
business cycle hypothesis not oflegislativc control 
over policymakcrs. (pp.440-441) 
Th< woiy•• pro.;do"oppon foc <ho "''""' ""' I 
career chatacreristics have significant bearing on 
individual FOMC member voting behaviour. 
Rcjoiner to Belden (1989). HG argue that Belden 
omits three influcnres on FOMC behaviour which 
could explain her findings, namely (1) Career and 
background ofF OMC members (2) the stare of the 
economy (3) the explicit appointments procedure 
for FOMC members 
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Selected FOMC studies (continued) 
Econometric 
Study Genre methodology Variables 
US federal funds rate; data on 
current/ contemporaneous regional 
economic conditions; Greenbook 
Too tell Reaction Multinomial forerastsof real GN'P growth, implicit 
(1991h) function logit price deflator growth and 
unemployment; voting data for District 
Presidents, Board members and 
O!airmen. 
US federal funds rate; Greenbook 
estimates of both real GNP growth anc 
Allen eta] Reaction Multinomial implicit price defla1Dr growth; 
(1997) function log it ARMA(1,1) forecast of unemployment 
rate; number of months experience of 
FOMC OJ airmen; number of months 
in office ofFOMC govemors. 
FOMC voting records of Board 
members and regional Reserve Bank 
presidents; interest rare; FOMC 
member career characteci sties and 
Meade and Reaction regional affiliations; regional 
Sheets (2002) function Ordered lo gi t unanplo}ment data; national measures 
for industrial production, output gap 
(cal01lated using HP filter), monthly 
unemployment rate, CPI data (rronthly 
year on year estimates). 
Estimation 
Period Aim 
To determine whether the 'FOMC policy votes of 
1965-1985 Federal Reserve Bank presidents are more 
"oonservative" than those of their Board governor 
counterparts'. (p.3) 
Federal Reserve policymakers vote on one of three 
policy choices: tighter, looser or unchanged monctatj 
policy. Allen tJ a/model thls decision as a function 
1970:2- of unemployment, real growth and inflation ondthe 
1985:12 ccpcrienc:e of the BoardofFOMC govemorsand 
Chairmen. Thisisdone with a view to dcterming if 
the FOMC reacted differently to policy under 
different FOMC OJ airmen. 
The authors look for" ... systematic: evidence that 
1978-2000, policymakers have cast their votes according to 
214 meetings economic developments in their region ｾ｡ｴｨ･ｲ＠ than focusing exclusively on developments in the national 
economy." (p.l) 
Findings 
"District Bank presidents ser policy dependent on 
national, not their regional conditions." (p.3) 
The Fed reacted differently to its three policy 
objectives: growth, inflation and unemployment 
under each of the three chairs when the three policy 
variables and two experience variables of the chair 
are included in the tested model.' (p.36) 
Poli cymakers at the Fed consider regional 
unemployment when formulating monetary policy. 
Regional developments are more important for 
FOMC Board members than for Reserve Bank 
presidents. 
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Part III 
Monetary Policy and Theories of 
Con1mittee Voting Behaviour 
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Chapter 3 
Monetary Policy Committees and the Free-Rider Problem 
"Success is dependent on effort." Sophocles, 496-406 BC. 
3.1 Introduction 
Groups of individuals are responsible for making important decisions in an array 
of bodies and organisations in society. Consider, for example, the role of a jury. 
In criminal trials, juries have the task of determining the guilt or innocence of a 
defendant, and it is frequently argued they are less likely to n1ake howling errors 
such as convicting innocents or acquitting the guilty, than would any individual in 
isolation.1 In n1uch the san1e way that juries are a prominent feature of judicial 
systems across the world, so too are monetary policy committees, albeit in the 
sphere of econo1nic policy n1aking. As is the case for a jury, it is in1perative for 
a monetary policy con1nlittee to n1ake the correct policy choice, and arguments 
for the institution of monetary policy conmlittees are no different that those ad-
vocated for jtu·ies. For instance, delegating monetary policy to a committee is 
often justified on the grounds that 'two heads are sin1ply better than one. '2 On 
this assertion, a policy n1alcer in isolation is less likely to n1ake the correct policy 
choice than would a con11nittee. 
This chapter builds on recent work in the jury-gan1es literature where jurors' 
private signals cannot be acquired costlessly, incentivising individuals to free-ride 
on the signals of others. It exanlines the consequences of such a feature for 111011-
1 Consequently, the institution of juries and their associated propensity for making correct 
decisions increase social welfare through engendering confidence in the legal system. It is 
unarguable that like juries, :NIPCs make decisions which affect social welfare - consider how an 
MPC choosing an inappropriate policy stance may have lasting macroeconomic consequei1ces. 
2 See for example Blinder and Morgan (2003) and Lombardelli et al (2002). 
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etary policy decision n1aking by comnuttee and the individuals that con1prise it. 
In the analysis I reassess the basic result in a recent paper by Kaushik Mukhopad-
haya (2003), henceforth M, that when jurors acquire costly signals about a de-
fendant's guilt, the probability of reaching a correct verdict n1ay in fact decrease 
as jury size increases. The result is contrary to the Condorcet Jury Theoren1 
[Condorcet (1785), Grofman (1978), Miller (1986), Boland (1989), I(arotkin and 
Paroush (2003)], which shows that as the size of a group increases, its judgn1en-
tal competence approaches perfection. M's result obtains because under costly 
inforn1ation acquisition, as the size of the group increases, individuals have n1ore 
incentive to free-ride on the signals of others. That is, individuals are incentivised 
to expend less effort in paying attention to their own private signals as group size 
grows. As a consequence, the probability of a group n1aking a correct decision 
under majority rule is decreasing in group size. This result is shown by M to 
hold under both a perfect and in1perfect costly signal. The underlying theo-
retical fran1ework is consistent with Austen-Sn1ith and Banks (1996), henceforth 
ASB, although the pru·ameter values are restricted throughout to the case where 
rational voting is sincere and informative. This occurs when the optimal voting 
n1echanism is simple n1ajority rule. Under such conditions, and assunung costless 
information acquisition, the n1odel exhibits the properties of naYve CJT, albeit in 
a rational voter context. Ｓ ｾ Ｔ＠
Given that a key n1otivation of this chapter is to draw out the in1plications of 
3The set-up of the game is such that sincere voting is rational and informative (Austen-Smith 
and Banks (1996)). Jurors' decisions are effectively determined by their respective signals. This 
occurs under conditions where majority rule is both the aggregation rule of choice and the optimal 
procedure for aggregating members' information. Sincere voting is informative if 
qa 7r 1- q1 
-->-->--
1- q1 l-1r qa 
(3.1) 
and 
( 
qQ )JNL ( qQ ) h+l > 1f > ( 1 _ qQ) JNL+l ( qQ )JL 
1 - q! 1 - q! 1 - 1f q[ 1 - q[ (3.2) 
Setting 1r =! and setting qa = q1 = q E (!, 1), rewrite (3.2) as 
_q_ > 1 > 1-q 
1- q q (3.3) 
4Many key contributions in the jury-games literature succumb to the criticism of assuming 
costless signals. Wit (1998), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), McLennan (1998), Coughlan 
(2000), are notable for neglecting the consequences of costly signal acquisition. In this sense, 
the contributions from IVIukhopadhaya (2004) and Persico (2004) are noteworthy for redressing 
this imbalance. 
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free-riding for a n1onetary policy conmrittee, the assumption of sin1ple n1ajority 
rule ala ASB is particularly apposite: as noted by Fry et al (2000), SMV is the 
statutorily prescribed decision n1echanisn1 for a considerable nun1ber of real-world 
n1onetary policy conmlittees, such as the body responsible for setting the repo-rate 
at the Bank of England. 5 Perhaps n1ore crucially, it is not in1plausible to asso-
ciate free-riding with me1nbers of an MPC. Goodfriend (1999) suggests that when 
men1bers of a relatively large MPC like the FOMC realise their individual influence 
n1ay be sn1all, they may free-ride on the preparations of those men1bers who are 
"more expert, interested or responsible for n1onetary policy, such as the Chairman 
and the Board Staff." 6 Free-riding is undesirable as it potentially reduces the size 
of the conm1ittee, and is all but undetectable. This is because free-riders are able 
to ｣ｯｮｴｲｩ｢ｵｾ･＠ seemingly astute statements which in practice merely echo the views 
of n1ore dominant men1bers. Free-riders thus n1asquerade behind the preparations 
and opinions of others. The benefits associated with a heterogeneous conm1ittee 
- such as a wide range of views - are hence greatly reduced. 
Underpinning M's analysis, three particular assun1ptions are of note, which 
when applied to n1en1bers of an MPC rather than a jury read as follows: ( i) the 
optin1al MPC size should n1aximize the probability of an accurate decision; (ii) 
each MPC n1en1ber's payoff when no individual pays any attention is zero, which 
is denoted as ¢(0) = 0 and (iii) although M presents the solutions for a wide 
range of equilibria, he ignores a kind of equilibrium which is neither con1pletely 
mixed nor a ptu·e strategy equilibrium.7 Call this unreported class of equilibriun1 
asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. Asymmetric-mixed-strategy equilibrium 
has out of n MPC n1en1bers, k playing the sym1netric mixed-strategy a*(k : c, q) 
and the ren1aining n-k n1embers paying no attention with probability 1. This ef-
fectively n1eans that n-k players shirk. 
The first assun1ption, motivated by the Condorcet Jury Theoren1, turns out 
to be equivalent to the n1axin1ization of expected benefits of accurate verdicts 
less expected costs of inaccurate verdicts (type I and type II errors), given M's 
assun1ption that the accurate verdicts yield payoffs equal to 1 and inaccurate ver-
5 A simple majority of members is all that is required for a decision to be made in many 
1\IIPCs: in Fry et al, of 79 countries where monetary policy is delegated to a committee, just 
under half - specifically, 36 committees - reach a decision through the application of a formal 
voting procedure, typically SMV. 
6 Goodfriend (1999), p.8. 
7The jurors, for instance, play a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in a binary-decision, 
information gathering game - pay attention or don't pay attention. 
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diets yield zero payoffs. But if such welfaristic interpretation is to be imposed, the 
implicit social objective in M would still be incon1plete as it ignores MPC nlenl-
bers' inforn1ation gathering costs. Since inforn1ation gathering costs are likely to 
vary with MPC size, a priori it is not clear that the MPC size that maxinlizes the 
probability of an accurate decision would necessarily maxinlize the expected social 
welfare of verdict decisions (net of the inforn1ation gathering costs). Shnilarly, it 
is not clear how social welfare would change with the increase in MPC size. These 
issues are addressed. 
M justifies the second assun1ption by clainling that a positive valued ¢(0) 
"would bias results toward n1ore free-riding, but would not qualitatively change 
the findings" .8 '9 This clain1 is not straightforward. M notes that in a jury, the 
increased free-riding tendency is definitely true for any given number of jurors, 
hence each juror pays attention with a lower probability for both small and large 
juries. Yet whether this necessarily implies a relatively greater reduction (due to 
positive ¢(0)) in the probability of reaching a correct verdict for larger juries is 
unclear. The same logic is assun1ed to carry over to n1en1bers of a monetary policy 
con1mittee, and the in1plications of such an assumption for the question of optimal 
MPC size should be properly exanlined. Indeed, M assumes that if nobody pays 
attention, an incorrect decision is reached with payoff zero to each juror. This 
sin1plistic assumption is questionable. Even with a perfect signal, when jurors 
pay no attention they nught still harbour a guess as to the innocence or guilt of 
the defendant. In particular, jurors might be guided by their priors. If nature 
chooses the state innocent with ｰｲｯ｢｡｢ｩｬｩｴｹｾ＠ and guilt with equal probability, the 
expected utility fron1 not paying attention for either state would be ｾ＠ .10 M writes 
"In the real world, jurors can pay attention and still reach a wrong 
decision. This means that having one attentive juror does not guarantee 
reaching a correct decision." (p.29) 
M does not consider that when guided by their priors, jurors can pay no attention 
and still reach a correct decision, and even having one inattentive juror does not 
guarantee reaching a wrong decision. Likewise, even having one inattentive MPC 
n1en1ber does not guarantee reaching a wrong policy decision. 
8 :t-.1ukhopadhaya (2004), p.30. 
9 q'>(O) can be positive if the defendant is declared guilty with probability!, when the number 
of signals indicating guilt equals the number of signals indicating innocence. 
10This is similar to the concept of minimal competence [Miller (1986)]. 
55 
With respect to the third assumption, ruling out possible asymmetric mixed-
strategy equilibria, where son1e individuals play 1nixed strategies and others play 
pure strategies (i.e., pay no attention), would have been more acceptable if one 
can show that the symmetric equilibrium would Pareto dominate the asym1netric 
equilibria. However, M does not consider developing this avenue of investigation, 
and only briefly acknowledges the possibility of such equilibria. This possibility 
is therefore also examined for an MPC. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by 'relocating' the setting of the gan1e 
from a jury to a monetary policy committee (MPC). Rather than having to choose 
between finding a defendant innocent or guilty, men1bers of an MPC n1ust deter-
mine whether to inflate (I) or not inflate (N I) the econon1y.11 I then explicate 
the core findings in M, contrasting equilibria derived under the conflicting assump-
tions of ¢(0) = 0 and ¢(0) = !· Indeed, the assun1ption that ¢(0) = 0 is shown to 
penalize no attention by all MPC n1en1bers, effectively biasing the pure strategy 
and nlixed-strategy equilibriun1 towards paying attention, under both perfect and 
imperfect signals. F\rrther, it is noted that some of the results reported by M are 
replicated for con1pleteness. Equilibriun1 solutions are presented for both perfect 
and in1perfect signals, specifically asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria and 
symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria, symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibria 
and finally, asymmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. With respect to the lat-
ter solution concept, it is shown that asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria exist, 
and the best such equilibriun1 (in terms of the probability of reaching a correct 
1nonetary policy decision) for any given MPC size is equivalent to a synlffietric 
equilibriun1 corresponding to a sn1aller MPC. Therefore, by varying the MPC 
size and con1paring across the best asymmetric equilibria, it is detennined that 
the probability of making the correct policy choice is n1aximized for a particular 
MPC size and this probability will remain unchanged with further increases in 
MPC size. Thus if one focuses on the best asymmetric equilibrium, M's n1ain 
result about larger juries strictly lowering the probability of accuracy - or in the 
context of this chapter, larger n1onetary policy conlmittees - is son1ewhat miti-
gated.12 In1portantly, the asymmetric equilibria neither Pareto don1inate, nor are 
Pareto dominated by, the symmetric equilibriun1 of M. Asyn1metric equilibria 
are essentially no less con1pelling as a plausible description of equilibriun1. I now 
11 The restriction to a binary choice is no different to the choice faced my the monetary au-
thorities in much of the policy games literature. 
12This remains true whether ¢(0) = 0 (Mukhopadhaya's assumption) or for ¢(0) positive. 
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turn to examination of the case of a perfect signal. 
3.2 Play Under a Perfect Signal 
The so-called 'civic duty' game of Rasmusen (2001) underpins the theoretical 
framework. In this set-up, players observe a crhne in progress. Witnesses to 
the crin1e have the opportunity of calling the police, with the prospect that having 
been notified, the police n1ay catch the perpetrator in flagrante delicto. If nobody 
pays attention - or rather, nobody phones the police - then there is obviously no 
benefit to anyone. Assunung nobody else intervenes, or the police arriving at the 
scene by chance, the criminal will get away. Here, the 'cost' is associated with 
the act of reporting the crin1e to the police whilst the crin1e is in progress. I 
apply this frmnework to n risk-neutral n1embers of a n1onetary policy con1mittee, 
essentially presenting an 'MPC duty' gan1e. Players are confronted with a binary 
choice: nan1ely, the state of the world is that the econon1y needs Inflating or Not 
Inflating, {I, N I}. The outcome of MPC deliberations is that inflation is Required 
or Not Required, {R, NR}. The uncertainty about the true state is denoted by 
a comn1on prior probability p = ｾ＠ that the true state is N I. Each n1en1ber's 
payoffs over outcon1es and states - which are the san1e as society's payoffs13 - are 
U(R,I) = U(NR,NI) = 1 and U(R,NI) = U(NR,I) = 0. This says that a 
payoff of 1 is received fron1 making the correct policy decision, and a payoff of 0 is 
received for an incorrect policy decision. For example, U(R, I) is the utility from 
inflating the econon1y (I) when inflation is required (R), U(R, NI) is the utility 
fron1 not inflating the econon1y (NI) when inflation is required (R), and so on. 
During the course of MPC deliberations a men1ber who pays attention receives 
a private signal 80 or 81 about the true state of the world where Pr[S1 II] = 
Pr[SoiNI] = q = 1. In other words, the signal is perfect.14 MPC men1bers 
choose an alternative by majority voting, and there is a cost associated with paying 
attention. In the case of a tie, the decision to inflate or not inflate is chosen with 
probability ｾＮ＠ With these assun1ptions, sincere a11d infonnative voting is rational. 15 
MPC n1en1bers who do not pay attention observe and follow the n1ajority voting of 
the inforn1ed men1bers. The specific voting rule to be used will be tu1in1portant, as 
13 Or the mechanism designer's payoffs. 
HJt is noted here that under an imperfect signal- discussed later- it is assumed that q E (!,1]. 
Tllis is equivalent to assuming that if MPC members pay attention, they can do no worse that 
making a decision based on flipping a fair coin. 
15 i.e., expected utility maximizing voting in accordance with the signal received. 
57 
Column 
FIGURE 3.1. 
THE MPC DUTY GAME - TWO PLAYERS 
the jurors share their information costlessly before they vote. To help shape ideas, 
consider the two player norn1al forn1 game under a perfect signal, as depicted by 
the payoff n1atrix shown in FIGURE 3.1. Letting A and N A stand for Attention 
and No Attention respectively, let 
a<b-c<b (3.4) 
where a is the payoff when neither n1en1ber pays attention (denoted as ¢(0) =a), 
b is the payoff to the colun1n (row) player fron1 paying n9 attention when the row 
(column) me1nber pays attention, cis the cost associated with paying attention, 
and b - c is the payoff to the row (column) player fron1 paying attention when 
the colun1n (row) player pays no attention. The terms rJ and (1- rJ) denote the 
probabilities of paying Attention and No Attention respectively, and it is further 
assumed that a, b and c are all non-negative. Under this structure, it is clear 
that there exists asyrmnetric pure-strategy Nash-equilibria under which one player 
attention whilst the other does not. In other words, an equilibrium occurs which 
is characterised by the colurm1 (row) player free-riding on the attentive behaviour 
of the row (column) player. However, because this chapter is concerned with how a 
n1onetary policy committee - which typically consists of more than two individuals 
- n1akes decisions, all further analysis focusses on the n player gan1e. 
3.2.1 Asymmetric and Symmetric Pure-Strategy Nash Equi-
libria 
Assuming the condition given in (3.4) holds, when all players adopt pure strategies 
the game is characterised by n asymmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria, where 
only one player is paying attention. Yet this solution lacks a focal point. It is not 
clear how MPC men1bers are able to detern1ine who the attentive individual is, 
and assun1ing that alln1en1bers share the san1e characteristics, no clear candidate 
en1erges. However it is noted that forcE [b-a, b), there exists a unique symmetric 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium under which no member pays attention. It is in 
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no n1ember's interest to expend effort in acquiring a signal: guessing is preferable 
to investing tilne in costly signal acquisition. This occurs when the condition in 
(3.4) is contravened such that b- c < a< b, or put another way, when the cost 
of paying attention is greater than the the payoff fron1 paying no attention when 
another men1ber pays attention, b, less ¢(0) = a, the payoff to n1en1bers when 
nobody pays attention (i.e. if c > b - a). 
3.2.2 Symmetric Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium 
In the case of an N player gan1e, M obtains the symmetric mixed-strategy equi-
librium. This is achieved through application of the payoff-equating method. To 
achieve this, initially in1pose the condition that CJi = CJ, for i = (1, 2, ... , N) play-
ers. The probability of a single con1nlittee n1en1ber choosing not to pay attention 
is (1- CJ). Therefore, the probability that none of the ren1aining N -1 comnlittee 
men1bers pays attention is given by (1- CJ)N-1 • This implies that the probability 
of one or more n1en1bers choosing to pay attention is given by 1- (1- CJ)N-1• For 
any player i - this can be either the Row player or the Column player - the utility 
from playing A is given by: 
U(A) = (1- (1- CJ)N-1)(b- c)+ (1- CJ)N-1(b- c) (3.5) 
with a corresponding utility for playing N A given by 
U(N A) = (1- (1- CJ)N-1)b + (1- CJ)N-la (3.6) 
In a nlixed-strategy equilibriun1, n1embers are indifferent between choosing Atten-
tion (A) and No Attention (NA). 
U(A) = U(NA) (3.7) 
which equals 
(1-(1-a)N-1)(b-c)+(1-a)N-l(b-c) = (1-(1-CJ)N-1)b+(l-a)N-la (3.8) 
Sin1plifying the expression yields 
c = (1- a)N-1(b- a) (3.9) 
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Solving for a gives the mixed-strategy equilibrium: 
( 
C ) N:1 
a*(n; c)= 1- b _a (3.10) 
To obtain the probability, <I>(n; c), that an MPC of size N reaches a correct decision 
plug a* ( n; c) into 
ci>(n; c) = 1- (1- a*)N (3.11) 
Simple manipulation now yields 
(3.12) 
And ultin1ately 
( 
C ) ｎｾＱ＠
ci>(n; c) = 1- b _a (3.13) 
Note that the set-up considered by M is just a special case where a = 0, b = 1 
and c E ( 0, 1), an assun1ption which is scrutinised in the rest of this chapter. 
Specifically, the two assumptions ¢(0) = 0 and ¢(0) = ｾ＠ are con1pared, the latter 
being ･ｾｵｩｶ｡ｬ･ｮｴ＠ to a game where a = ｾＬ＠ b = 1 and c E (0, 1). This ·latter 
assumption says that in a n1onetary policy setting, it is possible for MPC men1bers 
to pay no attention, flip a coin, and arrive at a correct decision with ｰｲｯ｢｡｢ｩｬｩｴｹｾﾷ＠
In setting ¢(0) = 0, M's approach misses something important: a trial setting is 
quite different from Rasn1usen's original 'civic duty' gan1e. Assuming abstaining 
is not pernlitted, a group of inattentive MPC n1embers n1ay still arrive at a correct 
decision by guessing. This strengthens the argun1ent for ¢(0) = ｾＭ Guided by 
her priors, if it is con11110n lmowledge that nature chooses the state Inflate or 
Not Inflate with equal probability ｾＬ＠ the expected utility for any MPC n1en1ber 
j = (1, 2, ... , J) not paying attention when no other n1ember pays attention is ｾﾭ
This in1plies that assun1ing ¢(0) = 0, the probability of an MPC men1ber paying 
attention and of reaching a correct decision is given by 
* ( ) _1 a <P(D)=o n; c = 1 - cN-1 (3.14) 
and 
N 
<I><P(O)=o(n; c) = 1 - cN-l (3.15) 
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(A) Probability of paying attention, cr, under a perfect signal for 11 ==1 ,2 . . . ,12. c==0.1 
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Accordingly for ¢(0) = ｾ＠ it follows that 
1 ｵﾢＨｯＩ］ｾ＠ ( n; c) = 1 - (2c) N-1 (3.16) 
and 
N ＼ｬ＾＼Ｏ＾ＨｏＩ］ｾＨｮ［＠ c)= 1- (2c)N-l (3.17) 
The results in (3.14) and (3.15) lead to the following propositions: 
Proposition 1: If one attentive MPC member is enough to always reach a correct 
decision, a larger MPC is less likely to make a correct decision than a smaller MPC in 
the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of the n-player game. 
Proof of Proposition 1: In the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game with 
n(n > 1) MPC members, the probability of paying Attention is u*(n; c) = 1 - cN:_1 
for ¢(0) = 0 [equation (3.14)] and u*(n; c) ｾ＠ 1 - (2c)N:_1 for ¢(0) = ｾ＠ [equation 
(3.16)]. The mixing probability u* of paying attention monotonically decreases in 
n under each assumption regarding ¢(0). The greater the number of serving MPC 
members, the smaller the probability that each of them pays attention. The prob-
ability of an MPC reaching a correct decision is <l>(n; c) = 1 - c?-1 for ¢(0) = 0 
N [equation (3.15)] and <l>(n; c) = 1 - (2c) N-1 for ¢(0) = ｾ＠ [equation (3.17)]. Both 
<I></>(O)=o(n; c) and <I> ＼ｦ＾ＨｏＩ］ｾ＠ (n; c) are monotonically decreasing in n. An MPC is there-
fore less likely to reach a correct decision when the number of members is large. QED. 
With the alternative assun1ption that ¢(0) = ｾＧ＠ Proposition 1 still holds, 
albeit larger MPCs are even less likely to n1ake correct decisions than if ¢(0) = 
0. For con1parison, these probabilities are plotted in PANEL 3.1 (A) and (B). 
PANEL 3.1 (A) shows how the probability of any given individual paying attention 
n1onotonically decreases as MPC size, n, increases. Effectively, the larger the 
MPC, the n1ore incentive a player has to free-ride on the signals of others. As 
the cost of paying attention increases - plotted here for values of c = 0.1 and 0.3 
- so too does the likelihood of not paying attention. Further, ceteris paribus, 
replacing the assumption ¢(0) = 0 with ¢(0) = ｾ＠ has the effect of increasing the 
likelihood of n1en1bers free-riding on the signals of others. This den1onstrates how 
assuming ¢(0) = 0 has the effect of biasing n1en1bers towards paying attention. 
In PANEL 3.1 (B) the corresponding probabilities of reaching a correct decision 
under a perfect signal are plotted, all n1onotonically decreasing in MPC size. As c 
increases, the probability of making a correct decision, holding all other parameter 
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values fixed, declines. Additionally, changing the assun1ption ¢(0) = 0 to ¢(0) =! 
has, ceteris paribus, the effect of lowering the probability of n1aking a correct 
decision, as n1embers are incentivised to put in less effort when acquiring their 
signals. 
3.3 Play Under an Imperfect Signal 
The gan1e under an in1perfect signal is now developed. Unlike the case of a perfect 
signal where q = 1, each MPC men1ber who pays attention receives a private signal 
80 or 81 about the true state of the world where ｐＷｾ｛ｓ Ｑ ｉｇｊ＠ = Pr[S0 ING) = q E 
ＨｾＬ＠ 1]. To begin with, turn to the sequence of play. 
3.3.1 Sequence of Play 
The sequence of play characterising the gan1e is stylised in FIGURE 3.2. At the 
outset of the gan1e, nature decides that a priori, the econon1y is just as likely to 
require inflation as no inflation. This is common knowledge an1ongst all play-
ers. MPC n1en1bers are then confronted with choosing between Attention and 
No Attention. Should an individual be indifferent between the two alternatives, 
she is asstuned to pay attention. MPC men1bers who decide to be attentive then 
receive a private signal. Note here that son1e attentive conmlittee n1embers can-
not pay 'more' attention than other attentive MPC n1en1bers. They either pay 
attention or not at all. On the basis of their respective signals, n1embers cast their 
votes sin1ultaneously, and the alternative which receives at least half of the votes 
is adopted. In the event of a tie, the correct decision is chosen with probability 
ｾＮ＠ Finally, n1en1bers receive their payoffs, with a one for a correct verdict, a zero 
for an incorrect one. Should the n1ember have chosen to pay attention, the cost 
of doing this is deducted fron1 her payoff. A payoff of zero is received by all 
conmlittee n1en1bers if nobody decides to pay attention. 
3.3.2 Asymmetric Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria 
Under an in1perfect signal, k* out of n MPC members pay attention in asymn1etric 
pure-strategy Nash equilibria. It turns out that k* is not a function of MPC size, 
n; rather, it is endogenously determined by c and q E ＨｾＬ＠ 1). Now define b(1n; k, q) 
as "the binomial probability that out of k independent signals, m (1n ::::; k) are 
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correct, given the precision of the signal, q" .16 This entails that 
(3.18) 
Now denote ¢(k) as the probability of ann person MPC reaching a correct decision 
when precisely k 2:: 1 n1embers pay attention as 
and 
k 
¢(k) I: b(1n; k, q), if k is odd 
ｭ］｛ｾＩＫｬ＠
k 
¢(k) - I: b(1n; k, q) + ｾ｢＠ (k/2; k, q), if k is even 
ｭ］ｾＫｬ＠
(3.19) 
(3.20) 
The additional tern1 Ａ｢Ｈｾ［＠ k, q) in (3.20) corresponds to the probability of a tie be-
tween correct and incorrect ｳｩｧｾ｡ｬｳＮ ＱＷ＠ (3.19) and (3.20) are in fact n1athen1atical 
representations of CJT. They show that in the linut, as the nun1ber of attentive 
members tends to infinity, the probability of an MPC arriving at a correct ver-
dict equals one. This result can be ascertained through appealing to a normal 
approxin1ation to the binonlial distribution for large k, nan1ely 
liln ¢( k) = lim Pr z > 2 = 1 ( 
k- kq ) 
k--.oo k--.oo y'kq(1 - q) (3.21) 
Now denote the benefit to the kth n1en1ber from paying attention when k- 1 
n1embers pay attention, gross the cost of paying attention as B(k, q). Specifically, 
this benefit is equal to an increase in the probability that the MPC delivers a 
correct verdict: 
B(k, q) = ¢(k)- ¢(k- 1) (3.22) 
16M, p.31. 
17This calculates the probability that at least ｾ＠ (i.e. half) of all attentive jury members reach 
the correct decision. 
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Explicitly deriving B(k, q) is somewhat cun1berson1e. It is in1portant here to 
distinguish between MPCs of even and odd size - it turns out that the solution for 
B(k, q) is different for odd and even sized cormnittees. For an odd con1mittee, it 
can be shown that 
B(k,q) - (q-Db(k;\k-l,q) 
( 1) (k- 1) k-1 (1 )1-k::..! - q-- q 2 -q 2 2 k-1 
2 
(3.23) 
for k > 1 and B(k, q) = q for k = 1. In the case where k > 1, B(k, q) is positive 
and decreasing ink ask increases in incren1ents of two. For an even sized MPC 
B(k, q) = 0. Proof of these results are provided in the appendix to this chapter 
in Lemma 1. The kth MPC n1en1ber is pivotal under circun1Stances where her 
vote is tie-breaking (when k is odd, k > 1) or tie-inducing (when k is even). Yet 
B(k, q) needs a little further qualification. Under even k, the kth men1ber benefits 
from tie-inducing behaviour when the vote is changed fron1 a majority of incorrect 
votes. A benefit loss is achieved by inducing a tie when the majority of votes are 
correct. Given that q E ( ｾＬ＠ 1], the signal received by the kth me1nber is more 
likely to be correct than not. However, it is n1ore likely for a cornnlittee n1en1-
ber to revert to tie-inducing behaviour when the n1ajority of signals are correct 
than incorrect. On those occasions where the kth n1en1ber is pivotal, the payoff 
changes by ｾＮ＠ When q = ｾＬ＠ the benefit loss is exactly compensated for by the 
benefit gain. The benefit gain to the kth jtuor when precisely k-1 men1bers pay 
attention for odd k > 1 is attributable to the rise in probability corresponding to 
making a correct decision when the kth n1en1ber's vote is tie-breaking. When k is 
odd, B(k, q) n1onotonically decreases in k:18 this is because as the number MPC 
n1en1bers paying attention increases, the likelihood of a tie arising falls. 
Now consider the net benefit to a men1ber fron1 being attentive. This is defined 
by B(k, q)- c conditional on k out of n n1en1bers being attentive. Denote k*(c, q) 
as the size of the largest group of MPC n1en1bers enjoying a positive net benefit 
fron1 being attentive. It follows that for k*(c, q), 
B(k*,q)- c 2::0 (3.24) 
18Note that for odd k, k is assumed here to increase in increments of two. 
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and 
B(k* + 2, q) - c < 0 (3.25) 
The n1athen1atical properties of B(k, q) are such that a unique k*(c, q) 2:: 1 exists 
for all c E (0, q] and k*(c, q) is decreasing inc, the cost of paying attention. These 
properties lead to the asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria in the MPC Duty Gan1e, 
and the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: For any n > 1, q E (!, 1] and c E (B(n, q), q) there exist asymmet-
ric pure-strategy equilibria in which k*(c, q) E (0, n) members pay attention. In the 
equilibria, k*(c, q) is odd and it does not depend on the size of the MPC, n. 
The proof of this proposition is straightforward. 
Proof of Proposition 2: An asymmetric pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist 
for an even number of attentive MPC members, as the net benefit from being attentive 
is zero. This is because when B(k, q) = 0, it necessarily follows that B(k, q)- c < 0 
for positive c. Thus k* is odd, and is independent of MPC size, n. The condition that 
c E (B(n, q), q) ensures k* E (0, n). QED. 
FIGURE 3.3 depicts the net benefit to the kth men1ber corresponding to B(k, 0.65). 
For odd k, B(k, q) n1onotonically decreases in k; for even k, B(k, q) equals zero. 
Both these results are independent of jury size. For odd k, the unique asymmetric 
pure-strategy equilibrium obtains where k is at its n1axirnlnn value, namely k* = 
max(k = 1, 3, 5 ... , n) > c. FIGURE 3.3 depicts how when c = 0.1 only a single 
n1en1ber is attentive in equilibriun1, irrespective of MPC size: k* = 1. · The im-
plication of this result is that (i) in even sized MPCs, all but one n1ember should 
acquire signals and (ii) when n is odd, all members should acquire signals. With 
increasing MPC size, n, the distance between the unique asymmetric pure-strategy 
equilibrium widens, as does the optin1al nun1ber of attentive men1bers. Put an-
other way, individuals serving on larger MPCs are n1ore predisposed to free-riding 
than those serving on sn1aller MPCs: the problen1 of free-riding intensifies as n 
increases. Yet as n increases in size, the decrease in the the probability of 1naking 
a correct decision approaches 1- ¢(k*). In the linut, it obtains that 
lim<I>(k)- 1-¢(k*) 
ｮｾｯｯ＠
- 1-q 
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FIGURE 3.3. 
BENEFIT TO THE kth :rviPC l\IEi\113ER FROM PAYING ATTENTION WHEN k-1 
OTHER i\IEi\!BERS PAY ATTENTION UNDER ASl'l\IMETRIC PURE-STRATEGY NASH 
EQUII.ll3RIA. q=0.65. 
In the case where B(k, 0.65), it follows that 1 - cp(k*) = 1 - q = 1 - 0.65 = 0.35. 
3.3.3 Symmetric Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria 
Focus now turns to symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria. It is deternlined 
that its existence is a function of MPC size, n, the signal precision, q E ( ｾＬ＠ 1], 
and c, the cost of being attentive. When all other 111e1nbers are inattentive, the 
net benefit fron1 paying attention is B(k, q)- c = q- c. F\n'ther, when c > q, a 
syn1illetric pure-strategy NE exists in which all players are inattentive.19 In the 
case where all n- 1 111e1nbers are attentive, the benefit to the nth 1nen1ber fron1 
paying attention is characterised as 
B(n, q) > 0 if 11 is odd (3.28) 
and 
B(n, q) = 0 if 11 is even (3.29) 
Yet there does exist a symmetric pH're-strategy NE in which all 1ne1nbers are at-
tentive, as asserted in the following statmnent (M, p.34): 
Proposition 3: For any n, q E ＨｾＬ＠ 1), and c E (0, q), there exists a symmetric 
19 Similarly, recall how for a perfect signal there exists a symmetr·ic puTe-stmtegy NE in which 
nobody pays attention, for ¢(0) ］ｾｾｩｦ＠ c E ＨｾＬ＠ 1). 
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pure-strategy NE in which everybody pays attention iff the MPC size, n, is odd, and 
n:::; k*(c, q). 
Proof of Proposition 3: The proof follows from Lemma 1, and the definition of 
the size of the largest attentive group of MPC members, k*(c, q), presented previously. 
According to Lemma 1, for odd n f k*(c, q), the net benefit to the nth member from 
paying attention is nonnegative, whilst for other MPC sizes it is negative. QED. 
Symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria are shown for n = 3, q = 0.65 in 
FIGURE 3.4. In the absence of all other n- 1 MPC members paying attention, 
the net benefit to the nth men1ber fron1 being attentive is negative- B(k, q) < 0 
when c > 0.65. This is depicted by the black line, which crosses the horizontal 
[cost (c)) axis at 0.65. Con1pare this to the case where all3 n1embers are attentive, 
as depicted by the grey line, B(3, 0.65)- c For values of c > 0.068, there exists 
no benefit for any n1en1ber to pay attention; when c :::; 0.068, all n1en1bers pay 
attention. Specifically, the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria where all 
n1embers pay attention are characterised by the condition that B(k, q) - c ｾ＠
0. Secondly, the equilibria is further qualified by the condition that for any 
given positive cost c:::; q, sn1all MPC sizes exist where all men1bers are attentive. 
Finally, for even sized MPCs, for any c ｾ＠ 0, no symmetric pure-strategy Nash 
equilibria exist. Thus for odd n, members are more likely to all be attentive when 
information is (i) not costly and (ii) MPC size is sn1all. Yet for even n, there 
will always be one inattentive n1ember. Normatively speaking, MPCs should 
not only be small and characterised by cheap information acquisition, but should 
contain an odd nun1ber of men1bers too. The latter statement holds because if the 
social planner's objective is to choose an MPC which n1aximizes the probability 
or reaching a correct decision, the optin1al MPC size is defined by n = k*(c, q). 
3.3.4 Symmetric Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 
In this section the solution for the symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium un-
der an imperfect signal for n MPC men1bers is derived for the alternative assump-
tions ¢(0) = 0 and ¢(0) = ｾＮ ＲＰ＠ In focusing on the synm1etric nlixed-strategy equi-
libriun1 two things are established: ( i) with the probability of reaching a correct 
policy decision as the prin1ary social objective,21 the n1ore plausible assumption 
20 Much of the analysis presented in sections 3.3.4 - 3.3.7 is the product of joint work with 
Professor Paul Levine and Professor Parimal Bag. 
21 Equivalent to reaching a correct verdict, as in M. 
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B{3,0.65}-c, IN THE THREE PERSON MPC. q=0.65. 
of ¢(0) = ! adds to the argun1ent that the MPC size should be restricted; (ii) a 
broader social objective by considering the information gathering costs would also 
strengthen M's suggestion about the jury size restriction, and hence MPC size 
restriction. While both points ( i) and ( ii) accentuate the basic findings of M, it 
is shown that arriving at the second conclusion (point ( ii)) is not intuitively that 
obvious, especially for ¢(0) = !· Thus, while the assun1ption that ¢(0) = 0 turns 
out not to n1atter in the core recomn1endation of MPC size restriction, to fully 
understand the underlying economic reasons it would be better to assun1e ¢(0) = ! 
instead. Proceeding sections demonstrate how if the MPC men1bers coordinate 
on any one of a number of (equally plausible) asymmetric equilibria other than 
the syn1metric equilibriun1, the probability of accuracy reaches a n1axin1un1 for a 
particular MPC size and ren1ains unchanged with larger MPCs, thus mitigating 
M's result son1ewhat. However, the case for linliting the MPC size gains addi-
tional grounds if one shifts the focus fron1 maximizing the probability of reaching 
a correct verdict to the maximization of the overall social surplus, n1easured by 
the expected benefits of MPC decisions less the expected costs of acquiring signals. 
In then player game, the nlixed-strategy Nash-equilibriun1 solution a* E (0, 1) 
is derived through applying the pay-off equating n1ethod used to deternline (3.10) 
and (3.13) under a perfect signal. Begin by denoting II as the net benefit to 
an attentive MPC n1en1ber when all other n1en1bers adopt the mixed-strategy, u. 
TI is equivalent to the change in probability of n1aking a correct decision when 
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an additional MPC n1ember collects a signal over every possible realisation of 
the number of attentive MPC members (which follows the binomial distribution 
with probability of success ()) and net of cost c. Specifically, the net benefit to 
an MPC member of paying attention when every other n1en1ber plays a n1ixed-
strategy 'attention' with probability() and 'no attention' with probability 1- ()is 
given by 
n 
n = TI(n,(J;c,q) = Lb(k -1;n -1,CJ)B(k,q)- c (3.30) 
k=l 
In the case of odd and even n, (3.30) is written as 
n 
TI(n, (Jj c, q) = L b(k- 1; n- 1, (J)B(k, q)- c if n is odd; (3.31) 
k=1,3, ... 
and 
n-1 
TI(n, (); c, q) = L b(k- 1; n -1, (J)B(k, q)- c if n is even. 
k=1,3,. .. 
Under the assun1ption of ¢(0) = 0, II is expressed as 
. _ ( _ ｾＩ＠ [n2I] (n _ 1)!((Jq)m((J(1 _ q))m(1 _ (J)(n-1-2m) (1 _ (J)n-1 
ll(n, a, c, q).p(o)=O- q 2 l; (m!)2(n -1-2m)! + 2 c 
(3.32) 
where (l-udn-l exists as a result of the assumption that if all members are in receipt 
of no signal, they enjoy a zero payoff, as opposed to ! received in the event of a 
tie. Accordingly, assuming ¢(0) =! in1plies that II can be rewritten as 
. _ ( _ ｾＩ＠ ｛ｾ｝＠ (n- 1)!((Jq)m((J(1 _ q))m(1 _ (J)Cn-1-2m) _ 
II(n, (), c, q)¢{O)=! - q 2 ｾ＠ (1n!)2(n- 1 -2m)! c 
(3.33) 
{1 )n-1 
and the tern1 Ｍｾ＠ becon1es superfluous. It is clear from (3.32) and (3.33) that 
the net benefit to 1nembers m1der ¢(0) = 0 is higher than for ¢(0) = !· For 
exan1ple, consider the case where n = 2: II(n, CJj c, q)¢(O)=O = q - qCJ, whereas 
TI(n, (Jj c, ｱＩﾢＨｏＩ］ｾ＠ = q - qCJ - Ｈ Ｑ ｾｵＩＮ＠ In the case where () = 0, TI(n, (Jj c, q)¢(0)=0 
differs fron1 II(n, CJ; c, ｱＩﾢＨｏＩ］ｾ＠ by exactly !, as is illustrated in PANEL 3.2. This 
is a result which extends to all n ｾ＠ 2. 
The unique syn1n1etric nlixed-strategy Nash equilibriun1 (J*(n; c, q) E (0, 1) is 
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obtained by solving 
IT(n, a; c, q) = 0, (3.34) 
for a, which is equivalent to equating the cost and benefit from paying attention 
in the net benefit function.22 Due to the con1plexity of the net benefit function, 
it is not possible to derive an explicit solution for (j. Instead, it has to be esti-
nlated nun1erically, holding q, c, and n 2:: 1 at exogenously specified values. The 
probability of the MPC n1aking a correct decision is then given by 
n 
q, = <I?(n; c, q) = 'L b(j; n, (j*(n; c, q))¢;(j). (3.35) 
j=O 
Note that if ¢(0) =f 0, then the sun1n1ation n1ust include a j = 0 tern1, unlike the 
case considered in M. 
Note that (3.35) applies to k 2:: 1. When no members pay attention and receive 
no signals M assun1es that the payoff is zero; i.e., ¢(0) = 0. As stated at the 
outset, an alternative assumption is that they vote according to their prior of ! 
so that ¢(0) = ｾﾷ＠ Note here that. b(O; 0, q) = ｯｾ｢ Ｑ ｱ Ｐ ＨＱＭ q)0 = 1 so that with this 
assumption (3.35) still applies with k = 0, treating zero as even. It is now useful 
to recall (3.22), nan1ely B(k, q) = ¢;(k)- ¢;(k- 1) which defines the benefit to the 
kth MPC men1ber from paying attention when exactly k- 1 other n1embers pay 
attention gross of the cost of paying attention. FUrther, recall the result given in 
Lemma 1, reproduced below: 
B(k q) = { O, 
) (q- ｾＩ｢ＨＨｫＭ 1)/2; (k- 1), q)' 
if k is even; 
if k is odd. 
(3.36) 
Assunung ¢(0) = 0 as in M then (3.36) does not hold fork= 1 and B(l, q) = 1. 
However, under ¢(0) = ｾＧ＠ (3.36) holds fork= 1 as well. In what follows the con-
sequences of both assun1ptions regarding ¢(0) are pursued. 
22 In other words, for the case of IT(n, u; c, q)q,(o)=O set 
BENEFI'r FROM PAYING ATTENTION 
( 
- ｾＩ＠ [n;l) (n _ l)!(uq)m(u(l _ q))m(l _ u)(n-1-2m} (1 _ a)n-1 -COST OF ｐａｾ＠ ATTENTION 
q 2 ｾ＠ (m!) 2 (n- 1-2m)! + 2 - c 
and derive a solution for u. In the case of II(n, u; c, q)q,(O)=.!, the expression Ｈ Ｑ ＭｾＩｮＭｬ＠ is omitted 
from the benefit term on the LHS of the equality. 2 
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PANEL 3.2 uses MATLAB to show the net benefit to the nth MPC member from 
paying attention given n-1 jurors pay no attention for a E [0, 1], n = {2, 3, 6, 12}, 
q = 0.7 and c = 0.1. PANEL 3.2 (A) essentially reproduces the results shown in 
M (figure 4) for ¢(0) = 0, and PANEL 3.2 (B) con1pares the results for ¢(0) = ｾﾷ＠
If anything, this den1onstrates the extent to which the assun1ption that ¢(0) = 0 is 
not innocuous: it heavily penalizes no attention by all MPC n1en1bers and so biases 
the n1ixed equilibriun1 towards paying attention. PANEL 3.3 (A) and (B) show 
n1m1erical results for u* and ｾ＠ using MATLAB. Results are reported for parameter 
values c = 0.1 and q = 0.75.23 The result is that in (A), whereas with ¢(0) = 0 
group accuracy is n1axin1ized at an MPC size n = 3, with ¢(0) = ｾ＠ accuracy 
increases n1onotonically as n decreases fron1 n = 12 ton= 1. Using MPC accuracy 
as the n1easure of social benefit then sees the alterative assumption regarding 
¢(0) further undermine the Condorcet Jury Theoren1. In a later section, CJT is 
nu·ther undernlined when different MPC sizes are ranked using social efficiency as 
a 1neasure. 
3.3.5 Asymmetric Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria 
As stated at the outset of the chapter, M ignores another kind of equilibriun1 which 
is neither con1pletely nlixed nor a pure strategy equilibriun1. Explored here, this 
unreported class of equilibrium is referred to as asymmetric mixed-strategy equi-
librium, the existence of which is demonstrated numerically. Asymmetric-mixed-
strategy equilibrium has out of n MPC n1embers, k playing the symmetric mixed-
strategy a*(k : c, q) and the ren1aining n-k men1bers paying no attention with 
probability 1. This effectively n1eru1s that n-k players shirk. Such an equilibriun1 
exists because MPC n1en1bers who pay no attention are essentially absent from the 
gan1e, whilst the ren1aining MPC members play symn1etric mixed-strategy equi-
libriunl an1ongst themselves. Using the result in (3.35) the probability of n1aking 
a correct decision is then 
k 
ｾＨｫ［＠ c, q) = L b(j; k, u*(k; c, q))¢(j), (3.37) 
j=O 
and the net payoff for each attentive men1ber is ｾ＠ - c and for each non-attentive 
n1en1ber ｾＮ＠ The condition for an asynm1etric n1ixed strategy equilibrium is that 
the net payoff when the (k + 1)th n1en1ber pays attention must be less thru1 when 
23It is possible to reproduce the results given in M who uses various values of q. However, I 
confine myself to one intermediate value, q = 0. 75. 
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(A) Net benefit to the nth MPC member from paying attention when Jt-1members 
pay no attention with probability cr as 11 z 1 increases. q = 0.7, c=0.1 and ｾＨＰＩ］Ｐ＠
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(B) Net benefit to the 11th :NIPC member from paying attention when Jt-lmembers 
pay no attention with probability cr as 11 z 1 increases. q = 0.7, c=0.1 and ｾＨＰＩ］ＱＯＲ＠
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(A) Symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrimn, <J*, with an imperfect signal, as 11 
increases. q = 0.75, c=O.l. ｾＨＰＩ］Ｐ＠ compared with ｾＨＰＩ］ＱＯＲ＠
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(B) Probability of an MPC arriving at a correct decision, <I>, with an imperfect signal 
as It;;::: 2 increases. q = 0.75, c=O.l. ｾＨＰＩ］Ｐ＠ compared with ｾＨＰＩ］ＱＯＲ＠
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she does not; i.e., 
k k 
<I>= I: b(j; k, (J*(k; c, q))¢(j) >I: b(j; k, (J*(k; c, q))¢(j + 1)- c. (3.38) 
j=O j=O 
(3.38) says that the probability of a correct decision when only k men1bers pay 
attention with probability O"* must exceed the increased probability when one more 
n1ember pays attention net of the cost of doing so. Write this as 
k k 
6-<I> = L:b(j;k,O"*(k;c,q))¢(j + 1)- L:b(j;k,a*(k;c,q))¢(j) <c. (3.39) 
j=O j=O 
PANEL 3.4 (A) shows that this condition, 6-<I> < c, is satisfied for q = 0.75 
and c = 0.1. Under each alternative assumption regarding ¢(0), the value of 
6-<I> lies below the cost line, which is plotted for c = 0.1. This holds as the 
nun1ber of attentive n1embers k increases fron1 1 through 12. The net payoff is 
therefore negative in both cases, as ｾ＼ｉ＾Ｍ c < 0. It has therefore been shown 
nun1erically that alongside the syn1metric equilibria (SE), there exist asymmetric 
mixed-strategy equilibria (AE) for which k = 2, 3, ... of out n n1en1bers play a 
mixed-strategy with probability O"*(k; c, q) of paying attention at a fixed c, and the 
ren1aining n- k pay no attention with probability 1 and zero cost. Now in an AE, 
the overall probability of. accuracy stops increasing in MPC size as more inattentive 
men1bers are added. But which equilibriun1, SE or AE, is n1ore plausible? 
3.3.6 Choice of Symmetric or Asymmetric Equilibria 
For an MPC of size n there ru.·e now n possible equilibria to choose fron1, one SE 
and n -1 AE equilibria with k = 1, 2, ... n -l attentive n1en1bers. An AE equilib-
rium with 1 < k ::; n- 1 attentive n1embers, AE(k) say, is essentially equivalent 
to a SE with MPC size k, SE(k) say. The probability of accuracy and the costs 
incurred by the MPC n1en1bers are identical in AE(k) and SE(k). Thus PANEL 
3.3 (A) and PANEL 3.3 (B) for SE(n) also apply to asy1nn1etric equilibria as well. 
Yet can the Pareto don1inance of any of these equilibria be established? Con-
sider the two groups of n1en1bers, non-attentive and attentive. For the forn1er they 
incur no attention costs ru.1d so prefer equilibria that n1axhnize the probability of 
accuracy, <I>. Fron1 PANEL 3.3 (B) this occurs when 3 n1en1bers pay attention if 
¢(0) = 0 and when 1 n1en1ber pays attention if ¢(0) = ｾＭ Now consider the atten-
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tive n1en1bers. PANEL 3.4 (B) plots their expected utility as the size of the group 
k increases. Two opposite effects are at work here: as k increases the probability 
of paying attention first rises and falls monotonically with k for the case ¢(0) = 0 
as is seen in PANEL 3. 3 (B) (since the SE( k) is equivalent to AE( k)) and falls 
n1onotonically for the case ¢(0) = ｾＭ However, this effect that reduces the utility 
of the attentive member is n1ore than cancelled out by a reduction in attention 
costs owing to the free-rider effect. The net results is that the utility of attentive 
n1en1bers rises as k increases reaching a maximtml at k = n, the synm1etric equi-
librhlnl. I conclude fron1 this that the Pareto-don1inance of any of the multiple 
equilibria cannot established. 
3.3. 7 Social Efficiency 
I now return to symn1etric equilibria and exanline the question of social efficiency. 
PANEL 3.5 (A) plots the expected social cost of a synunetric equilibriun1 with n 
n1embers defined as C = nCY*c. For ¢(0) = 0, as MPC size falls then expected 
social costs fall and as has been seen the expected accuracy of the MPC rises. 
This provides a further argun1ent for limiting the size of an MPC. However the 
same figure shows that this result is sensitive to the assu1nption regarding ¢(0). If 
it is assun1ed that ¢(0) ］ｾｴｨ･ｮ＠ the in1proven1ent in accuracy of the MPC comes 
at an increasing social cost as MPC size decreases fron1 n = 12 to n = 3, but a 
further decrease in size sees social cost falling as before. 
PANEL 3.5 (B) assesses the net benefit of reducing MPC size by plotting 
the expected social surplus q> - C against MPC size. Whereas for ¢( 0) = 0 the 
probability of accuracy is n1axin1ized at n = 3, social surplus is n1axi1nized at 
n = 1. Social efficiency considerations therefore adds weight to the case for a 
sn1aller MPC. The alternative assun1ption regarding ¢(0) further undernlines the 
Condorcet Jury Theoretn (for this nun1erical example). Again social surplus rises 
n1onotonically as n decreases and suggests that, owing to the free-rider problen1, 
any MPC n1ay yield less benefit than a decision arrived by a single policy 1nalcer. 
3.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter I set out to exanline the in1plications of delegating n1onetary policy 
to a con11nittee where it is possible for men1bers to free-ride on the signals of oth-
ers. I relocated and extended Kauship Mukhopaclhaya's analysis of free-riding in 
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(A) Condition for an Asymmetric mL""<ed strategy Nash equilibrium with k out of 11 
MPC members playing cr*, and the remaining n-k paying no attention, as k ｾ＠ 1 
increases. q:::: 0.75, c=0.1. $(0)=0 compared with $(0)=1/2 
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(A) Expected social cost for Symmetric Equilibria as JJ ｾ＠ 1 increases. q = 0.75, c=O.l. 
ｾＨＰＩ］Ｐ＠ compared with ｾＨＰＩ］ＱＯＲ＠
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(B) Benefit-cost measure for Symmetric Equilibria as 11 ｾ＠ 1 increases. q = 0.75, 
c=O.l. ｾＨＰＩ］Ｐ＠ compared with ｾＨＰＩ］ＱＯＲ＠
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juries to the case of an MPC faced with n1aking a binary choice, thereby creating 
a 'MPC Duty Game'. 
In particular, I investigated the assun1ption regarding the payoffs for ¢(0) when 
no MPC n1embers pay attention. In an MPC, the increased free-riding tendency is 
definitely true for any given nun1ber of n1embers, hence each n1en1ber pays atten-
tion with a lower probability for both sn1all and large n1onetary policy comnlittees. 
Yet whether this necessarily in1plied a relatively greater reduction (due to positive 
¢(0)) in the probability of making a correct policy choice for larger MPCs was un-
clear. The first numerical result den1onstrated that whereas under ¢(0) = 0 MPC 
accuracy is n1aximized at an MPC size n = 3, under ¢(0) = ｾ＠ accuracy increases 
monotonically as n decreases fron1 n = 12 to n = 1. Using MPC accuracy as 
the n:1easure of social benefit then sees the alterative assun1ption regarding ¢(0) 
strengthen the result under ¢(0). 
The second nun1erical result shows that using social surplus as the criterion for 
con1paring different MPC sizes further strengthens the result under ¢(0), in that 
with both assumptions regarding ¢(0), social surplus is n1axin1ized at an MPC size 
n = 1. Finally, the existence of asynm1etric equilibria for which the probability 
of an MPC making correct decisions does not decline with MPC size was demon-
strated. None of the n n1ultiple equilibria Pareto-donlinated. This result n1eans 
the case for a smaller MPC suggested by the SE results needs to be qualified, 
since a large conmrittee of size n can achieve the same social welfare as a smaller 
one of size k < n in a possibly more plausible equilibriun1 with only k attentive 
n1embers. Of course if one were to include additional social costs incurred even by 
an inattentive n1en1ber (expenses etc.) the case for a sn1aller MPC would remain. 
The results suggest that large n1onetary policy con1mittees, such as the ECB 
Governing Council, should be reduced in size substantially. Unlike Condorcet's 
eponyn1ous Jury Theorem under costless inforn1ation acquisition, it is not desir-
able to increase the size of an MPC indefinitely. This is because in the presence of 
free-riding, the accuracy of n1aking a correct decision is generally decreasing. A 
practical n1easure to dissuade n1en1bers fron1 engaging in such activity - thereby 
increasing the accuracy of the decision - nlight be to n1ake MPC n1en1bers indi-
vidually accotmtable for their behaviour. Such scrutiny, which n1ay require MPC 
men1bers to justify their voting decisions in front of a government comn1ittee, is 
already practised in the Ul(, where MPC men1bers con1e under the scrutiny of a 
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Parlian1entary select committee. 
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3.A Appendix to Chapter 3 
3.A.l Lemma 1: For an odd sized MPC B(k, q) == (q- !) b(k21 ; k-
1, q); for an even sized MPC B(k, q) == 0 
Odd k 
By definition 
B(k, q) - ¢(k)- ¢(k- 1) 
FIRST 'l'ER?.I SECOND TERl\1 
k k-1 L b(1n;k,q)- L b(m;k-l,q) 
ｭ］ｾ＠ ｭ］ｾ＠
Ｋｾ｢Ｈ＠ k - 1· k - 1 q) 
2 2 ' ' (3.40) 
TIIIRD TERM 
The first tern1 may be rewritten as 
k k-1 L b(m; k, q) = L b(m; k, q) + b(k; k, q) (3.41) 
.ill m= 2 .ill m= 2 
It is also noted that for the first tern1, 
b(m; k, q) m(1 )k-m k! - q -q (k- m)!?n! (3.42) 
m ( ) k-m ( k - 1)! [ k ] 
- q 1 - q (k- 1 - m)!(m- 1)! x (k- m)m 
m ( 1 ) k-m ( k - 1)! [ 1 1 ] 
- q - q (k- 1- m)!(m- 1)! x (k- 1n) + m 
(k- 1)! m-1(1 )k-m q q - q (1n- 1)!(k- 1n)! 
+(1 _ q) (k- 1)! (k- 1) qm.(1 _ q)k-l-m (k- 1 - 1n)!m! m 
- qb(m- 1; k- 1, q) + (1- q)b(m; k- 1, q) 
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Therefore ｉＺｾ］ｾ＠ b(m; k, q) may be re-expressed as 
k L b(1n; k, q) -
ｭ］ｾ＠
Where it is noted that 
k-l L [qb(m- 1; k- 1, q) + (1- q)b(m; k- 1, q)] 
ｭ］ｾ＠
+qb(k -1; k -1,q) 
( ) (k-1)! k-1( )0 qb k- 1; k- 1, q - q (k _ 1)!0!q 1- q 
- qk 
- b(k; k, q) 
(3.43) 
(3.44) 
In other words, qb(k - 1; k - 1, q) = b(k; k, 1n) is n1erely the last tern1 of the 
sun1n1ation in ｉＺｾ］ｾ＠ b(m; k, q). This makes it possible to rewrite B(k, q) as 
k-l 
B(k, q) = L [qb(m- 1; k- 1, q) + (1 - q)b(m; k- 1, q)] 
ｭ］ｾ＠
SECOND TERlii 
k-1 
+qb(k- 1; k- 1) - L b(m; k- 1, q) 
TIIIRD TERM 
1 k -1 
--b(-·k q) 2 2 ) ) 
ｭ］ｾ＠
(3.45) 
Expanding out ｌＬＺｾｾｫﾥ＠ [qb(1n- 1; k- 1, q) + (1 -.q)b(m; k- 1, q)] in the expres-
sion above yields 
B(k, q) 
k-l k-l L qb(m- 1; k- 1, q) - L qb(m; k- 1, q) 
ll! m= 2 ll.! m= 2 
k-1 
+ L (b(1n; k- 1, q) + qb(k- 1; k- 1) 
ｭ］ｾ＠
SECOND TERM 
THIRD TERlll 
k-1 1 k -1 
- L b(m; k -1, q)- 2b(-2-; k, q) ll.! m= 2 
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(3.46) 
(3.47) 
Noting that 
k-1 ｾ＠ k -1 
L qb(m-1;k -1,q)- ｾ＠ qb(m;k -1,q)) = qb(-2-;k -1,q) ｭ］ｾ＠ ｭ］ｾ＠
and 
This leaves 
Even k 
By definition 
SECOND TERM 
k-1 k-1 
L (b(m;k -1,q)- L b(m;k -1,q) = 0 
m -.til. 
- 2 
B(k, q) 
.til. m= 2 
THIRD TERl\<1 
k-1 1 k-1 
- qb(-2-; k- 1, q) - 2b(-2-; k, q) 
( 1) k- 1 - q- 2 b(-2-; k- 1, q) 
B(k, q) - ¢(k)- ¢(k- 1) 
FIRST TERl'l'l SECOND TERtii 
k k-1 
L b(m;k,q)- Lb(m;k-l,q) 
1 k 
+2b(2; k, q) 
ｾ＠
THIRD TERM 
ｭ］ｾ＠
The first term is re-written as 
k k-1 
L b(m; k, q) = L b(m; k, q) + b(k; k, q) 
It is also noted that following (3.42) and (3.44), 
b(1n; k, q) = qb(m- 1; k- 1, q) + (1- q)b(1n; k- 1, q) 
and 
qb(k- 1; k- 1, q) = b(k; k, q) 
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(3.48) 
(3.49) 
(3.50) 
(3.51) 
Using (3.42) it is possible tore-express ＲＺＺＺＺｾ］ｾＫ Ｑ＠ b(m; k, q) as 
k k-1 2:: b(m; k, q) -
ｭ］ｾＫＱ＠
2:: [qb(m -1; k- 1, q) + (1- q)b(m; k- 1, q)] 
+qb(k- 1; k- 1, q) (3.52) 
In other words, qb(k - 1; k - 1, q) = b(k; k, m) is n1erely the last tern1 of the 
sunm1ation in ＲＺＺＺＺｾ］ＱＡ＼Ｋ Ｑ＠ b(m; k, q). This n1akes it possible to rewrite B(k, q) as 2 
k-1 
B(k, q) = 2:: [qb(1n- 1; k- 1, q) + (1- q)b(m; k- 1, q)] 
ｭ］ｾＫＱ＠
SECOND TERM 
k-1 
+qb(k -1; k -1)- 2:: b(m; k -1, q) 
ｭ］ｾ＠
THIRD TERM 
ｾ＠
+2b(2; k, q) (3.53) 
Expanding out ＲＺＺＺＺｾＺｾＫ Ｑ＠ [qb(1n- 1; k- 1, q) + (1 - q)b(1n; k- 1, q)) in the expres-
sion above yields 
k-1 k-1 
B(k, q) 2:: qb(m- 1; k- 1, q) - 2:: qb(m; k- 1, q) 
k-1 
+ 2:: b(1n; k- 1, q) + qb(k- 1; k- 1, q) (3.54) 
ｭ］ｾＫＱ＠
k-1 1 k 
- 2:: b(n-,; k -1, q) + 2b(2; k, q) ｭ］ｾ＠ (3.55) 
Noting that 
k-1 k-1 2:: qb(m- 1; k- 1, q)- 2:: qb(1n; k- 1, q)) - k qb( 2; k - 1, q) (3.56) 
-qb(k-1;k-1,q) 
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and 
SECOND TERM 
k-l k-1 k 2::: (b(1n; k -1, q)- 2::: b(m; k- 1, q) = -b(2; k -1, q) ｭ］ｾＫｬ＠ ｭ］ｾ＠
pernlits re-expression of B(k, q) as 
B(k,q) = k qb(2; k -1, q)- qb(k -1; k- 1, q) 
1 k 
+qb(k -1; k -1, q) + 2b(2; k, q) 
k 1 k 
qb(2; k- 1, q) + 2b(2; k, q) 
However, in the case of the third term it follows that setting ｾ＠ = m and appealing 
to the result fron1 (3.42) gives 
1 k 1[ k k ] 2b(2; k,q) = 2 qb(2 -1; k -1, q) + (1- q)b(2; k -1,q) 
This leaves 
B(k, q) k k 
- qb( 2; k- 1, q) - b( 2; k- 1, q) 
+qb(k- 1; k - 1, q) 
Ｋｾ＠ ｛ｱ｢ＨｾＭ 1; k- 1, q) + (1- ｱＩ｢Ｈｾ［＠ k -1, q)] 
k k 
qb(2; k -1, q)- b(2; k- 1, q) 
k 
+ (1 - q) b( 2; k- 1, q) 
- 0 
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(3.57) 
(3.58) 
(3.59) 
(3.60) 
(3.61) 
(3.62) 
Chapter 4 
Consensus Formation in Monetary Policy Committees 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I develop a boundedly-rational n1odel of how monetary policy conl-
nlittees are able to reach decisions on the interest-rate. I draw upon Morris De-
Groot's (1974) characterization of consensus forn1ation in groups and DeMarzo, 
Vayanos and Zweibel's (2003) n1odel of belief convergence in social networks. 
Given the role of consensus forn1ation in real-world MPCs,1 both n1odels, which 
share common features, are of relevance to the n1odelling of MPC decisions. Im-
plicit to each approach is the use of Markov chains as a heuristic by which agents of 
a group or network update their beliefs in successive periods, a procedtu·e hereafter 
referred to as Markovian Updating (MU). It provides a dynanlic n1echanisn1 by 
which MPC n1embers align their views thr<?ugh the deliberation process. Within 
this fran1ework, it is den1onstrated how men1bers of an MPC are able to reach 
agreen1ent even when ( i) not all members listen to each other in the course of 
deliberations and ( ii) views of n1e1nbers are initially diverse. The extent to which 
n1en1bers of a group listen to each other is n1odelled using a transition matrix, the 
configuration of which deternlines whether n1en1bers are able to agree with each 
other, and if so, the nature of any such agreen1ent. To con1pliment the analysis, 
I also use graph-theoretic representation to depict how n1en1bers of a n1onetary 
policy con1mittee are connected to each other. 
The 1nodel I develop potentially explains how n1en1bers of the United States 
FOMC, ECB Governing Council and Bank of England MPC are able to reach 
a agreen1ent on the interest-rate. I suggest, for example, that it is capable of 
explaining the stylised facts of Bank of England MPC men1ber voting behaviour. 
1 Fry et al (2000). 
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In particular, the voting record of the BoEMPC suggests that on a meeting by 
n1eeting basis, policy preferences of outsiders exhibit significantly n1ore heterogene-
ity than those of insiders. To quote Edn1onds (1999) insiders behave as if they 
are a "cohesive hon1ogeneous group." 2 Outsiders, by contrast constitute a n1ore 
disparate grouping. The n1odel potentially explains this behaviour. It is also 
applicable to FOMC voting behaviotu·. Recent studies of FOMC decision making 
have characterised its Chairman as a n1onetary policy 'dictator'. Chappell et al 
(2002) report a disproportionately large influence of the Chairn1an in relation to 
final policy decisions when con1pared with other FOMC n1en1bers. Again, the 
general n1odel developed herein plausibly reproduces this phenon1enon. 
The plan of the chapter is as follows. I initially proceed by presenting son1e 
'stylised facts' of n1onetary policy conm1ittee voting. When presenting these facts, 
I draw on Blinder and Wyplosz's (2005) classification of real-world monetary policy 
conmlittees into three distinct varieties - those which are ( i) autocratically-collegial, 
( ii) genuinely-collegial and (iii) individualistic. It is noted that this classification 
is particularly useful when rationalising the results of n1odel sin1ulations presented 
towards the end of the chapter. I then proceed to outline the n1odels of DeGroot 
(henceforth DG) and DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zweibel (henceforth DVZ). In much 
that san1e way DVZ suppose that newspapers sway readers toward their views over 
tin1e - even when the political affiliation of a newspaper is conm1on ln1owledge -
some men1bers of a monetary policy conmlittee sway other n1embers to their views, 
even when all n1en1ber's views are conm1only lnlOW11. A framework is provided 
which is able to account for why some MPC n1embers listen to some of their col-
leagues, but not others. I rationalise this in tern1s of amongst other factors, the 
career concerns of MPC 1nembers and the precision of n1embers' information. FUr-
ther, I account for why n1en1bers of an MPC n1ight hold different views regarding 
the appropriate policy stance. This, I suggest is attributable to the theoretical 
leanings of MPC men1bers and their perception of how the economy works. All 
of these clain1S are supported by empirical evidence, whether in the forn1 of MPC 
voting records or conm1ents or staten1ents n1ade by n1en1bers of MPCs past and 
present. I now turn to the en1pirics. 
2Edmonds (1999), p.3. 
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4.2 Some Stylised Facts of MPC Voting 
I begin by presenting son1e stylised facts of n1en1ber voting behaviour for the 
United States FOMC, the ECB Governing Council and the Bank of England MPC. 
Blinder and Wyplosz's (2005) characterisation of real-world monetary policy conl-
nlittees into three distinct types is integral to the analysis, and it is notable that 
according to their classification, none of the three conunittees discussed here are of 
the same type. Most pertinently, the classification n1ethod of Blinder and Wyplosz 
- hereafter BW - identifies the characterising structures of each conmlittee, in ad-
dition to rationalising the different patterns of voting behaviotu· corresponding to 
each one. It explains, for instance, why different n1onetary policy conm1ittees 
experience different levels of dissent. 
It is noted however that the first two types of conmlittee I define fall in a n1ore 
general class of collegial committees, according to wllich the decision reached by 
an MPC is supported by all n1en1bers: the policy decision is seen as en1bodying 
the collective wisdon1 of the con1mittee, and its n1embers hold that any differences 
of opinion n1ust be second to the con1n1on good- otherwise the authority of the 
conmlittee is dinlinished. 3 This is true for conmlittees which reach a decision by 
taking a formal vote and those which reach a consensus. For those conmlittees 
where a forn1al vote is taken, it is typified by a unanin1ous decision, or near 
unaninlity. Dissenting votes are thus considered unusual. So-called autocratically-
collegial, genuinely-collegial and individualistic n1onetary policy con1nlittees are 
now defined and related to their respective real-world counterparts, the US FOMC, 
ECB Governing Council and Bank of England MPC. 4 
3 Consider for example the comments of Chairman Burns from September 20, 1977 when the 
FOMC was badly split by seven votes to five in favour of the first policy directive: 
"Well let's stop and deliberate it. I think that would be a very unfortunate 
vote. It wo'l.tld mean that this would excite a great deal of disc'l.tssion that wo'l.tld 
not bring hono'Ur or credit to the Committee and therefore I think we m:ust seek to 
accommodate one another. I don't think that our differences are very large. Let's 
try again. Does anyone have a proposal to make, one of the dissenters?" (Emphasis 
added. Cited from Chappell et al (2002), ppS-6.) 
'
1BW also suggest there exists a natural ordering to their classification of committee types in 
terms of closeness to the unitary decision maker of economic theory. As one moves further down 
the ranking, so too does the power and influence of any single committee member, such as the 
Chairman. In terms of closeness to a single policy maker - consider the atypical institutional 
arrangement at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand where the decision on the interest rate rests 
solely with the Governor - the order of closeness is a'l.ttocmtically-collegial MPC, gen'Uinely-
collegial NIPC and finally an individ'ualistic JI.!JPC. 
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4.2.1 Autocratically-Collegial MPCs 
In an autocratically-collegial committee, the chairn1an is a virtual monetary policy 
'dictator'. The interest-rate decision is effectively the Chairman's choice. He 
n1ay n1ake a decision prior to the n1eeting, and n1erely notify his colleagues at 
its outset. Alternatively, he nlight take on board the views of other conmlittee 
n1en1bers during the n1eeting, then announce his decision and expect everyone to 
close ranks. BW class the US FOMC tmder Alan Greenspan as an autocratically 
collegial committee, an assertion which is borne out by the recent FOMC voting 
record. Between 2000- 2004, of 43 FOMC n1eetings and 473 votes cast exclud-
ing those of the chairn1an, only six were classed as dissenting. 5 Further work by 
Chappell et al (2002) reconfirms this result. They report that even though the 
FOMC places a very high value on reaching a consensus, the Chairman exercises 
40-50% of the voting weight in comn1ittee decisions. In sinlilar vain, Maisel (1973) 
argues that although the Chairn1an may be influenced by other FOMC n1en1bers, 
any policy preferred by hin1 is likely to be adopted. 
4.2.2 Genuinely-Collegial MPCs 
Men1bers on a genuinely-collegial committee n1ay openly disagree strongly about 
the best policy stance in the cotuse of MPC deliberations but in the end compro-
nlise on a comnlittee decision. Once a con1pronlise is reached, and the decision is 
annotmced, all comnlittee men1bers present a united front in public, ensuring that 
any disagreements are left in the board room. Essentially, each men1ber effectively 
assumes ownership of the decision. The ECB Govenling Council is an exan1ple of 
such a con1mittee. Although nlinutes of ECB Governing Council meetings are not 
published, it is well known that no formal vote is taken by its n1en1bers- rather, 
all n1en1bers reach a consensus,6 with all n1en1bers' opinions reportedly converging 
on a single interest-rate. 7 This assertion has a basis in numerous answers pro-
vided by the President of the ECB, Win1 Duisenberg, to questions fielded at the 
routine ECB press conferences which follow monetary policy decisions n1ade by 
the Governing Cotmcil. Ren1arks n1ade on February 3rd 2000 reflect this: 
5 As the Chairman tables the motion, he is assumed not to dissent. 
6! thanlc Nick Vidalis and Marco Catenaro at the ECB for helpful discussions relating to this 
matter. 
7This is in spite of ECB statutes stating that decisions taken by the GC on the short term 
interest rate are to be talcen using the mechanism of simple majority rule. Simple majority rule 
is outlined in Definition 4. 
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uFirst, there was no formal vote. Again ... .it was a consensus decision." 
(emphasis added) 
Sinular con1ments were n1ade on June 8th 2000: 
uwe had an intensive discussion, a prolonged discussion, which was very 
useful, and, in the end, resulted in a consensus on what we had to do." 
(emphasis added) 
4.2.3 Individualistic MPCs 
On an individualistic committee, n1en1bers not only openly disagree strongly about 
the best policy stance in the course of MPC deliberations, but actively cast a 
vote which reflects their position. Such a con1mittee is assumed to make decisions 
through the application of SMV, with a unanin1ous decision being neither expected 
nor sought. The Bank of England MPC is the archetypal case of an individualistic 
committee. The rate of dissent is certainly higher on the Bank of England MPC 
than the FOMC. Meade and Sheets (2002) report that over the period 1978-2000 
inclusive, only 198 out of 2403 votes cast by FOMC members were dissenting. This 
an1ounts to about 8% of all votes cast. Contrast this with the voting behaviour of 
Bank of England MPC members. For the first five years of the MPC, 106 out of 642 
votes cast- approxin1ately ＱＶｾＥＭ were dissenting. Crudely put, MPC n1embers 
are twice as likely to dissent than FOMC men1bers.8 However, it is noted here that 
on an individualistic MPC, the prospect of a majority of 1nen1bers not being able 
to reach agreen1ent is en1phatically not an option: irrespective of any differences 
over the appropriate interest-rate for the econon1y, MPC n1embers are compelled to 
8 Comparison with other committees is also of interest. Nobuyuki Nalmhara (2002), member 
of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, attributes differences in the dissent voting behaviour 
of members of the monetary policy committees of the Bank of England and Bank of Japan to 
individual accountability, attesting: 
"I heard that Dr. DeAnne Julius, a former member of the Monetary Policy 
Committee of the Bank of England, said that when members are not individually 
accountable, they lose the incentive to malm public their position at the voting 
stage even if they had voiced opposing views during the debate, and that it will 
become easier for the majority, which would include the most influential individual, 
to carry the vote. To avoid this situation, the parliament holds individual hearings. 
Although the connection is not clear, since April 1998, deputy governors, though 
they are chosen from the staff of the Bank of England, are known to have cast 
eleven minority votes on eight occasions. As for the Bank of Japan, it was revealed 
at a recent parliamentary session that there had never been a division of views of 
the governor and two deputy governors." (emphasis added) 
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reach a decision, albeit via a winning majority as opposed to unaninlity. Clearly, 
failure to reach a decision in the forn1 of no winning n1ajority emerging would have 
damaging consequences for the credibility of n1onetary policy. 9 I now turn to the 
model. 
4.3 The Model 
Envisage a n1onetary policy conm1ittee of m n1en1bers with responsibility for set-
ting the interest-rate. Prior to the start of the n1eeting (and the deliberation 
process), each MPC men1ber weights the opinions of other n1embers, including 
himself. More formally, let, Pi,k denote the weight placed on n1ember k's opinion 
by the jth n1en1ber. For each men1ber the sun1 of weights equals one 
m 
LPj,k = 1 (4.1) 
j=l 
where 
V j, k E {1, 2, ... m} (4.2) 
This determines the elements of an m x m transition n1atrix, where each row 
corresponds to respective 1nembers' allocation of weights. 
P1,1 P1,2 Pl,m-1 Pl,m 
P2,1 P2,2 P2,m-1 P2,m 
P3,3 
P= (4.3) 
Pm-2,m-2 
Pm-1,1 Pm-1,2 Pm-1,m-1 Pm-l,m 
Pm,1 Pm,l Pm,m-1 Pm,m 
I call the configuration of P the influence structure of the group. P is informative 
because it indicates the extent to which all n1en1bers of the group are influenced 
by each other. Specifically, I define Pi,k, the weight placed on men1ber k's opinion 
by the jlh men1ber, as the direct influence of k on j. Accordingly, k is said to have 
no direct influence on j if Pi,k = 0. However, if Pi,k = 0, it is still possible fork to 
influence j. Even when n1ember j is not directly influenced by k, k bears influence 
9It is inconceivable that a monetary policy committee would announce to the public that "our 
members are unable to reach a collective decision about the level of the interest-rate. Come 
back again tomorrow." 
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on j if k influences a n1ember l who directly influences j. Call this the indirect 
influence of j on k.10 Moreover, k still exerts influence on j if k influences a 
men1ber l who indirectly influences j, and so on. This exrunple illustrates that for 
some weighting allocations the nature of influence running to and fron1 men1bers 
n1ay becon1e highly complex, with the chain of influence an1ongst n1embers being 
deeply intertwined. By way of a further definition if a n1en1ber j neither directly 
nor indirectly influences n1ember k, then that 111e1nber is not influenced by k. 
F\trther, if any two n1en1bers j and k do not influence each other, they they do not 
communicate with each other. More generally, in the san1e way that m individuals 
do not conununicate with each other an analogous situation arises for groups of 
individuals. If there are two groups, J and J{ where no n1ember of either group 
comn1unicates with each other then group J does not con1municate with group K. 
This logic extends to the case of rn > 2 groups. 
4.3.1 Interest-Rate Preferences 
Corresponding to P is a belief vector containing n1en1bers' interest-rate preferences 
prior to the deliberation process. This vector contains the interest rates men1bers 
would choose to set were they given individual responsibility for monetary policy. 
Denote the transpose of this vector as 
1[0]1 - [" . ] 
- 11,0, ... , lm,O (4.4) 
where nun1bers given in subscripts M,N correspond to the respective interest-rate 
preferences for n1en1bers 1\1 = { 1, ... m} and the stage of the deliberation process 
N = {1, 2, ... , n} which is also denoted in the square bracket I[NJ. Members' 
revised views after the first period of discussions are calculated by pre-n1ultiplying 
the vector I [OJ by P, yielding 
(4.5) 
The transpose of this vector is given by 
1[1]1 - [' . ] 
- 11,1, ... , 1m,1 (4.6) 
Consensus is reached by a11 iterative process. Following the first round of deliber-
ations n1embers' original interest-rate preferences will have changed fron1 h,0 ... , im,o 
to revised esthnates given by h,1, ... , im,l· If a 1najority of n1en1bers' revised rates 
10We note here that k's influence on l may be either direct or indirect in nature. 
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·"• 
have not converged to the same interest-rate in the first period, then the process 
of revision continues until it does. Revised opinions are calculated up to the nth 
period as 
1[1] PI[O] = pli[O] 
1[2] - pj[l] = p21[0] 
(4.7) 
where pn is the n1atrix Praised to the nth power, n = 1, 2, ... n. The n1echanisn1 
by which n1en1bers revise their opinion might best be best viewed as a discrete 
iterative process that only ceases when all men1bers reach a consensus.n With 
each iteration, members revise their judgement of the interest-rate given their 
weighting of others' opinions. 
4.3.2 Informational Criterion 
An alternative criterion to allocating weights in the influence matrix is to assun1e 
that MPC n1mnbers weight n1en1bers according to inforn1ational criterion as op-
posed to perceived career concerns. I now envisage a setting where MPC members 
n1ust estimate the appropriate interest-rate for the economy, i*, in order to achieve 
some pre-determined policy objective, such as hitting an inflation target.12 The 
approach taken follows elements of DVZ, particularly with respect to the structure 
of the influence matrix, or to use their tern1inology, listening matrix. Members 
are essentially faced with reaching agreement on a single issue.13 It is assun1ed 
that individual i's estin1ate of paran1eter i* prior to the deliberation process ( i.e. 
at tin1e t = 0) is given by the noisy signal 
(4.8) 
11In the case of SMV, it might only be necessary for a sufficient number of MPC members to 
reach a consensus amongst themselves for a majority decision to be reached. 
12 Such as the institutional arrangement at the Bank of England. 
13This is unlike the DVZ set-up, where there were many issues. 
94 
F\1rther, n1ember j is assigned initial precision 1r?i by individual i, nan1ely 
(4.9) 
According to this structlu·e, ｬｩｭ€ｪｾｯｯ＠ = 0. In other words, the greater the variance 
associated with j' s inforn1ation, the sn1aller the associated precision. It is noted 
that in their original paper, DVZ assun1e introduce a binary variable qi,j where 
qi,j = { 1, 
0, 
if i listens to j; 
if i does not listen to j. (4.10) 
I assun1e that because MPCs are composed of n1en1bers who n1eet face to face on 
a regular basis, it is not feasible to suppose that members cannot listen to each 
other. Therefore I impose the assumption that qi,j = 1 for all men1bers. Unlike 
DG, the weight which members of a con1n1ittee place on the opinions of others is 
determined by n1embers' precisions, with the precision assigned to another menl-
ber's information being a n1en1bers subjective assessment. This may emanate from 
a men1ber's disclosure of private inforn1ation, At,j. Only certain members of the 
committee have inforn1ation which is worth listening to, and the n1ore useful the 
inforn1ation the sn1aller the variance. Inforn1ation deen1ed useless is assigned an 
infinitely large variance. 
More forn1ally, for an m n1en1ber n1onetary policy conlmittee, let the weight 
m 
given by a men1ber c to the inforn1ation of a men1ber k be given by ＱｲｾＬｫＯ＠ ?= ＱｲｾＬｪＮ＠
J=l 
The sum of these weights is necessarily one, and in line with in DG, these weight-
m 
ings are then assigned to an 1n x m matrix T, where the weighting ＱｲｾＬｫＯ＠ 2: ＱｲｾＬｪ＠
j=l 
corresponds to the elen1ent in the cth row and kth colun111. Matrix T thus has the 
characteristics of a transition n1atrix, the elen1ents in each row being non-negative 
and sumn1ing to unity. For con1pleteness, Tis more explicitly expressed as 
ＷＱＢｾ＠ 1 
-,n-'-
L; ＷＱＢｾ＠ • 
j=l .J 
T= (4.11) 
ＷＱＢｾ Ｑ ＷＱｌ＠
f: ＷＱＢｾ＠ j j=l I 
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Updating occurs is shnilar fashion to DG, only in this instance the belief vector 
containing n1embers' interest-rate preferences prior to the deliberation process is 
populated by noisy estimates of i*. Again, this vector contains the interest rates 
me1nbers would choose to set were they given individual responsibility for n1onetary 
policy. Inforn1ation pertaining to individuals' initial signals is then conm1unicated 
to each other through a social network, and n1embers update their views in con-
tiguous deliberative rounds. Updating in the first round takes place according to 
by post-multiplying the listening matrix by men1ber's initial interest-rate beliefs. 
First round revisions are thus explicitly defined as 
ＱｦｾＬｬ＠ ＱｦｾＬｭ＠
f ＷｦｾＮ＠j=l ,J 
_1l_l_ 
I: Ｗｦｾ＠ • j=l ·3 
X ( 4.12) 
(4.13) 
As is the case with the DG model, if n1en1bers' revised rates have not converged 
to the san1e interest-rate in the first period, the revision process continues until it 
does with agents treating the inforn1ation in each round as new and independent. 
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Up to the nth period revised opinions are calculated as 
J[l] TI[O} = Tl J(O] 
Il21 - Tl[l] = T2Il01 
where Tn is the n1atrix T raised to the nth power. 
(4.14) 
4.3.3 Graph Theoretic Representation of Direct and Indi-
rect Influence 
The nature of direct and indirect influence in the n1odel can be depicted using 
graph-theoretic representation. In terms of graph theory, a graph is a structure 
comprised of nodes, which represent men1bers of a group, and lines connecting the 
nodes together, lmown as edges.14 Edges are directed - giving them the appearance 
of arrows - which means that it is possible to capture the direction of influence 
running fron1 n1en1ber to men1ber. For example, a directed edge running directly 
from men1ber j to men1ber k indicates that j is directly influenced by k. Put 
another way, elen1ent Pi,k E (0, 1]. However, if k is also directly influenced by j, 
both members will be connected by an arrow, -r-t, which runs in both directions. 
Figure 4.0 gives sin1ple exan1ples of possible influence structures. Diagran1 ( i) 
can be construed as a special case of a one n1ember comn1ittee where that n1en1ber 
listens only to himself. The unidirectional arrow running fron1 the node to itself is 
thus used to show that j directly influences himself. A n1en1ber directly influencing 
himself is represented using a unidirectional arrow running from a node to itself. 
This is illustrated in (i) for the case of a n1ember j. For this member Pii = 1 -
( ii) depicts a two n1en1ber group con1prised of j and k, who do not co1nmunicate 
with each other - both men1bers effectively ignore each other, listening to their 
own opinion only. Therefore, Pik,Pki = 0 and Pii,Pkk = 1. Parts (iii) and (iv) 
depict two n1en1ber groups where individuals are influenced directly by each other. 
In (iii) n1ember j is directly influenced by k, although k ignores j, choosing to 
14 Sometimes nodes and edges are referred to as vertices and arcs respectively. 
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listen to himself only. Therefore pjj,Pkj = 0 and Pjk,Pkk = 1. In (iv) both group 
men1bers listen to then1selves and are directly influenced by each other. There-
fore it must follow that pjj,Pkj,Pjk,Pkk E (0, 1). The final example, (v) depicts 
the nature of indirect influence an1ongst a three men1ber group, and shows that 
although j is indirectly influenced by k, the opposite cannot be said to be true. 
The exan1ple den1onstrates that with only a three n1en1ber network, the nature of 
relationships between its men1bers can be complex. 
The notions of direct and indirect influence can also be n1apped to standard 
concepts in the theory of Markov chains. A transient state has a steady-state 
probability of zero. In FIGURE 4.0 (iii) j is equivalent to a transient state: once 
j reaches k it is is hnpossible to get back. A transient set contains a group of 
states all of which have steady-state values of zero. A recurrent set contains a set 
of states such that once the systen1 enters it, it always n1akes transitions within 
the set and never leaves it. In FIGURE 4.0 (v) land k form a recurrent set. Once 
j enters it, it is impossible to return. An absorbing state is a special case of a 
recurrent set which contains only one state. This is the case in FIGURE 4.0 (iii) -
k is an absorbing state. If the entire systen1 is a is a recurrent set, then it is called 
ergodic. FIGURE 4.0 (iv) is an example of an ergodic systen1. If a systen1 is not 
ergodic, then there n1ay be n1ore than one recurrent set in the systmn. FIGURE 
4.0 (v) is therefore not ergodic - it contains one recurrent set (k and l) and a 
transient state (j), and is characteristic of an absorbing chain. 
4.4 Diverse Interest-Rate Preferences 
Each MPC men1ber is assumed to have a preferred interest rate which is non-
negative and continuous, and predonunantly based on all currently available eco-
nonuc inforn1ation.15 More formally, write that 
ij,t E {0 ::; i < oo} = f(O.t, At,j, l'lfj) (4.15) 
Equation (4.15) represents n1en1ber j' s choice of interest-rate ij as a function of 
group information ｬｾｮｯｷｮ＠ to all conlffiittee men1bers in the current period, O.t, plus 
information specific to that individual n1en1ber, Aj,t· Refer to n1en1ber specific 
information as n1en1ber j'8 private information. This general fra1nework reflects 
15In practice however, the values from which a member will choose from are likely to be 
constrained to a small finite set of values. 
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(i) 
(H) 
(ill) 
(iv) 
(v) 
j din:ct!J• influences himself. 
j and k do not inflmnce each other.} 
direct!;• iliflllences himself, as docs k. 
j is direct!;• tiif711mced by k, but docs not ilif/lleJJce himself. 
k is not injiNmcedbyj. k dti-ect!J• ilif111mces himself only. 
j and k both direct!;• hif/11mce each other. 
j is direct!;• tiif/lleltced by himself, as is k. 
j is indirect!J• influenced by k via I. However, k 
is not indirectfy iliflmnced by j because I docs 
not tiifluence / I and k dti-ect!J• iliflllencc each other. 
Neither} nor k direct!;• bifluence each other. 
FIGURE 4.0. 
GRAPH THEORETIC REPRESENTATIONS OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT INFLUENCE 
real-world features of n1onetary policy decision n1aking. For example, in the case 
of the Bank of England, ilt n1ay be construed as e1nbodying information contained 
in internal Bank forecasts and the ntn11erous econonlic analyses presented to MPC 
n1e1nbers at pre-Iv1PC 1neetings by bank staff. This infonnation is con1n1on knowl-
edge to all MPC members.16 The existence of private infonnation, Aj,t, e1nanates 
fron1 the fact that different 1nen1bers will invariably be both exposed to and re-
ceptive to different sources of infonnation during their tin1e on the MPC.17 In 
addition to the role of infonnation, it is supposed that l\IIPC n1e1nbers 1nay have 
different views of how the econon1y works, and to put it crudely, different n1odels 
of the econon1y in their heads. 18 Thus, even when 1nen1bers are presented with 
16Much of this information is not in the public domain. For example, the monthly report 
on regional developments presented at pre-1viPC meetings by the Bank of England's regional 
agencies is unavailable to the public at large. In this sense, the information forming MPC 
members' common information set is still exclusive to the monetary authorities. 
17In the case of European monetary union, a member j of the ECB's governing council may 
not divulge private information which, if it becomes common knowledge, may lead to other 
committee members taking an interest rate decision detrimental to member j 8 economy. 
18 Sushil vVadhwani (2002) is an example of an JVIPC member to openly express doubts about 
the efficacy of the suite of Bank of England models used in the forecast of inflation and GDP. 
These forecasts, which form the basis of the Dank's Inflation RepoTt, are purportedly integral 
to decisions on the interest rate, and are supposed to represent the 'collective judgement' of the 
MPC. 
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the san1e econonlic facts, they n1ay still prescribe conflicting courses of action for 
the economy - different men1bers may treat the same inforn1ation differently. In 
light of this, .Nij denotes a n1en1ber j's n1odel of the economy.19 The fran1ework 
en1bodied in (4.15) is also assumed to extend to the United States FOMC and 
the ECB Governing Council. However, having arrived at a view as to the n1ost 
appropriate interest-rate, men1bers must now arrive at a collective decision. The 
n1echanisn1 which captures this process is described in the following section. 
4.4.1 Weighting the Opinions of MPC Members 
Given nt, At,j and .Nfj there is no guarantee that n1en1bers j = {1, 2, .. , J} will 
prescribe the same interest-rate for the econo1ny. Indeed, prior to the deliberation 
process, n1en1bers 1nay initially hold different views. In this fran1ework, ( 4.15) 
accounts for such diverse interest-rate preferences. Where differences in opi1lion 
arise, son1e mechanisn1 exists which brings about a group consensus or sufficient 
agreen1ent leading to a n1ajority of votes being cast in favour of one particular 
course of action. Having forn1ed an opinion on the interest-rate, n1embers are 
assun1ed to reach an agreement on the interest-rate using the iterative procedure 
outlined in (4.7). A key issue, however, is MPC men1bers' criteria for allocating 
weights. Some weighting allocations will lead to no consensus being reached. Yet 
for the FOMC, ECB Governing Council and Bank of England Monetary Policy 
Conm1ittee, failure to reach a decision is emphatically not an option - a course of 
action must be agreed upon. 20 Such results are in a sense not plausible. 
4.4.2 Allocating Weights to Members' Opinions 
A clear obstacle in applying this n1odellies in the allocation of weights of others' 
opinions. Weights are not deternlined arbitrarily, but detern1ined by ( i) career 
19This has a clear analogy with jury deliberations. Even when presented with exactly the 
same evidence in a trial, jurors arrive at different conclusions as to the innocence or guilt of a 
defendant. Although this may be due to some jurors having a lower threshold of doubt than 
others, it is not implausible to assume that members may use different lines of reasoning than 
their fellow jurors or attach different levels of importance to the same piece of evidence. In 
much the same way, committee members may not weight all economic information in the same 
way when arriving at a decision about monetary policy. Evidence that this occtus is given by 
Goodhart (1999), stating that 
"What .. .is the current sign of the output gap? As evidenced by our differing votes, 
we in the MPC can and do see the same underlying data having different implica-
tions for that gap.n (pp.247-248) 
2
°Failure to reach a decision would severely damage the reputation on the monetru.·y authorities. 
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concerns, a view which is not entirely new to the literature and ( ii) the precision of 
men1bers' inforn1ation, as exemplified by the general approach of DVZ. In relation 
to (i), consider Havrilesky and Schweitzer's (1990) proposal that dissent voting is 
a source of disutility for individuals serving on the US FOMC. When differences 
in opinion arise, the presence of career concerns can lead a member to 'revise' their 
view and subsequently vote with individuals who are perceived to have a bearing 
on his or her career path. Lawrence Roos, president of the St. Louis Federal 
Reserve Bank pays testan1ent to this view, forging a clear link between dissent 
voting behaviour and career concerns: 
"If one is a young, career oriented president who's got a family to feed 
he tends to be n1ore moderate in his opposition to governors." 21 
The message here seen1S to be that even when views on the interest-rate are diver-
gent, social forces come into play thus bringing about agreen1ent an1ongst commit-
tee metnbers. Accordingly, members are more likely to pay attention to n1embers 
of a sinular type as they may have to work with then1 in the future - perhaps even 
long after their tin1e on serving on the comnuttee has ended. Disagree1nent now 
may han1per future prospects of pron1otion, and although n1en1bers care about 
the objectives of the conm1ittee, they also care about future career advancement. 
In this sense, the way a n1ember 'performs' on an MPC is not just measured as 
their ability to hit an inflation target, so to speak, but judged according to a their 
propensity to agree with men1bers of his or her type. 
This may be particularly true for insiders serving on the Bank of England 
MPC. As stated in the section in individualistic MPCs, the voting record for the 
first five years of the MPC, demonstrates that approximately 16!% of n1embers' 
votes were dissents. Essentially, MPC n1embers are twice as likely to dissent than 
FOMC n1en1bers. Yet this statistic can be broken down further. Bank insiders 
were on the winning side of a n1onetary policy decision 93.6% of the time, com-
pared with outsiders for whom the figure was 73.9%. In other words, insiders 
are far less likeiy to dissent than outsiders, although when insiders dissent, they 
do so on the side of n1onetary tightness, whereas outsiders do so on the side of 
21 cf. Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990), p.3. Also considered is the opinion of Henry Wallich, 
a member of the Board of Governors: 
"It is not a pleasant thing to have to keep dissenting ... One dissents less often than 
you would think. After all you are a member of a group and you want to get along 
with the other members." 
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monetary ease. These results forn1 the focus of further analysis in Chapter 6. Yet 
an equally con1pelling finding is that insiders were in agreen1ent with each other 
n1ore so than outsiders. To quote Edmonds (1999) insiders behaved as if they 
were a "cohesive hon1ogeneous group." 22 
To substantiate this claim, I develop the following n1easure, 8j, which corre-
sponds degree of agreement between insiders and outsiders respectively, at the 
average MPC meeting. Let this be expressed as 
T ･ Ｎ］ｾＧＢＢ＠ aj,t 3 ｌＮＮＮＮＮ［ｾ＠ ' T t=l ｾｪＬｴ＠ j=I,O (4.16) 
where I and 0 denote insiders and outsiders respectively, a j,t denotes the standard 
deviation of the desired interest-rate for members of group j in n1eeting t, and "lj,t 
the corresponding n1ean interest-rate for each group in meeting t. The term ｾ＠
. .,,t 
is no more than the coefficient of variation in n1eeting t. Lastly, let T stand for 
the total nun1ber of meetings included in the sample. Essentially, I calculate the 
coefficient of variation of interest rate preferences for each group at each n1eeting, 
and then take the group average across all n1eetings in the sample, to proxy for 
the measure of agreement within each group at the average meeting.. Accordingly, 
the smaller the value of ej, the lower the level of variability in interest-rate pref-
erences expressed by n1embers at each meeting. A value of 8 1 = 0 would suggest 
that insiders were on average in perfect agreement with each other in every MPC 
meeting. The coefficient of variation associated with outsider preferences over the 
interest-rate- 8o = 1.508- is son1ewhat higher than those of insiders, for whom 
e 1 = 0.563. The policy preferences of outsiders at the average meeting are n1ore 
diverse that those of insiders, who on average, have n1ore of a tendency to agree 
with each other at each MPC meeting. 23 Indeed, insiders were in total agreen1ent 
with each other in 56 out of 74 n1eetings (i.e. when ｾ＠ = 0). For outsiders, the 
'l.f,t 
nun1ber was in only 31 meetings (i.e. when ｾｯＬｴ＠ = 0). These results are plotted 
'l.O,t 
in FIGURE 4.3. 
22 Edmonds (1999), p.3. 
23 F\rrther, the finding that insiders are more likely to agree with each other more than outsiders 
has important ramifications for the way the MPC is perceived. It is commonplace in the financial 
press and media to portray insiders and outsiders as two distinct groups, each with well defined 
objectives and goals. These result serve to partially dispel this myth. 
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Whereas insiders 1nay be seen to have well defined goals and fonn a honlo-
geneous cohesive group, outsiders forn1 n1ore of a disparate grouping. I suggest 
that such observed voting behaviour arises due to insiders being incentivised to 
pay 1nore attention to each other than outsiders. In the context of the n1odel, 
this leads to insiders only weighting the policy preferences of fellow insiders in the 
course of MPC deliberations, which can be explained by the presence of career 
concerns.24 •25 As insiders have a 5-4 in-built n1ajority over outsiders one might 
reasonably posit that if insiders voted together as a group - essentially weighting 
only the opinions of other insiders- they would dmninate decisions on the MPC, 
regardless of any opposition frmn their externally appointed counterparts. This 
24 This may be because, as Buiter (1999) points out, the appointment of insideTs to the lviPC 
emanates from their positions in the hierarchy of the Bank. Given the fact that insiders enjoy a 
numerical majority on the IviPC, it is reasonable to suppose that were an 'institutional consensus' 
to develop - which is likely in an organisation like the Bank, which has a strong internal culture 
and sense of 'corporate identity'- insideTs would dominate MPC decisions by dint of their inbuilt 
majority. Put another way, 
' ... every organisation develops, in short order, an in-house view, an orthodoxy, a 
conventional wisdom, which it becomes increasingly difficult to challenge' (Buiter 
(1999), p.l3.) 
For this reason Buiter suggests that it would be apposite for the committee to have a majority 
of outsideTs, or rather, individuals who do not hail from a single organisation. 
25 In the event of a split decision, the Governor of the Bank in his role as Chairman of the 
1\IIPC has a casting vote. 
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is what is seen in practice. 
4.5 Unanimous versus Majority Consensus 
I now define two types of consensus which can be reached by a conmlittee: unan-
imous consensus and majority consensus. A unanimous consensus occurs where 
n1en1bers' opinions all converge on the san1e interest-rate. Contrast this with a 
majority consensus, where at least half of all elen1ents in the belief vector converge 
to the san1e point estimate in the lin1it. The former category is n1ost inm1ediately 
applicable to autocratically-collegial and genuinely-collegial n1onetary policy com-
n1ittees - in both of these conm1ittees, the ability to reach a deliberative outcon1e 
characterised by all n1en1bers being in agreement with each other. Unanimity is 
highly valued, and thus consciously sought. As a real-world example of unanimous 
consensus, recall the remarks of Win1 Duisenberg at an ECB press conference fol-
lowing the monetary policy decision made by the Governing Council on February 
3rd 2000: 
"First, there was no formal vote. Again ... .it was a consensus decision." 
(emphasis added) 
The staten1ent in1plies that all n1en1bers of the ECB Governing Council were agreed 
on the san1e interest-rate. Therefore its men1bers can be said to have reached a 
unanimous consensus. A unanimous consensus might also apply to an individ-
ualistic conm1ittees where all men1bers vote in favour of the Chairn1an's policy 
proposal, such as the August 2002 n1eeting of the Bank of England MPC - all 
men1bers voted in favour of the proposition that the Bank's repo-rate should be 
n1aintained at 4%. However, a majority consensus is n1ore likely to be charac-
teristic of the decisions reached by individualistic committees, where agreen1ent 
amongst all n1embers is not sought or expected. As previously attested, the nine 
men1ber Monetary Policy Conmlittee of the Bank of England is such a body, and 
this is borne out in the previous section. 
4.5.1 Convergence to a Unanimous Consensus 
A unanimous consensus is reached if all elen1ents in the belief vector converge to 
the san1e value in the limit as n --7 oo. More forn1ally, consensus is achieved by 
all MPC n1en1bers if 
1. . "* 1m 11· n =I· n-+oo ' J,n V j = 1,2, ... ,7n. ( 4.17) 
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This only occurs where there is a (1 x m) row vector 1r = [7r1 , .... , 7rm] such that 
for j = (1, 2, ... , m) and l = (1, 2, ... , m), 
1. (n) liD p ·z = trz ｮｾｯｯ＠ J, (4.18) 
where ｰｾｮＩ＠ is an elmnent belonging to the transition matrix pn fron1 row j and J,l 
colunm l. In other words, for an 'In n1ember comnlittee, unanimous consensus is 
achieved when the elmnents of ｰｮｾｯｯ＠ converge on a distribution characterised by 
m identical rows; in any given colun1n, the elen1ents will be identical. F\1rther, 
in keeping with the properties of a transition n1atrix, the elen1ents will be non-
negative and sun1 to unity, specifically 
(4.19) 
4.5.2 Convergence to a Majority Consensus 
A majority consensus is reached if at least half of all elements in the belief vector 
converge to the san1e value in the lin1it as n ｾ＠ oo. More forn1ally, consensus is 
achieved amongst a n1ajority of MPC men1bers if 
where 
1. . '* liD ljn =I· ｮｾｯｯ＠ ' J,n 
'ln-1 
Vj#k, k={1,2, ... ,-2-} 
Vk lim ik n # ｩ Ｑ ｾｮ＠ｮｾｯｯ＠ ' ' 
(4.20) 
(4.21) 
This will only occur when there is a vector 1r 1 = [7r1, .... , 'If m] such that for j, l = 
(1, 2, ... ,'In), 
1. (n) liD PJ·z = 1rz, 
ｮｾｯｯ＠ ' 
j,l # k (4.22) 
where ｰＩｾＩ＠ is an elen1ent belonging to the transition matrix pn fron1 row j and 
column l. In other words, for an 'In n1en1ber conlffiittee, majority consensus is 
achieved when the elements of ｰｮｾｯｯ＠ converge on a distribution characterised by 
j ｾ＠ m;l identical rows;26 unlike unanimous consensus, all that is required here 
is for a n1ajority of columns, the elen1ents will be identical. As was specified for 
unanin1ous consensus, under majority consensus the elen1ents in each row will be 
non-negative and sun1 to unity. 
26 To keep the analysis simple, odd m is assumed. 
105 
4.6 Conditions for Reaching a Consensus 
In specifying the conditions for reaching a consensus I develop theoren1S whose 
corresponding proofs have a basis in the theory of Markov chains. Such proofs 
can be found in standard reference texts on stochastic processes, probability theory, 
n1atrix theory and finite Markov chains. 27 It is assun1ed throughout that no two 
members share the same initial policy preferences. This implies that each elen1ent 
of the belief vector is tmique. 28 Conditions under which unanimous consensus is 
achieved are now stated. 
4.6.1 Unanimous Consensus 
Proposition 1: A unanimous consensus will be reached by the committee if the 
influence matrix P is irreducible and aperiodic. 
The following definition is introduced: 
Definition 1: A transition matrix is irreducible if and only if for every (j, k) there 
exists a natural number q such that 
PJ,k E (0, 1) (4.23) 
In other words, if all elen1ents in the influence n1atrix are positiye for son1e power 
q, it has a unique long-nm stationary distribution. In other words, although the 
transition matrix p[o) n1ay contain son1e zeros, n1embers are sufficiently connected 
such that every member listens to every other member either directly or indirectly. 
When the matrix is raised to some power q, all of the elen1ents in the listening 
n1atrix becon1e strictly positive but less than unity. It is crucial to note here that 
no PJ,k = 1, which would imply periodicity or an absorbing class. By (4.23) all 
27See for example Doob (1953), Feller (1968), Karlin (1969), Parzen (1962), Berman and 
Plemmons (1979), Kemeny and Snell (1960) and Theil (1972). 
28 This is an important assumption, and has ramifications for the conditions under which 
consensus will be reached. Here, the work of Berger (1981) is of particular importance. In 
a follow up paper to DG, Berger corrects DG's assertion regarding the necessary conditions 
for reaching a consensus. Simply put, whereas DG asserts that whether a consensus can be 
reached depends only on the influence matrix, P, Berger shows how it is also dependent on the 
initial (timet= 0) composition of the belief vector, 1[01. For example, assume that prior to the 
deliberation process all elements of the belief vector are equal, that is i1,0 = i2,0···im-1,0 = im,o, 
n = 1,2, ... oo. The make-up of P is hence irrelevant and a unanimous consensus is reached as 
l[n) = p[nll = 1[01. Given that the concern of this paper is to determine how members of an MPC 
reach agreement under initially diverse interest rate preferences, I do not consider this prospect. 
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recurrent states of the Markov chain communicate with each other and are aperi-
odic. A transition matrix with such properties is sometimes called regular. 
Proof of Proposition 1: See Appendix. 
The concept of irreducibility has an equivalent graph theoretic interpretation. 
If the digraph corresponding to the matrix P is strongly connected, then it is irre-
ducible. Strongly connected asserts that for any ordered pair (Pi ,P j) of vertices 
there exists a sequence of paths leading fron1 Pi to P j. Monetary policy conm1ittees 
whose men1bers axe strongly connected will necessarily reach a consensus. Simu-
lated examples of strongly connected MPCs are provided in proceeding sections. 
I now introduce the following further proposition relating to unanimous consensus. 
Proposition 2: A unanimous consensus will be reached by the committee if any 
member j is influenced only by himself, and influences all other members, either di-
rectly or indirectly. Members' beliefs will necessarily converge to those of member j. 
Proof of Proposition 2: See Appendix. 
Such a n1ember j is akin to n1onetary policy dictator of the variety assun1ed to 
yield influence in autocratically-collegiate MPCs. 
4.6.2 Majority Consensus 
In this section I restrict myself to the case where there are two distinct groups of 
n1en1bers on a n1onetary policy comn1ittee. This set-up is analogous to the insti-
tutional arrangen1ent at the Bank of England, and in line with the terminology 
popularly used to describe members of its n1onetary policy conlmittee, I refer to 
them as insiders and outsiders. This leads to Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3: If there exists two distinct groups of members within a monetary 
policy committee who do not communicate with each other, and each group forms an 
aperiodic recurrent class, for an m member committee, a majority consensus will be 
reached by the group with the largest number of members. 
Proof of Proposition 3: See Appendix. 
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The intuition underlying Proposition 3 is easy to understand. It says that if 
insiders and outsiders listen only to n1en1bers of their own type (thereby assigning 
zero weight to the views of those n1en1bers not of their type) insiders will be 
neither directly nor indirectly influenced by outsiders, and vice versa. By assuming 
that insiders and outsiders each forn1 an aperiodic recurrent class, it follows that 
men1bers in each group will reach a consensus an1ongst themselves. In the presence 
of initially diverse interest rate preferences, it is still possible for members to reach 
a unanin1ous consensus if the consensus rate of interest for both converges on the 
sa1ne rate. As a special case, this is den1onstrated in the appendix, and follows 
the proof of Proposition 3. Insiders are assun1ed to listen only to insiders, with 
the equivalent being true for outsiders. 
4.6.3 Failure to Reach a Consensus 
I now introduce the following proposition, which underscores the in1portance of 
listening to other MPC men1bers when views are initially diverse. 
Proposition 4: If no MPC member is directly or indirectly influenced by any other 
member, a consensus will never be reached. 
Proof of Proposition 4: See Appendix. 
This result follows because in each stage of the deliberation process each n1en1-
ber only updates his beliefs on the basis of listening to hin1Self. Consequently, 
a given men1ber's beliefs ren1ain unchanged fron1 period to period. This result 
suggests that MPCs should be populated by people who are willing to listen to the 
views of others. A conlffiittee con1prised of 'egoists' will never reach agreen1ent 
because in not weighting the opinions of others, n1en1bers are unable to budge 
fron1 their ｩｮｩｴｩｾ＠ positions on the interest-rate. If the asstm1ption of initial belief 
diversity is relaxed (i.e. son1e n1en1bers share the srune interest rate preferences 
prior to the deliberation process), a majority consensus will be reached if at least 
half of, but not all men1bers share the same initial belief. When all n1embers 
share the san1e initial belief a unanimous consensus is achieved. In either case 
there is no need to deliberate. 
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4.6.4 Periodic Behaviour 
Not all irreducible Markov chains thus have the property of ergodicity, and It is 
possible for a Markov chain to be both irreducible and periodic. Assunling ini-
tially diverse interest rate preferences, periodicity in1plies that limn-tooP is not 
characterised by a unique stationanJ distribution. A periodic Markov chain with 
n eigenvalues of n1odulus 1 has period n. In tern1s of the listening n1atrix P, this 
implies that n1embers n1ay be only be directly or indirectly influenced by other 
n1en1bers at regular intervals (i.e. every nth interval). F.t·on1 an intuitive perspec-
tive, such behaviour is unappealing. Periodicity in1plies that n1en1bers constantly 
switch to listening to different n1en1bers at different stages of the deliberation 
process. I nevertheless introduce the following proposition: 
Proposition 5: Under initially diverse interest rate preferences and assuming peri-
odicity, neither a unanimous nor majority consensus will be achievable when states are 
periodic. 
Proof of Proposition 5: See Appendix. 
It is noted that the results for Proposition 5 do not extend to the case where the 
influence matrix P is characterised by 1n sets of cyclic recurrent classes. Under 
such conditions, it is possible that ( i) there exist some linear con1bination of opinion 
weights and initial beliefs ensuring that 1[11 = 1[21 = ... = l[nJ (unanimous consensus) 
or (ii) a n1ajority of n1en1bers beliefs converge on the san1e interest rate for l[nJ, 
n = 1, 2, ... oo with the composition of the majority switching regularly in sync 
with the period of the cycle (majority consensus). Illustrative examples of such 
behaviour proceeds the proof of Proposition 5 in the appendix. I now turn to the 
sin1ulations. 
4.6.5 Speed of Convergence to a Consensus 
I have not yet touched on the speed at which beliefs will converge. In any transition 
n1atrix which is irreducible and aperiodic (therefore entailing that a unanimous 
consensus is reachable) the absolute value of the largest eigenvalue will equal unity, 
with the corresponding n1oduli of all other eigenvalues being sn1aller than one. 
Indeed, eigenvalue analysis n1ay be used to check whether convergence occurs, and 
a sufficient condition for reaching a unanin1ous consensus characterised by a unique . 
stationart.J distribution is given by the case where all other m -1 eigenvalues have 
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moduli strictly less than one. The rate with which convergence is achieved is 
related to the second largest eigenvalue in absolute value. Define this as 
8(P) = max{IAI: A E o-(P)}, A -1 1} (4.24) 
where o-(P) is the set of all eigenvalues in P. 8(P) declines geon1etrically with 
each iteration. For some transition n1atrices, it is possible that the roots may 
be complex. Calculating the absolute value of a complex number is given by the 
square root of its modulus. Therefore, for any complex eigenvalue Aj = a± bi, its 
absolute value can be defined as 
(4.25) 
Should the second largest eigenvalue A2 be con1plex, the convergence towards the 
stationary ､ｩｳｴｲｩｾｵｴｩｯｮ＠ is of the damped oscillary type. Fluther, if two influence 
n1atrices P and Pare con1pared such that ｾｨ･＠ 8(P) < 8(P), then consensus will 
ｾ＠ ｾ＠
be reached n1ore quickly under P than for P. It is noted that the largest eigen-
value of any transition n1atrix always is always a tmit root. The presence of more 
than one eigenvalue of n1odulus 1 does not necessarily imply that a unanimous 
consensus has not been reached, as this will also depend on the initial elen1ents of 
the of belief vector. In the case of a n1ajority consensus, there will be at least two 
eigenvalues with moduli equal to 1. 
It is possible to use 8(P) to determine the nun1ber of iterations until consensus 
is reached. A 'rough and ready' estin1ate is given by the forn1ula 
ｾ＠ = log0.008 
log(o(P)) (4.26) 
where ｾ＠ is the nun1ber of iterations (i.e. deliberative rotn1ds) and logarithms are 
to base 10. 
4. 7 Simulation Results 
PANELS 4.1-4.4 show various influence structures for MPCs. PANEL 4.1 (a) 
shows the influence network for a five men1ber monetary policy comnlittee where 
each n1en1ber places positive weight on the opinions of all n1en1bers, including 
hin1Self. In line with the institutional arrangen1ents at the Bank of England, two 
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types of n1ember are specified - insiders and outsiders. 29 F\lrther, the conm1ittee 
comprises three of the former type and two of the latter type. 30 Specifically, MPC 
members' ideal interest rates are captured by the belief vector 1*,0 , 
MEli1BER 
4.5 Governor 
4.4 Insider 1 
1*,0 = 4.3 Insider 2 (4.27) 
4.2 Outsider 1 
4.1 Outsider 2 
and opinion weights in the transition n1atrix P is are allocated such that 
MEMBER 
0.8 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 Governor 
0.05 0.8 0.05 0.05 0.05 Insider 1 
P= 0.05 0.05 0.8 0.05 0.05 Insider 2 (4.28) 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.8 0.05 Outsider 1 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.8 Outsider 2 
In P, rows 1-3 contain the opinion weights pertaining to insiders, and the remain-
ing two rows contain outsiders' allocation of weights. F\1rther, asstm1e that the 
insider in the first row is the Governor, who also assun1es the role of conlffiittee 
Chair. The general configuration of ( 4.28) applies to all simulations. In this 
exrunple, a unanimous consensus is achieved as all n1en1bers have a direct influ-
ence on each other. The MPC is strongly connected, with the influence n1atrix 
thus being irreducible and aperiodic. Corresponding numerical paran1eters for the 
opinion matrix are also shown. The speed of convergence, o(P) = 0.75. Using 
(4.26) it is detern1ined that the group reaches a consensus after approximately 
ｾ＠ = Ｑ ｦ Ｐ ｾ Ｐ Ｐ ｾ Ｗ ﾰ Ｕ Ｘ＠ = 16.78 deliberative rounds. Such an influence structure structure 
n1ay correspond to that at the European Central bank, and n1ore generally, gen-
uinely collegiate n1onetary policy committees. 
In PANEL 4.1 (b), each n1ember only listen to hin1self. By application of 
Proposition 4, because no MPC men1ber is directly or indirectly influenced by any 
other n1en1ber a consensus will never be reached. It is notable that the group 
29 Alternatively, one could' consider the distinction between Board members and Bank Presi-
dents on the Federal Open Market Committee or National Central Bank Governors and Board 
members sitting on the European Central Bank's Governing Council. 
30 As is the case with the MPC, it is supposed that insiders comprise the majority of members. 
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would reach a majority or unanin1ous consensus if a n1ajority of or all committee 
men1bers were endowed with same initial interest rate beliefs (i.e. if the assump-
tion of initially diverse beliefs is relaxed). No agreen1ent is otherwise reached, as 
is borne out in the example. 
In PANEL 4.2 (c), each n1en1ber only weights the opinion of a single member 
other than hin1self. No two men1bers weight the opinion of the san1e member, and 
P is irreducible and periodic with period 5. Fron1 Proposition 5, neither unani-
nlous nor n1ajority consensus are reachable, and associated transition n1atrix has 
no stationary distribution. This configuration has little intuitive appeal, as nlem-
bers' beliefs follow a cyclical pattern switching abruptly from period to period. 
However, it is notable that unanin1ous consensus is reachable if and only if the 
elen1ents of the belief vector are initially equal. A majority consensus is possible 
if a n1ajority of elen1ents in belief vector are equal, although the con1position of 
the n1ajority will switches from period to period following a cycle. PANEL 4. 2 
(d) depicts a n1onetary policy conm1ittee of insiders and outsiders who do not 
comn1unicate with each other. The exan1ple shows that even when both groups 
ignore each other consensus is still reachable, even under initially diverse interest 
rate preferences. It constitutes the special case of Proposition 3, as elaborated on 
in the proof given in the ｡ｰｰｾｮ､ｩｸＮ＠
In PANEL 4.3 (e), four members weight only the opinion of a single men1ber, in 
this case the Governor. As the Governor only weights his own opinion, the interest 
rate converges to his preferred rate. A unanin1ous consensus is thus reached. This 
is an exan1ple of an absorbing chain, the proof of which is given in Proposition 2. 
The example corresponds to a structure like the FOMC, which is an exan1ple of an 
autocratically collegiate con1nlittee. Here, all n1embers weight the opinion of the 
Governor, but he does not reciprocate, opting to weight his own opinion only. In 
PANEL 4.3 (f) n1en1bers are partitioned into two groups- insiders and outsiders. 
However, if two n1en1bers- one fron1 each group- both conm1unicate with each 
other, a unanimous consensus is reached. This is because fron1 Proposition!, the 
influence n1atrix is both aperiodic and irreducible. 
The final two shnulations shown in PANEL 4.4 depict possible states of af-
fairs for an individualistic MPC. Both exan1ples are geared specifically towards 
the institutional nuances of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Con1nlittee, 
and reproduce the stylised facts of voting behaviotu· associated with its n1en1bers. 
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In line with Proposition 3, insiders and outsiders are seen to reach a consensus 
an1ongst then1selves. However, it is assumed that outsiders initially prefer lower 
interest rates than outsiders. When insiders vote together as a group, they are 
seen to do1ninate decisions on the MPC, regardless of any opposition fron1 their 
externally appointed counterparts. Insiders reach a majority consensus, because 
they restrict then1selves to only weighting the opinions of n1en1bers of their own 
type. Further, the policy outcon1e is typified by an interest-rate which is higher 
than would be chosen by outsiders. 31 
The two examples also illustrate the importance of listening to others in the 
course of MPC deliberations. (g) can be viewed as con1prising a con1nlittee of 
'pragmatists', whereas (h) con1prises a committee of 'egoists'. Begin by assun1ing 
that the belief vector containing men1ber's ideal interest rates is identical to that 
in (4.27). Men1bers of conmlittee (h) weight their own opinions n1ore heavily 
than n1embers of comnlittee (g). We have that 
MEMBER 
0.8 0.1 0.1 0 0 Governor 
0.01 0.8 0.1 0 0 Insider 1 
pPragmatists = 0.1 0.1 0.8 0 0 Insider 2 (4.29) 
0 0 0 0.8 0.2 Outsider 1 
0 0 0 0.2 0.8 Outsider 2 
and 
MEMBER 
0.9 0.05 0.05 0 0 Governor 
0.05 0.9 0.05 0 0 Insider 1 
pEgoists = 0.05 0.05 0.9 0 0 Insider 2 (4.30) 
0 0 0 0.9 0.1 Outsider 1 
0 0 0 0.1 0.9 Outsider 2 
where pPragmatists and pEgoists correspond to the matrices in simulations (g) and 
(h) respectively. Con1pared to pPragmatists, the influence matrix pEgoists is notable 
in as far as all MPC n1en1bers weight their own opinions n1ore heavily, at the cost 
31 I suggest that if career concerns are present amongst members of the BoEMPC, and manifest 
themselves in much the same way as described by Lawrence Roos for members of the FOMC, it is 
not entirely incredulous to suggest that insiders will weight the opinions of insiders more heavily 
than outsiders. This fosters the prediction that insiders will be on the winning side of :NIPC 
decisions than outsiders, which is seen in practice. It would thus account for why Edmonds 
(1999) was able to observe that "the Bank representatives [insiders] have formed into a cohesive 
homogenous group" .(p.12) 
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of the opinions of their peers. Men1bers are less open to the opinions of others, 
so to speak: less pragmatic, and n1ore egoistic. Because egoists by definition 
weight their own opinions more heavily than pragn1atists, reaching a majority 
consensus takes longer. In the exan1ples in PANEL 4.4, both committees still 
choose the san1e interest-rate, albeit it takes longer for n1en1bers to arrive at a 
decision. This is borne out by eigenvalue analysis. Firstly, because the influence 
matrix is characterised by two disjoint conm1unicating classes, both matrices have 
two eigenvalues with n1oduli equal to 1. In (g) and (h) it follows that 
ＵＨｐｐｲｮｾｭ｡ｴｩｳｴｳＩ＠ < ｯＨｐｅｧｯｾｳｴｳ＠ ) 
I nsuler s I nstder s (4.31) 
and 
｢Ｈｐｐｲ｡ｧＱｾＱ｡ｴｩｳｴｳＩ＠ < ｯＨｐｅｧｯｩｳｾｳ＠ ) 
ｏｵｴｳｾ､･ｲｳ＠ ｏｵｴｳｾ､･ｲｳ＠ (4.32) 
Egoistic insiders reach a consensus an1ongst themselves after e = Ｑ ｾ［ｧ＠ Ｐ Ｐ ｾ Ｘ ﾰ Ｕ Ｘ＠ ｾ＠ 30 
deliberative rounds, whereas their pragn1atic COlUlterparts do SO after e = ｬｾｾｾＰｾｾ Ｘ＠ ｾ＠
14 rounds. The same applies to outsiders, for whon1 members of the egoistic variety 
reach a consensus after ｾ＠ = log o.oos ｾ＠ 22 rounds in contrast to ｾ＠ = log 0·008 ｾ＠ 9 
1::. log0.8 ' 1::. log0.6 
rounds for pragmatists. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has adopted a bounded-rational approach to decision making by mon-
etary policy con1mittees. It has sought to account for the deliberation process by 
den1onstrating how MPC men1bers' views align when interest rate preferences are 
initially diverse. If n1embers share initially diverse views, comn1unication amongst 
MPC n1en1bers is crucial in forging consensus. I showed how consensus n1ay be 
achieved under a variety of different assumptions, and provided a forn1al nlecha-
nisnl which potentially explains how autocratically collegiate, genuinely collegiate 
and individualistic committees are able to reach a decision. The model potentially 
explains the process by which n1en1bers of an MPC are persuaded to budge fron1 
their initial interest rate positions. In practice, MPCs do reach an agreen1ent, 
which suggests that men1bers do listen to each other and n1odify their beliefs in 
the cotu·se of deliberations. I suggest that this n1ay be due to career concerns, 
n1en1bers' subjective assessn1ents of other's inforn1ation, and the internal culture 
of an MPC. 
An overriding conclusion which mnerges fron1 the analysis is that it is possible 
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to populate MPCs with people who hold very different views about the economy 
and still reach an agreen1ent. Secondly, and perhaps n1ore obviously, MPCs should 
be populated by people who are willing to listen to the opinions of others. A con-
sequence of not adhering to this reconm1endation is that reaching an agreen1ent 
n1ay not be achievable, as was demonstrated by Proposition 4 - when no men1ber 
listens to the views of other n1en1bers, consensus is not reached, unless one relaxes 
the assumption of initially diverse interest rate preferences. Yet the fact that 
what drives people to listen to one another is n1otivated by ( i) career concerns 
and ( ii) men1bers' subjective assessn1ents of others information raises in1portant 
questions. Is, for example, the consensus outcon1e the best for the econon1y, espe-
cially given that the propensity for n1embers to reach agreement is en1phatically 
not driven by a desire to adopt the 'optin1al' policy, but selfish motives such as 
career advancen1ent? 
The model may potentially explain Alan Blinder's (1998) contention that nlon-
etary polfcy comnlittees reach decisions which are 'inertial' and 'regress towards 
the mean'. For instance, consider how genuinely collegiate MPCs reach a 'com-
promise' interest rate characterised by an average of initial beliefs weighted by the 
unique stationary distribution of the influence matrix as limn-+oo pn. The model 
raises further questions about the benefits of delegating n1onetary policy to a com-
nlittee. It is often assun1ed that such an institutional arrangen1ent is beneficial 
because men1bers are able to pool their information. However, this precludes the 
fact that ( i) any given n1en1ber's assessment of others' inforn1ation may be purely 
subjective -and wide off the n1ark - and ( ii) agents may be boundedly rational, 
using a simple heuristic to update beliefs, as opposed to more robust and compu-
tationally burdenson1e procedures. Very few models of n1onetary policy decision 
making consider these possibilities. In this sense there exists considerable scope 
for this chapter to be extended, especially if one relaxes the assun1ption of initially 
diverse interest rate preferences. This would entail that for exan1ple, some nlem-
bers may share identical beliefs prior to the deliberation process. The analysis in 
this section has not considered this more general case, and it therefore represents 
a possibility for further analysis. Secondly, one nlight con1pare the extent to which 
decision outcomes are different when n1en1bers are fully as opposed to boundedly 
rational. 
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4.A Appendix to Chapter 4 
4.A.l Proof of Proposition 1 
To prove that a unanin1ous consensus will be reached by the conm1ittee if the 
influence n1atrix P is irreducible I draw heavily on I(enleny and Snell (1960) and 
Theil (1972). To establish the proof it is first necessary to draw on the following 
lermna: 
Lemma 1 
Let the m x m transition matrix P contain strictly positive elen1ents Pi,j such that 
Pi,j E [0, 1] and Ｚｅｾ Ｑ＠ = 1. Denote c as the sn1allest elen1ent of P by x, an m x 1 
colun111 vector and Px the vector arising from pre-n1ultiplying x by P. Denote 
by m 0 and lv10 the smallest and largest elements of x respectively, and let m 1 and 
lvh denote the corresponding values for vector Px. Len1ma 1 asserts that 
(4.33) 
(4.34) 
and 
lvh- m1 ｾ＠ (1- 2c)(Mo- mo) (4.35) 
Proof of M1 ｾ＠ lvfo: To show (4.33) and (4.35), begin by denoting x* as an 1n x 1 
colun111 vector obtained fron1 x through replacing all but one element m0 with lV£0 • 
Where there is n1ore than one 1n0 elen1ent in x assun1e that all but one of them 
are replaced by M0 • Now consider that we have that 
X= and x* = 
Xn-1 
lvfo 
ｸｾ＠ x* 
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?no 
Mo 
Mo 
Mo 
(4.36) 
(4.37) 
by assunling that each elen1ent of x* is greater than its corresponding element in 
x by a nonnegative runount. Using the relationships outlined above, and because 
m I: Pid = 1, the ith elen1ent of vector Px* is captured by 
j=l 
m 
Pi,tmo + LPidl\1o - Pi,tmo + (1- Pi,t)lvfo 
j=2 
(4.38) 
Given that c is the sn1allest elen1ent of the transition n1atrix P, it follows that it 
n1ust be less than or equal to any element Pi,j, nan1ely 
c<p·. = t,J (4.39) 
Therefore we have that c ;£ Pi,l· This in1plies that for vector Px*, 
Mo- c(Mo- 'lno) ｾ＠ l\1o- Pi,t(Mo- mo) (4.40) 
As it has already been defined that x ;£ x*, it follows that 
Mo- Pi,l(lvfo- mo) ｾ＠ M1 (4.41) 
Using ( 4.40) and ( 4.41) it is possible to write 
lvfo- c(Mo- mo) ｾ＠ M1 (4.42) 
Assunling M0 ｾ＠ 1n0 and E E [0, 1] in (4.42) establishes the first part of (4.33), 
namely 1\1!1 ｾ＠ Mo. 
Proof of 1n1 ｾ＠ 1n0 : Proving (4.34) draws on the result shown in (4.33), namely 
(4.42). First consider the difference between the ith elen1ent in the (1n x 1) colun1n 
vectors Px* and Px, where Xj corresponds to the jth elen1ent of x and xj denotes 
the equivalent elen1ent of x*. Specifically, write that 
m 
"'p· ·(x ·- ｸｾＩ＠L...J t,J J J (4.43) 
j=l 
Given the assumption of ｸｾｸＪ＠ coupled with Pi,j E [0, 1] it follows that (4.43) 
cannot be positive. Now supplant x with -x such that Px now becon1es P( -x) = 
-Px. This in1plies that the smallest and largest elen1ents of -Px are -M1 and -m1 
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respectively. Therefore re-write ( 4.42) as 
(4.44) 
The inequality ( 4.44) establishes that 1n1 ｾ＠ m0 . QED. 
Proof of NI1 -1n1 ｾ＠ (1-2c:)(NI0 -m0): To den1onstrate that (4.35) holds hinges 
on the key results used to prove (4.33) and (4.34). Stmuning (4.42) and (4.44) 
yields 
Nh- 1n1 ｾ＠ (1- 2c:)(Mo- mo) 
which confirnlS (4.35). QED. 
(4.45) 
Convergence of a Regular Markov Chain to a Stationary Distribution 
Using Len1n1a 1 it is now proved that consensus is reached by all MPC Members 
when the opinion n1atrix is regular. In keeping with the previous section the 
elmnents of the opinion matrix are assun1ed to have the values Pi,j E [0, 1] where 
Ｚｅｾ Ｑ ｐｩ＠ = 1, i = (1, 2, ... 1n). Specifically, the proof requires demonstration that 
for any regular n1atrix pt, limt-+oo pt = t-rr', where is a m x 1 vector of ones, and 
-rr' is a 1 x 1n vector of probabilities. In other words, in the lin1it as t ---t oo pt 
converges on an m x 1n n1atrix with identical rows, entailing that elen1ents in each 
column are identical. Write this as 
7fl 1f2 1fm-1 1fm -rr' 
7fl 1f2 1fm-1 1fm -rr' 
lim pt = = = t1r' ( 4.46) t-+oo 
7fl 7f2 1fm-1 1fm -rr' 
7fl 7f2 1fm-1 1fm -rr' 
where Ｚｅｾ Ｑ Ｑｲｩ＠ = 1, i = (1, 2, ... m). Now introduce the 1n x 1 vector ii. All 
elen1ents of are assun1ed to be zero apart fron1 the jth element, which equals 1. 
Further, consider the n1atrix A which has m colunms. Post-n1ultiplication of A 
by ij yields an 1n x 1 vector identical to the jth colunm of A. 
Now envisage the chain of vectors ij, Pij, P 2ij, P 3ij, ... , ptij, ... denoting the 
largest corresponding ･ｬ･ｮＱ･ｮｴｾ＠ A!f0 , Nib l\12 , NI3 , •.. ,Nit, ... and the sn1allest ele-
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n1ents rn0 , m1, m2, m 3 , ... , mt, .... Applying Lemn1a 1, and using the relationship 
ptii = P(Pt-lii) it is possible to conclude that 
(4.47) 
(4.48) 
and 
(4.49) 
Substituting lVIt-l - mt-1 with (1- 2c:)(lVIt-2- mt-2) gives 
( 4.50) 
Systen1atically repeating this procedure for (1Vft-2-7nt_2), (l\1t_3-mt_3) through to 
(Mt-(t-1) - ffit-(t-1)) - in other words using backwards substitution- gives 
(4.51) 
where dt = Ivft - mt and d0 = 1, the latter tern1 being the value of the largest 
elen1ent of ij, 1VI0 = 1, less the smallest element, m 0 = 0. As (1- 2c:) E (-1, 1], dt 
necessarily converges to zero as t -t oo: essentially, as lVft and mt are the largest 
and smallest elen1ents in the lh colunm of P, all elen1ents of the colunm converge 
to the same value, namely 1fj in (4.46). QED. 
Proof that 1fj is positive: It has previously been shown that 1n1 ｾ＠ mt (eqn. 
(4.48) ]. As m1 is identical to the smallest transition probability in row j of 
elmnent of n1atrix P, nan1ely PI,j,P2,j, ... ,Pm-l,j,Pm,j, and each Pi,j ｾ＠ c > 0, 1fj 
n1ust be positive. QED. 
4.A.2 Proof of Proposition 2 
To prove Proposition 2 it is first necessary to draw on the theory of absorbing 
chains. For any m x m transition n1atrix P, a state si is defined as absorbing if 
and only if Pii = 1 Vj = 1, 2, ... , m. In the context of the model, an absorbing 
state is characterised by an MPC n1ember listening only to himself, thereby placing 
no weight on the opinions of his colleagues. Should absorbing states arise, it is 
possible to pern1utate and subsequently partition the rows and colun1ns of the 
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corresponding influence matrix into the block form 
ｐ］｛ｾ＠ ｾ｝＠ (4.52) 
where I is a (7n- s) x (m- s) identity matrix, 0 is (m- s) x s array of zeros 
and B and C are s x (7n- s) and s x s arrays of transient states respectively. 
This structure of ( 4.52) implies that men1bers belonging to the initial (m- s) rows 
weight only their own opinions, whereas individuals pertaining to the last s rows 
with are influenced by the opinions of n1embers who weight only their opinions in 
the first (m- s) rows. It follows from (4.52) that 
pn= ( 4.53) 
where by Theorem 1.11.1 of I<en1eny and Snell (1960), limn-oo en= 0. Using 
these theorenlS, proof of Proposition 2 now follows: 
Proof of Proposition 2: For an m men1ber conunittee if any n1ember j is 
influenced only by hin1Self, and influences all other n1en1bers, either directly or 
indirectly a unanimous consensus will be reached by the conmlittee. By ( 4.52) and 
Theorem 1.11.1 of Kemeny and Snell, n1en1bers' beliefs will necessarily converge 
to those of member j . TI·eating I as a (1 x 1) n1atrix whose only element is p11 = 1, 
it follows that in the limit all elen1ents in the rmnaining (1n- 1) rows of the first 
colunu1 of the influence matrix will converge to a single column of ones, with all 
other elen1ents converging to zero. 
1 0 0 
1 0 0 
lin1 pn = (4.54) 
n-oo 
1 0 0 
QED. 
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4.A.3 Proof of Proposition 3 
To prove Proposition 3 I draw on results fron1 the proof of Proposition 1. For an 
m men1ber conm1ittee, begin by introducing the block n1atrix 
(4.55) 
where Y and D.. con1prise two disjoint con1municating classes. Specifically, letT 
denote a ( m - s) x ( m - s) bloc of opinion weights for insiders and D.. denote a 
corresponding s x s bloc for outsiders. In the limit it necessarily holds that 
[ 
T
00 
O ] limP= 
n-+oo 0 ｾｯｯ＠ (4.56) 
Given ( 4.56) it follows that each bloc can be treated as a matrix in its own right (as 
the elements of 1 and D.. do not influence each other). Because both n1atrices each 
comprise a single aperiodic recurrent class (i.e. all n1embers within each group are 
strongly connected) the results for Proposition 1 apply to the (1n- s) x (rn- s) 
matrix 1 and the s x s n1atrix D... Thus the linliting distribution of P takes the 
form. 
'lrm-s 0 
lim pt = 'lrm-s 0 
t-+oo 0 'lrm-s+l 
0 0 'lrm-1 
0 
0 
• 11"m 
I 
1f'Jnsiders 
I 
1f' Insiders 
I 
1f' Outsiders 
I 
7r Outsiders 
(4.57) 
The first ( 1n - s) rows will converge to a stationary distribution characterised by 
the first (1n - s) colunu1s containing strictly positive elen1ents and the latter s 
colunms con1prising zeros. The last s rows will converge to a limit characterised 
by elen1ents in the first ( m - s) cohm1ns con1prising zeros, and the ren1aining s 
colunu1s containing strictly positive elements. Assun1ing (m- s) > s implies that 
insiders reach a majority consensus. In the presence of a tie (i.e. when 1n is not 
odd), assun1e that the chairman has a casting vote. QED. 
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The special case of a unanimous consensus being reached in the presence of two 
aperiodic recurrent classes is characterised by both groups converging on the same 
interest rate. Again, assun1ing an m n1ember conlmittee with initially diverse 
preferences, this occurs when 
m-s m 
L 'lrjij,O = L 'lrjlj,O (4.58) 
j=l j=m-s+l 
where 'lrj denotes elen1ents of n1atrix ( 4.18) in the jth column and the ij,oS corre-
spond to the elen1ents of the period t = 0 belief vector J[o] as in (4.4). The first 
m- s elen1ents correspond to insiders' initial beliefs, and the latter s elen1ents 
correspond to the initial beliefs of outsiders. The transpose of the vector is given 
by 
m-s insiders s outsiders 
ｉ ｛ｏ｝ｦ｟ｾｾ＠ A ' ｾ＠
- ll1,0, ... , lm-s,o, lm-s+l,O, ... , lm,O (4.59) 
An equivalent representation of ( 4.4) is given by 
I [0]_ I [0] 
7r Insiders I - 7r Outside1·sl (4.60) 
where Ｗｲｾｮｳｩ､･ｲｳ＠ is the vector capturing the unique stationary distribution for in-
siders, and Ｑｲｾｵｴｳｩ､･ｲｳ＠ is the corresponding vector for outsiders. 
4.A.4 Proof of Proposition 4 
If members are neither directly nor indirectly influenced by their colleagues, they 
effectively place weight 1 on their own opinions. The influence matrix is thus an 
'In x m identity n1atrix. This implies that 
P=Pn, V n, n = 1,2 ..... oo (4.61) 
If P = pn, then 
J[O] = J(n) 
) V n, n = 1, 2 ..... oo (4.62) 
as fron1 (4.5) and (4.7) we have that J[n) = pnJ[O] = PJ[o] = J[O] V n. Initial beliefs 
remain unchanged irrespective of the stage of the deliberation process, and no 
consensus is achieved. QED. 
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4.A.5 Proof of Proposition 5 
By Theorem XV.6.1 of Feller (1968), all states of an irreducible chain are of the 
san1e type. Thus for a periodic chain, if there are m recurrent states then P is 
cyclic of order m. This implies that n1en1ber j is only influenced by any another 
member k every t = m intervals. In all other t -1 periods j is not influenced by k. 
Consider, for instance, a three n1en1ber MPC sitting in a circle, where each 
n1ember only weights the opinion of the person sitting to the right of hin1. Let 
the influence n1atrix P and subsequent powers to which it is raised be given by 
p = [ ｾ＠ ｾ＠ ｾ＠ l , p2 = [ ｾ＠ ｾ＠ ｾ＠ l ' p3 = [ ｾ＠ ｾ＠ ｾ＠ l ' p4 = [ ｾ＠ ｾ＠ ｾ＠ l 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
(4.63) 
The n1atrix Pis of period 3. Not only does P = P\ but n1ore generally P = Pn3+1, 
V n = 1, 2, .... oo. Given that P f= P2 f= P3 and (P = pn3+1) f= (P2 = p((n+1)3)+1 )f= 
(P3 = p((n+2)3)+1), V , n = 1, 2, .... oo, pn can never converge. Extending this to 
the case of m men1bers (and thus m cycles) it therefore follows that 
(4.64) 
and 
(4.65) 
Now apply (4.65) to the iteration process given by (4.7). The beliefs which en1erge 
following subsequent revisions have the following properties: 
l(nm} (4.66) 
1(1) _ l[nm+l) 
l[m-1] = l(nm+(m-l)J 
for all n = 1, 2, ... oo. As pn cannot converge, neither do initial beliefs. Rather, 
revised estin1ates at each stage of the deliberation process cycle in tanden1 with 
the period 'In of the listening n1atrix such that n1mnber j is only influenced by any 
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another n1ember k every mth interval.32 QED. 
It is noted that the results for Proposition 5 do not extend to the case where 
the influence matrix P is characterised by m sets of cyclic recurrent classes. I 
stated earlier that it is possible for ( i) unanhnous consensus to be reached when 
there to exist son1e linear con1bination of opinion weights and initial beliefs such 
that 1[11 = 1[21 = ... = l[nJ or (ii) a majority consensus arising when n1en1bers beliefs 
converge on the san1e interest rate for l[nJ, n = 1, 2, ... oo, such that the composition 
of the majority switches regularly in sync with the period of the cycle. Illustrative 
examples of such behaviour are henceforth given. 
Case (i): Unanimous Consensus 
Consider a nine mmnber conm1ittee characterised by the following belief matrix P: 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 3 3 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 3 3 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 3 3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 3 3 
P= 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 (4.67) 3 3 3 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 3 3 
1 1 
.! 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 
which is representable by the following bloc forn1, where each bloc is a 3 x 3 
sub-n1atrix: 
｛ｾ＠ A ｾ｝＠P= 0 (4.68) 0 
The dynanlic behaviour of (4.68) is clearly analogous to that given by (4.65). Now 
introduce a belief vector l{o], the transpose of which is given by 
I[O] = [4.5, 4.4, 4.3, 5.0, 4.6, 3.6, 4.9, 4.2] (4.69) 
Given the influence structure in ( 4.65) and its corresponding cycling behaviour, it 
can be shown that revised estin1ates in every period converge to an interest rate 
32 See Feller (1968) for an equivalent proof of the generalization to m states. 
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of 4.4 %, namely 
l[nJ = [4.4, 4.4, 4.4, 4.4, 4.4, 4.4, 4.4, 4.4], n = 1, 2, .... oo. (4.70) 
Case (ii}: Majority Consensus 
Under majority consensus, the composition of the n1ajority switches regularly in 
sync with the period of the cycle. Again, consider the influence matrix given by 
( 4. 67) and its corresponding bloc fron1 in ( 4. 68). If a belief vector I [OJ is in trod need 
such that 
[OJ'- [ I - 4.5, 4.4, 4.3, 5.0, 4.0, 3.6, 4.9, 4.2], (4.71) 
it follows that revised beliefs using the iterative procedure in ( 4. 7) in successive 
rounds are given by 
4.2 4.4 4.4 4.2 
4.2 4.4 4.4 4.2 
4.2 4.4 4.4 4.2 
4.4 4.4 4.2 4.4 
J[l] = 4.4 ,1[2} = 4.4 
' 
1(3} = 4.2 ) 1[41 = 4.4 (4.72) 
4.4 4.4 4.2 4.4 
4.4 4.2 4.4 4.4 
4.4 4.2 4.4 4.4 
4.4 4.2 4.4 4.4 
Clearly, a n1ajority consensus is reached at every iteration with six out of nine 
members preferring to settle for a rate of 4.4%. However, as stated above, the 
composition of the majority switches cyclically from period to period. More 
formally we have that J[nJ = J(n+vmlwhere n denotes the deliberative round, m the 
period and v = 1, 2, ..... oo. This implies that all attempts by the chairman decide 
to continue deliberating in the hope of increasing the size of the majority will have 
no effect. Re-expressing J[0lin the bloc forn1 
(4.73) 
where X, Y and Z denote (3 x 1) sub-n1atrices of the first, second and last three 
elements, a sufficient condition for majority consensus to be reached each period 
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is thus given by 
BX - ex, (4.74) 
AZ - BX, 
AX 
- cz 
and 
BZ EX, (4.75) 
ex - cz, 
AZ 
- AX 
Here, A, Band C denote the blocs in (4.68) and the elen1ents in each sub-n1atrix 
in each n1ultiplication are assumed to converge to the sa1ne value. 
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Part IV 
The Formulation of Monetary 
Policy at the Bank of England 
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Chapter 5 
Estimating MPC Members' Reaction Functions 
5.1 Introduction 
"There shall be a committee of the Bank, to be known as the Monetary Policy Committee 
of the Bank of England, which shall have responsibility within the Bank for formulating 
monetary policy." Bank of England Act 1998, Section 13(1). 
Jtme 1997 witnessed a landn1ark change in the conduct of UK monetary policy. 
In a move towards independence, the Bank of England was granted operational 
responsibility for setting interest rates to n1eet a Governn1ent inflation target of 
RPIX 2.5 percent. As part of the shift towards independence, operational de-
cisions on n1onetary policy were delegated to a nine n1ember Monetary Policy 
Con1mittee. It is the interest-rate setting behaviour of this comnuttee1 - n1ore 
specifically, the policy preferences of individual members as revealed by the voting 
record- which forn1S the basis of this chapter.2 Since the inception of the MPC, 
1 Herafter referred to as the BoEMPC. 
2The decision to shift to operational independence can be interpreted as a means of ame-
liorating the well known problem of time-inconsistency: taking the decision on the short-term 
interest rate out of the control of "politicians ... who might bend it for their electoral ends" (The 
Economist, September 1997, pp.36-37) should in theory be instrumental in increasing the credi-
bility of, and by implication the success of UK monetary policy. However, using the criteria for 
measuring the degree of independence of a central bank developed by Grilli, Masciandaro and 
Tabellini (1991)- hereafter referred to as GMT- it is possible to see that the shift to operational 
independence has not drastically increased what they define as the level of 'political' indepen-
dence afforded to the Bank - a measure associated "with how the members of the central bank 
board are appointed, its relationship with government and its responsibilities" (see TABLE 5.1 
for clarification of this point). This is echoed in the words of Buiter (2002), for whom 
"Even operational independence is qualified in the case of the Banlc of Eng-
land ... Any form of pressure by the government on the MPC to change its behaviour, 
other than a public, and properly enacted, change in its mandate, would violate 
both the spirit and the letter of operational independence. There has not been a 
single instance of such pressure in the first three years of the MPC's existence." 
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the voting behaviour of its n1en1bers is a subject which has received considerable 
attention in the financial press and news n1edia - attention largely attributable 
to the publication of voting records shortly after a decision on interest rates is 
taken. Near split decisions often constitute stories in thmnselves. The Financial 
Times on 25th January 2001 ran the headline 'Banlc committee voted 5-4 to hold 
interest rates', reporting that only the use of the casting vote by the Governor of 
the Bank, Sir Edward George "prevented the MPC cutting [the] cost of borrowing 
by 0.25%". The story also featured an index ranking MPC members according 
to their degree of 'hawkishness', with higher numbers corresponding to a n1ore 
hawkish voting record.3•4 It is even a subject which has con1e to the attention of 
the House of Conm1ons 'll·easury Select Con1nuttee, to which the MPC is partially 
accountable. The following exchange between George Palmer MP, Member of the 
House of ConliDons 'll·easury Select Con1mittee, and Richard Lambert, external 
n1en1ber of the MPC, reflects this assertion: 
George Palmer: "It is known that there has been widespread speculation 
over the years that the Bank staff are more hawkish on interest rates than 
the independent mmnbers of the MPC. In May [2003], the five Bank staff 
all voted to n1aintain rates and the four independent members all voted to 
reduce rates. The probability of this happening by chance 0.019%. Do you 
think that there was in fact a coincidence?" 
In other words, it is not implausible to suggest that the operational nature of the independence 
granted to the Banlc is not in itself a guard against undue political influence. Indeed, com-
mentators of more cynical leanings may, after close scrutiny of the Bank of England Act 1998, 
conclude that the monetary policy framework enjoyed by the Banlc is potentially susceptible to 
political manipulation. This may be in spite of the relatively high degree of economic indepen-
dence enjoyed by the bank, which to employ GMT's terminology concerns the ability of a central 
banlc to use the instruments of monetary policy without interference from governmental bodies 
or institutions. In the case of Bank of England, this corresponds to the ability to pursue the 
inflation target unimpeded. The interested reader is referred to the appendix for a comparison 
of the changing nature of political and economic independence enjoyed by the bank, both prior 
to and immediately after the switch to operational independence. 
3It is also possible that changes in voting patterns may yield information about how interest 
rates will move in the futm·e. This avenue of research is not pursued here. See Andersson 
et al (2001) and Gerlach-Kristen (2001) for applications to the Executive Board of the Swedish 
Riksbank and BoEMPC respectively. 
4It is noteworthy to add that such interest in the voting record is not confined to the case 
of the Bank of England MPC. The composition and voting record of the United States Federal 
Open MaJ.·kets Committee (FOMC) generates similar interest, where to quote Haubrich and 
Hwnpage (2001) 
"Newspapers and financial magazines can be counted on to count up the "hawks" 
and "doves" whenever a new member is appointed or the next batch of reserve 
bank presidents rotate on the committee.,p.3 
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Richard Lambert: "I an1 not sure I really properly understand the ques-
tion. It seen1s to me, looking at the n1inutes, that here were nine people: 
four came to one conclusion and five can1e to another. I did not get a sense 
from the minutes that their internalness or externalness had a bearing on 
the outcon1e." 5 ( en1phasis added) 
In this study, evidence is presented den1onstrating that 'internalness' and 'mcter-
nalness' do in fact have a significant bearing on the policy preferences of MPC 
n1en1bers, and therefore policy outcomes. Amongst other things, the hypothesis 
that Bank outsiders prefer relatively lower interest rates than insiders is tested. 6 
To sumn1arise the results, it is shown that on average, insiders prefer relatively 
higher interest rates than outsiders. In light of this finding, insiders can clearly be 
construed as behaving more 'conservatively' than their externally appointed peers. 
Further, insiders display a greater propensity for leaving interest rates unchanged 
than outsiders. In this sense, outsiders n1ay be described as being 1nore activist 
than their internally appointed colleagues. It is also reported that changes in 
interest rates are most likely to occur during n1onths in which the Bank's quar-
terly Inflation Report is published. All of the findings are based on voting data 
contained in the Minutes of Monthly Meetings for a period covering the first five 
years of the MPC.7•8 This encompasses the entire spell for which the MPC was 
chaired by Sir Edward George9 , namely June lOth 1997- 5th June 2003. In all, 
this amounts to 74 meetings,10 a period over which MPC members cast 642 votes. 
Having established significant differences in voting behaviour, reaction func-
tions for both groups are estimated. To do this, limited dependent variable 
analysis is drawn upon. Using ordered logit analysis it is demonstrated that under 
a variety of different specifications, there exist differences in the policy preferences 
of insiders and outsiders. 
5Treasury Select Committee Minutes of Evidence (Q79), Monday 16th June 2003. 
6This may be construed as a test to see if outsiders have a predilection for monetary policy 
which leads to comparatively lower inflation and higher unemployment than that preferred by 
Bank insiders. 
7Hereafter referred to as the Minutes. The Minutes are published 2 weeks after each MPC 
meeting. 
8During this period, Sir Edward George also presided as Governor of the Bank of England. 
9In July 2003 Sir Edward George was replaced by Mervyn King as both Governor of the Bank 
and Chairman of the MPC. 
10 Also included are votes cast in the special MPC meeting held on September 18th 2001, which 
followed the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre. 
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5.2 Relationship to the Literature 
As seen in Part II en1pirical studies of insider-outsider behaviour are relatively 
sparse. It was found that there exist no studies of BoEMPC behaviour which es-
timate the reaction functions of MPC members. What distinguishes this chapter 
fron1 other BoEMPC studies is that in addition to providing a detailed exanlination 
of insider-outsider voting behaviour, reaction functions are estimated for insiders 
and outsiders tmder a variety of alternative econometric specifications.11 That is, 
MPC votes are n1odelled as a function of the economic environment. This chap-
ter therefore falls into what Meade and Sheets describe as the 'reaction function 
camp' [Tootell (1991a,b), Meade and Sheets (2002)], and not the 'partisan theory 
of politics' genus of studies. Unlike Tootell (1991b), who fails to find evidence to 
support the hypothesis that "FOMC policy votes of Federal Reserve Bank presi-
dents are n1ore 'conservative' than those of their Board Governor counterparts", 
I find that the policy votes of insiders are more conservative than those of outsiders. 
A second difference should be highlighted. Tootell (1991a) and Meade and 
Sheets (2002), investigate the hypothesis that District Bank presidents set pol-
icy according to regional, as opposed to national economic conditions. I do not 
pursue this hypothesis. This is because Bank Presidents can be viewed as pro-
viding regional representation on the FOMC. MPC members should not be seen 
as providing regional representation, unlike Bank presidents (Tootell 1991a,b) or 
members of the Governing Council of the ECB (Dornbusch et al, 1998). Thus 
whilst undoubtedly falling into the same genus as the FOMC, the MPC is a some-
what different anin1al to its US equivalent. Further, in this chapter, the emphasis 
is emphatically not on the dissent voting behaviour of MPC members, which is 
the focus of the following chapter. 
5.3 The Monetary Policy Framework at the Bank 
of England 
The framework deternlining the con1position of the MPC and the n1eans by which 
it reaches a decision is embodied in the Bank of England Act 1998 (hereafter re-
11The analysis only covers the period under which Sir Edward George presided as its Chairman, 
namely June 1997-June 2003. Mervyn King replaced Sir Edward George as Chairman of the 
MPC in July 2003. Restricting our sample to June 1997-June 2003 means that we do not have to 
control for the impact different chairmen on insider-outsider behaviour. This might be considered 
as an avenue for research in the more distant future. 
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ferred to as the Act). It is the piece of legislation accountable for ( i) granting 
operational responsibility for n1onetary policy to the Bank of England and ( ii) 
establishing the Bank's nine member Monetary Policy Conlffiittee. The decision 
to shift to operational independence was taken by the British Labour Party, who 
announced their intentions in the period imn1ediately following their general elec-
tion victory on May 5th 1997. By June 1997 a coniDlittee had been established, 
although not containing a full con1plen1ent of members. Nevertheless, the nlone-
tary policy fran1ework at the Bank had undergone a seisn1ic shift.12 
Acquaintance with the operational framework of UK n1onetary policy - partic-
ularly the structure of the BoEMPC- is useful in so far as it provides a background 
against which the interest-rate setting behaviour of the MPC can be rationalised. 
In light of this, analysis of the statutes of Bank of England with explicit reference 
to the Act is the focus of this section.13 In what follows, attention is drawn to 
those statutes pertaining to the objectives of n1onetary policy, the fornRllation of 
monetary policy and voting arrangements on the MPC, and transparency. Finally, 
the extent to which the granting of operational independence has influenced the 
degree of political and economic independence of the Bank, as defined by Grilli, 
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991), is briefly exa1nined. 
5.3.1 Objectives of Monetary Policy 
Part II, Section 11 (Objectives) of the Bank of England Act 1998 explicates the 
objectives of the Bank vis-a-vis monetary policy as 
"(a) to maintain price stability, and 
(b) subject to that, to support the econon1ic policy of her Majesty's 
Governn1ent, including its objectives for growth and en1ploy1nent." (Section 
11) 
In the context of the framework for UK n1onetary policy, price stability assumes the 
form of a governn1ent inflation target. Chosen by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
this stood as a 2.5% year on year increase in RPIX inflation for the period June 
1997-Decenlber 2003. Thereafter, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown 
12In the interim period between the Labour Party coming to power in May 1997 and the 
granting of Royal Assent for the Bank of England Act 1998 on June 1st 1998, the changes to the 
framework of UK monetary policy embodied in the Act operated de facto. 
13 Although no previous acquaintance with the Act is assumed, it is expedient here to only 
survey key clauses. More detailed accounts of the post-May 1997 framework for UK monetary 
policy are given in Budd (1998) and Rodgers (1997, 1998). 
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announced a new target of 2% year on year CPI inflation. It is in1portant here to 
stress that Section ll(b) should be viewed as a secondary objective: it is subject to 
the fulfiln1ent of Section11( a). The meeting of the inflation target of RPIX 2.5% is 
the 'rate at which the MPC is required to achieve and for which it is accountable' .14 
It is worth noting here the syn1n1etrical nature of the inflation target.15 If inflation 
deviates by more than 1% either side of its target the Governor of the Bank is 
required to write an open letter to the Chancellor explaining "why inflation was 
adrift, how long the divergence was expected to last, and the action taken to bring 
it back on course." 16 The inflation target should not be interpreted as a range of 
values, as is the case with the European Central Bank. Instead, "the inflation 
target is 2.5% at all tin1es." 17 
5.3.2 The Monetary Policy Committee 
Following the shift to operational independence, the responsibility for setting in-
terest rates was not given to a single individual. The prerogative lay instead with 
the Monetary Policy Comnlittee, or MPC, as it is more conm1only known: 
"There shall be a con1mittee of the Bank, to be known as the Monetary 
Policy Committee of the Bank of England, which shall have responsibility 
within the Bank for formulating n1onetary policy." Bank of England Act 
1998, Section 13(1) 
Comprising nine n1embers, the precise form of the committee is as follows: 
"(a) the Governor and Deputy Governors of the Bank 
(b) 2 n1en1bers appointed by the Governor of the Bank after consultation 
with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and 
(c) 4 n1embers appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer." 
Five members- nan1ely those referred to in clauses (a) and (b) - are chosen in-
ternally, from within the ranks of Bank staff, hence the name insiders. The Act 
requires three of the internal members to be the Governor and two Deputy Gover-
nors responsible for Financial Stability and Monetary Policy respectively. These 
14Bank of England Act 1998, Part II.ll (Objectives) 
15 This is analogous to the loss function for the monetary authorities assuming the quadratic 
form Zt = 1r2 • Assuming a zero inflation target, the squared term, 1r2 inpicates that a movement 
below or above the inflation target of like magnitude yields equal disutility. 
16Rodgers (1997), p.3. 
17
"Remitfor the Monetary Policy Committee," letter from the Rt. Hon. Gordon Brown to Sir 
Edward George, 17th April 2002. 
137 
members serve five year renewable tern1S. The remaining two internal appointees 
are chosen by the Governor following a discussion with the Chancellor, and serve 
three year terms. These n1embers are usually directors of the Bank with executive 
responsibility for a given area of banking operations. Appointed directly by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, the ren1aining four members are chosen from outside 
the ranks of Bank staff, hence the name outsiders, or 'external' MPC n1embers.18 
In this sense, outsiders cannot be viewed as Bank 'representatives', and are typ-
ically chosen fron1 the private sector and academia. Outsiders serve renewable 
three year terms.19 Given this institutional arrangen1ent the Chancellor arguably 
still has a potentially significant bearing on the direction of UK monetary policy. 
In addition to powers to set and change the inflation target discussed earlier, the 
power of appointment represents an additional vehicle for influencing the direction 
of UK n1onetary policy. 
5.3.3 Operational Independence 
From the procedural standpoint, the Bank controls the short-term interest-rate as 
the key operating target of monetary policy. In this respect, and perhaps most 
significantly, Section 4(1) of the Bank of England Act 1946 has been amended to 
read: 
"The Treasury n1ay from time to time give such directions to the Bank 
as, after consultation with the Governor of the Bank, they think necessary 
in the public interest, except in relation to monetary policy." [words in italics 
added by Section 10 of the Bank of England Act 1998) 
This an1endn1ent is clearly ain1ed at ensuring that "decision-making on n1onetary 
policy is more effective, open, accountable and free fron1 short-tern1 political nla-
nipulation". 20 In practice, Section 4(1) sin1ply n1eans that the Bank of England 
does not take instructions fron1 the Chancellor with respect to the level of the 
short-tenn interest-rate. It is the embodin1ent of operational responsibility. The 
policy instrun1ent used by the MPC is the rate on repurchase agreen1ents, n1ore 
18This does not preclude members who have previously worked at the Bank from becoming 
external appointees. Professor Charles Goodhart, for example, served on the MPC as an outsider, 
having previously been Chief Economist at the Banlc. 
19Under Sir Edward George, no external member had their term renewed. However, following 
the departure of Edward George from the MPC in July 2003, some outsiders appointed during 
his time as Chairman had their positions renewed, namely Professor Stephen Nickell and Kate 
Barker. 
20 Rodgers (1997), p.3. 
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commonly known as the repo-rate. This is the interest-rate at which the Bank 
of England lends to the money markets. The nature of the monetary transnus-
sion n1echanisn1 ensures that changes in the repo-rate propagate quickly to affect 
other short-tern1 interest rates and ultimately long-tern1 rates, which eventually 
feed through into inflation and GDP growth. It is estimated that changes in the 
repo-rate take two years to maximally impact inflation, and approxin1ately one 
year for GDP (Bank of England, 1999). 
5.3.4 Monetary Policy Formulation and Voting Arrange-
ments at the Bank 
Monetary policy is deternuned by sin1ple n1ajority rule, following a vote on the 
interest-rate tabled by the Governor of the Bank, who also chairs the MPC. In the 
event of a split decision, the Governor has a casting vote. This is in accordance 
with Schedule 3.11 clauses (2)-(6) which specify the forn1 of MPC proceedings. 
Clauses (3)-(5) are of special relevance: 
"(3) The chair shall be taken by the Governor of the Bank or, if he is 
not present, the Deputy Governor of the Bank with executive responsibility 
for n1onetary policy. 
( 4) Decisions shall be taken by a vote of all those n1embers present at 
the meeting. 
(5) In the event of a tie, the chairn1an shall have a second casting vote." 
Under the current operational monetary policy framework, the bank is required to 
publish a quarterly Inflation Report, Minutes of MPC Meetings and the individual 
votes of MPC men1bers. The con1position of the MPC is stylised .in FIGURE 5.1. 
5.3.5 The GMT index 
To provide the reader with an appreciation of the extent to which the shift to opera-
tional independence has increased the degree of independence enjoyed by the Bank 
I use the definitions provided by Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991).21 ,22 
Specifically, I con1pare the levels of independence before and after the Act. Gaug-
ing the degree of independence of a n1onetary institution is not an exact science, 
21 Hereafter GMT. 
22 I do not propose to provide a complete discussion of the GMT index. The interested reader 
is referred their original paper. Alternatively, for an updated GMT index the reader is referred 
to Hudson et al (2001). 
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and indice measuring the degree of central bank independence typically rely on 
what one author has termed the statute reading methodology . 23 That is one 
largely determines the independence of a central bank with explicit reference to 
its statutes. GMT delineate between two types of independence which a mone-
tary institution may enjoy - political independence and economic independence. 24 
The political independence of a central bank is associated 'with how the member 
of the central bank board are appointed its relationship with government and 
its responsibilities . So-called economic independence concern the ability of a 
central bank to use the instruments of monetary policy without interference from 
governmental bodies or institutions. To see how the degree of independence has 
changed pre and post the shift to operational independence refer to TABLE 5 .1. 
Prima face, the Bank has retained a low level of political independence in spite 
of the shift to operational independence. For example, the maximum term length 
an MPC member may be appointed for is five years. Further, the Government i 
still responsible for appointing the Governor. 
23 See Forcier (1995). Although highl critical of man methodologies used to con truct central 
bank indices Forcier fails to offer an alternati e method for measuring the degr e of autonom 
of monetru· institutions. 
24 The introduction of the Act is notable in as far as it r defines the statu of the Bank vis-a-vi 
goal and instrument independence. The Bank has in trument independ nc in that it sets hart-
term and key interest rates without interference from an other institution · conver el it doe 
not ha e goal independence as the main objective of maintaining price tability set out in th 
Act can only be changed at th discretion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. For an ex ge_ is of 
the distinction b tween goal and in trument independ nee e D belle and Fi h r (1994). W 
howe er u e the criteria used b GMT. 
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Political Independence of the Bank ofEngland 
Relationship Index of 
with political 
A2Eointments Government Constitution indeEendence 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] 
Pre-1998 Act * 1 
Post-1998 Act * * * 3 
Notes: (1) Governor not appointed by government; (2) Governor appointed for >5 years; (3) All the board 
not appointed by the government; (4) Board appointed for >5 years; (5) No mandat01y participation of 
government representative in the board; (6) No government approval of monetary policy formulation is 
required; [!) Statutory requirements that central bank pursues monetary stability amongst its goals; (8) Legal 
provisions that strengthen the central bank's position in conflicts with the government are present; (9) 
Overall index of political independence calculated by summing d1e number of stars in each row through (1) 
- (8) 
Economic Independence of the Bank of England 
Pre-1998 Act 
Post-1998 Act 
Monetary financing of budget deficit 
[11 [2] [3] [4] [5] 
* * * * 
* * * * * 
Monetary 
instruments 
[6] [7] 
* 
* ** 
Index of 
economic 
independence 
(8] 
5 
8 
Notes: (1) Direct credit facility: not automatic; (2) Direct credit facility: market interest rate; (3) Direct 
credit facility: temporary; (4) Direct credit facility: limited amount (5) Central bank does not participate in 
primary market for public debt; (6) Discount rate set by central bank; [!)Banking supervision uol entrusted 
to the central bank (**) or not entrusted to d1e central bank alone (*); (8) Overall index of economic 
independence calculated by summing the number of stars in each row through (1) - (7). 
Som-ce: Table adapted from Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). Pre-1998 Act levels of independence 
based on those given in Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991). Post-1998 Act levels of independence 
based on Hudson, Pearlman and Sarantis (2001). 
TABLE 5.1. 
GMT INDEX OF BANK OF ENGLAND POLI'l'ICAL AND EcONOMIC INDEPENDENCE 
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Recent institutional and regulatory changes with regard to UK banking super-
vision and debt n1anagen1ent have increased the level of econonlic independence 
enjoyed by the Bank. The creation of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) -
a body independent of the Bank of England responsible for UK banking supervi-
sion- coincided with the shift to operational independence in 1997. Essentially, 
banking supervision was no longer entrusted to the Bank of England. This move 
elinlinates a possible conflict of interest en1anating from when a central bank has 
the responsibility to set the discount rate and is also responsible for banking su-
pervision. Hudson et al (2001) bring this point hon1e: 
"If banking failures could be triggered by an increase in the interest-
rate, central bank might be unwilling to undertake n1onetary policy which 
is required at the n1acroeconomic level." 25 
F\u·thermore, 
" ... if banking failures did occur, the central bank might be regarded as 
responsible, and this could undern1ine its reputation." 26 
The establish1nent of the UK Debt Managen1ent Office (DMO) followed shortly 
after the creation of the FSA. 
5.3.6 The Decision on the interest-rate in Practice 
Decisions on the interest-rate are taken on the first Thursday of the each n1onth. 
Hosking (2000) describes how the decision on the interest-rate is n1ade in practice: 
" ... the con1mittee gathers before 9an1 and the Governor kicks off with 
a summary of what was discussed the day before. Members are free to 
chip in. Then comes the crux of the n1eeting. He invites every member 
to speak on where they should stand and what the policy decision should 
be. It is decision tin1e ... By 10.30an1 everyone has had their say. Unless the 
outcome is tmanimous, the Governor will put a proposition and ask for a 
show of hands. Those voting in the minority are then given an opportunity 
to restate what they would do and why. The committee then decides to put 
out an accon1panying staten1ent. They tend to if they think their decision 
is likely to surprise the n1arkets.'' 27 
25 Hudson et al, p.5. 
26Ibid. 
27 Hosking (2000), p.47. 
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The voting record is then published in the Minutes of the Monetary Policy Com-
mittee Meeting, released two weeks after the meeting. 
5.4 MPC Performance Under Sir Edward George 
Under the chairn1anship of Sir Edward George, the MPC broadly n1et its objec-
tives. FIGURE 5.2 shows that for the period covering June 1997-June 2003 the 
general trend was for interest rates to fall. RPIX inflation ren1ained relatively 
stable and close to the target rate of 2.5%. A notable observation is that for a 
significant period (May 1999- June 2002) inflation ren1ained below tru.·get, which 
prompted some economists to speak of a deflationary bias inherent in n1onetary 
policy. 28 On no occasion did the rate of inflation deviate fron1 its target rate suf-
ficiently to require the Governor writing a letter of explanation to the Chru.1cellor. 
In ternlS of the precise nature of the policy decision, the repo-rate was raised on 9 
occasions, lowered on 15 occasions but left unchanged 50 tin1es.29 In this respect, 
FIGURE 5.2 also reveals the inertial nature of n1onetary policy under Sir Edward · 
George. 30 However, when policy did change, it is hallmarked by what nught be 
referred as policy gradualism. 31 Here, rates are gradually changed upwards or 
downwards in a series of sn1all steps rather than fewer relatively lru.·ger steps. 
5.5 The Timing of Decisions 
TABLE 5.2 focuses on the likelihood of a change in n1onetary policy being taken 
vis-a-vis the release of the Bank of England's quru.·terly Inflation Report. The 
Inflation Report, it has been argued, is central to decisions on the interest-rate. 
At the core of each report is the result of a forecasting exercise which leads to the 
construction of mediun1 term forecasts32 for inflation and real GDP conditioned 
on a constant nominal interest-rate assumption. These are referred to as inflation 
and real GDP projections, and assun1e the forn1 of 'fan charts'. The charts are an 
28Wallis (2002) sees this as stemming from a tendency for the Bank's suite of forecasting 
models to overpredict the level of future inflation. One might reasonably suppose that it in 
practice this would lead to IviPC members prescribing higher interest rates than would be the 
case given a lower forecast. 
29 We also find that the likelihood of a decision to tighten, loosen or leave rates unchanged 
being followed a qualitatively identical decision is 33.3%, 46.6% and 70% respectively. 
30 Related to this point is Blinder's (1998) observation that a featm·e of monetary policy com-
mittees are policy decisions which "tend toward the mean and to be inertial". (p.21) 
31 Another name for this phenomenon is interest rate smoothing. 
32 The forecasting horizon is 24 months. 
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innovative means of representing the probability of any given level of GDP growth 
or inflation pertaining at a particular point in time. Indeed, for any given point 
over the projection period, the intensity of shading on the fan chart characterizes 
the height of a probability density function for given inflationary outcomes. Such 
conditional forecasts are useful to the MPC insofar as they help the Bank "decide 
on the appropriate direction for future interest-rate moves." 33 
Release dates for the Inflation Report are February, May, August and Novem-
ber. 34 From a methodological perspective, the forecasting models developed by the 
Bank of England are devised with an inflation targeting regime in mind. Unlike 
policy frameworks such as monetary targeting which relies chiefly on the behav-
iour of money stock as a predictor of inflation, inflation targeting utilizes a broad 
array of information pertaining to the economy. This eclectic approach to policy 
is embodied in the forecasting methodology employed in the inflation report, as 
acknowledged by Haldane (1997): 
" ... the Bank's published inflation projection is not a mechanical extrap-
olation from a single macro model. Rather it draws upon a much wider 
33 Haldane (1997) p.22. 
34 Hutchison and Judd (1992) provide empirical support for openness in terms of releasing 
internal bank forecasts into the public domain for the case of the US. Their findings suggest that 
the disclosure of in-house monetary projections at the Federal Re erve would have appreciably 
lessened money surprises in the United States. 
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Monetaty Policy Decisions and the Inflation Report, June 1997-
June 2003 
Policy Decisions 
ｆｾｏｽ＠ ｆｾｬｽ＠ F(2} TOTAL 
No change 13 (18)* 20 (27) 17 (23) 50 (68) 
Change 11 (15) 6 (8) 7 (9) 24 (32) 
Conditional Probabilities 
Pr(F(i) !No change)** 0.26 0.40 0.34 1 
Pr(F(i) I Change) 0.46 0.25 0.29 1 
Pooled Votes 
ｆｾｏｽ＠ Fp} ｆｾＲｽ＠ TOTAL 
No change 100 (15) 145 (23) 128 (20) 373 (58) 
Change 108 (17) 80 (12) 81 (13) 269 (42) 
Conditional Probabilities 
Pr(Fvote (i) I No change) 0.27 0.39 0.34 1 
Pt(Fvote (i) I Change) 0.40 0.30 0.30 1 
Notes: Policy Decisions gives the actual number of policy decisions taken by the MPC favouring a 
Cha11ge or No Chauge the interest rate in Injlalio11 Repott months (F(O)) and subsequent non-It!f/alion Report 
Months (F(1) and F(2)); Pooled Votes gives the number of ''Otes cast in favour of a Chrmge or No 
Change in moneta[}' policy in MPC meetings held during lt!flatiotl Reporl months ((F(O)) and subsequent 
mond1s in which an lt!flation Repott is not released (F(l) and F(2)). 
*Numbers in round brackets (.) denote the number of policy decisons (Policy Decisons) and votes cast 
(Pooled Votes) expressed as a percentage of all decisions taken/votes cast. 
**Pr(F(i) I·) denotes the probability of a decision being taken either in an lt!flaliotl Repott month (i=O) or a 
non-lt!flalioll Repo11 month (i=1,2) conditional on there being a Change or No Change in rl1e interest rate. 
Pr(F"'" (i) I·) denotes equivalent conditional probabilities for Pooled Votes. 
TABLE 5.2. 
PUBLICATION OF TilE INFLATION REPORT AND MPC DECISIONS 
145 
and richer set of information variables - quantitative and qualitative, real 
and n1onetary" 35 [emphasis added ] 
One question which I focus on is the following: what impact do the n1acro-
projection exercises - initiated about one n1onth before the Inflation Report is 
released, and ultin1ately culminating in the production of the BoEMPC's quar-
terly inflation and output projections - have on the policy stance of the BoEMPC? 
Specifically, I ask whether changes in the interest-rate are more likely to occur 
in n1onths in which the Inflation Report is produced. To help develop priors, 
consider Budd (1998), who provides insight into the role of the months in which 
the Inflation Report is not produced. During these n1onths, 
" .. .it is possible to evaluate new data with reference to the extent which 
they are consistent with the previously published forecast. In son1e cases 
the evidence n1ay be fairly direct, e.g. new GDP data or revisions to previ-
ous data; in others it is indirect but n1ay cast light on the starting point or 
on future developments .. .In son1e cases it is possible to revise the previous 
forecast in a fairly n1echanical way in response to new data ... . But S'l.tch revi-
sions are not a substitute for the complete reassessment of all the evidence 
that is involved in a full forecasting round. In reaching its decision in these 
[non-Inflation Report] months the MPC will assess how the new data, and 
any change in its underlying analysis of the inflationary process, affects its 
views of the prospects for inflation., 36 (emphasis added) 
This staten1ent clearly provides a hint that n1onths in which the forecasting round 
takes place are more 'in1portant' than nan-forecasting n1onths. In TABLE 5.2, 
F(O) denotes a month in which the Inflation Report is released, with F(l) and 
F(2) denoting the two proceeding non-forecasting round n1onths respectively. It 
shows that under the aegis of the MPC, the interest-rate changed relatively n1ore in 
Inflation Report n1onths than other n1onths. This is apparent in the top segment 
of the table which considers policy decisions taken between June 1997 and June 
2003, 74 meetings in all. During n1onths which the inflation report was released 
(F(O)), interest rates changed eleven tin1es, compared to only six and seven times 
in subsequent non-forecasting n1onths respectively. Another way of interpreting 
this finding is that interest rates are less likely to change during non-Inflation Re-
port months. The Conditional Probabilities in the top part of the table reflect 
35Ibid, p.21. 
36 Budd (1998), p.1790. 
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this fact. Over the sample period, the probability of changing the interest-rate-
Pr( Change) - is 0.32, irrespective of the whether or not it is a n1onth in which the 
Inflation Report is released. This reflects the inertial nature of UK monetary pol-
icy, as shown in FIGURE 5.2. Yet assuming that the MPC does decide to change 
the interest-rate, the (conditional) probability of it doing so in an Inflation Report 
month - Pr(FD (0) I Change) - is 0.46. 
As might be expected, these findings are reflected in the individual votes cast 
by MPC 1nen1bers. Of 642 votes cast by all MPC men1bers over the san1ple period, 
269 were for change. Given a n1ember chooses to vote for a change in the interest-
rate, the probability of their doing so in a month in which the inflation report is 
released is Pr(Fvote(O)I Change) = 0.4. as opposed to the n1onths subsequent to 
the release of the Inflation Report. Again, the probability of an individual MPC 
n1en1ber voting for no change is again greater in non-Inflation Report n1onths. 
Although individual votes are n1ore evenly spread across Inflation Report and non-
Inflation Report months, the san1e qualitative conclusions hold as for the actual 
policy decisions taken by the MPC. 
5.6 What Data is the MPC using? 
In addition to the n1acroeconon1ic projections at the heart of the Inflation Report, 
MPC n1en1bers are presented with a wide range of data upon which to base a policy 
decision. This is reflected in the Minutes, which contains sections on the 'world 
econon1y', 'den1and and output', 'n1oney, credit and asset prices' and 'prices and 
costs'. Data on consun1er confidence, changes in n1onetary aggregates (MO, M4), 
consensus forecasts of inflation and output, industrial production and exchange 
rates are invariably referred to in these sections. Of special in1portance is the 
role of the so-called 'pre-MPC' n1eeting which takes place on the Friday before a 
decision is taken. At such n1eetings, bank staff present various data and analyses 
which pertain to regional, national and international econonuc developn1ents. It 
is notable that not all of the information presented at pre-MPC n1eetings is in 
the public don1ain. For exan1ple, the n1onthly report on regional developn1ents 
presented at pre-MPC n1eetings by the Bank of England's regional agencies is 
unavailable to the public at large. 
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5. 7 Individual Policy Preferences 
TABLE A shows (i) the individual men1bers con1prising the MPC for the sample 
period, ( ii) their period of appointinent and the corresponding nun1ber of votes 
cast and (iii) whether they are insiders or outsiders. This is complimented by 
PANELS 5.1 - 5.3, which display the interest-rate preferences of individual MPC 
n1embers as revealed by their votes.37 Interest-rate preferences (%) are given on 
the vertical axes. The fact that MPC n1embers' tern1S are overlapping in conlbi-
nation with varying tern1 lengths associated with different types of n1en1ber - as 
reflected in TABLE A - accom1ts for the different interest rate paths. Inspection 
of the charts reveals that although policy preferences across members do differ, 
n1en1bers interest-rate paths are broadly sinlilar. Members who served for the 
longest periods- nan1ely the Governor, Mervyn King, Ian Plenderleith and David 
Clen1enti are all insiders. On1itted fron1 the panels are Howard Davies and Richard 
Lambert - it was felt that each of their series was h1Sufficiently long to warrant 
graphing. Davies, an insider, stands as the shortest serving MPC member, at-
tending only the first two MPC meetings; Lambert's appointn1ent coincided with 
the final meeting in the san1ple in June 2003, and so only voted once. 
5.8 Group Policy Preferences 
FIGURE 5.3 plots the average preferred interest rate for insiders and outsiders at 
each MPC n1eeting. This is obtained by taking the arithn1etic n1ean of interest 
rates cast by each group respectively at each MPC n1eeting. It shows that for most 
of the first five years of the MPC, insiders preferred on average higher interest 
rates than outsiders. With the exception of a handful of MPC meetings between 
October 1997 and May 1998, the average interest-rate preferred by outsiders was 
less than that preferred by insiders. The extent of the differences is n1ade clearer in 
the accompanying chart which plots the difference in mean interest rates preferred 
by insiders and outsiders. 
37The policy preferences of Howaa.·d Davies and llichaa.·d Lambert are not presented. Howard 
Davies left the NIPC after the second meeting; Richaa.·d Lambert's appointment coincided with 
the final meeting in our sample, and so only voted once. 
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Members of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee, June 
1997 -June 2003 
Insiders 
Eddie George* 
flowardl)avies** 
Ian Plenderleith**** 
Mervyn King*** 
!)avid Clementi** 
John Vickers**** 
Charles Bean**** 
Paul Tucker**** 
Andrew Large** 
Outsiders 
Charles Goodhart 
Willem Buiter 
l)e Anne Julius 
Sir Alan Budd 
Sushi! Wadhwani 
Stephen Nickell• 
Christopher Allsopp 
Kate Barker•• 
Marian Bell 
Richard Lambert 
Pedod of Appointtnent 
Jun 1997- Jun 2003 
Jun 1997 -Jul1997 
Jun 1997- May 2002 
Jun 1997- Jun 2003 
Sept 1997 - Aug 2002 
Jun 1998 - Sept 2000 
Oct 2000- Jun 2003 
J un 2002 - May 2005 
Oct 2002 - Sept 2007 
Jun 1997 - May 2000 
Jun 1997- May 2000 
Sep 1997 - May 2001 
l)ec 1997 - May 1999 
Jun 1999- May 2002 
J un 2000 - May 2006 
J un 2000 - May 2003 
Jun 2001 - May 2007 
J ul 2002 - J un 2005 
Jun 2003- May 2006 
Votes Castx 
74 
2 
61 
74 
61 
28 
34 
13 
9 
36 
36 
45 
18 
37 
38 
37 
26 
12 
1 
x The number of votes cast by each member is identical to the total munber of meetings 
attended by each member. The emergency MPC meeting following the terrorist attacks 
on d1e World Trade Centre on September 11th 2001 are also included - an extra meeting 
was held in this month. 
* Governor of the Bank and Chairman of the MPC I ** Deputy Governor of the Bank for 
Financial Stability I *** Deputy Governor of d1e Bank for Monetary Policy I **** 
Executive Director of d1e Bank. 
•Reappointed for a second term commencing June 2003. 
••Reappointed for a second term commencing June 2004. 
TABLE A. 
MPC MEMBERS AND PERIODS OF APPOINTMENT 
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Policy Preferences of l\tiPC members, June 1997 -June 2003 
98:01 99:01 00:01 01:01 02:01 03:01 
-GEORGE 
-BUl'IER 
4 
98:01 99:01 00:01 01:01 02:01 03:01 
-GOODHART -KING 
98:01 99:01 00:01 01:01 02:01 03:01 
-PLENDERLEITH -CLEMENTI 
PANEL 5.1. 
POLICY PREFERENCES OF MPC MEMBERS AS REVEALED BY 'l'HE VO'l'ING RECORD 
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Policy Preferences of MPC members, June 1997 - June 2003 
4 4 
98:01 99:01 00:01 01:01 02:01 03:01 98:01 99:01 00:01 01 :01 02:01 03:01 
-JUUUS 
-BUDD 
98:01 99:01 00:01 01:01 02:01 03:01 98:01 99:01 00:01 01 :01 02:01 03:01 
-VICKERS 
-WADH\VANI 
98:01 99:01 00:01 01:01 02:01 03:01 98:01 99:01 00:01 01:01 02:01 03:01 
-NICKELL 
-ALLSOPP 
PANEL 5.2. 
POLICY PREFERENCES OF MPC MEMBERS AS REVEALED BY THE VOTING RECORD 
151 
Policy Preferences of l'viPC members, June 1997 - June 2003 
98:01 99:01 00:01 01 :01 02:01 03:01 98:01 99:01 00:01 01 :01 02:01 03:01 
-BEAN 
-BARKER 
98:01 99:01 00:01 01:01 02:01 03:01 98:01 99:01 00:01 01:01 02:01 03:01 
-111CKER 
-BEll. 
98:01 99:01 00:01 01 :01 02:01 03:01 
-LARGE 
PANEL 5.3. 
POLICY PREFERENCES OF MPC MEi\.fBERS AS REVEALED BY TilE VOTING RECORD 
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5.8.1 Are the Differences Statistically Significant? 
I initially test to see if the differences illustrated in FIGURE 5.3 are statistically 
significant using paired t-tests. The null hypothesis of no difference in the average 
preferred interest-rate in n1eeting t for each group is tested against the alternative 
of the average preferred interest-rate in period t being greater for insiders. More 
forn1ally it is expressed as 
Ho : ｾｉｴ＠ - ｾｯ＠ t = 0 I I (5.1) 
against 
(5.2) 
where ｾｊ Ｑ ｴ＠ and ｾＰ Ｑ ｴ＠ denote n1eeting t average preferred interest rates for insiders 
and outsiders respectively. A t-statistic oft = 5.45 with a corresponding p-value 
of 0.000 points· to rejection of H0 in favour of H1: average preferred interest rates 
for outsiders are significantly higher for insiders than outsiders. This points to 
outsiders being more dovish than their internally appointed counterparts. 
In the interests of con1pleteness, further tests were conducted confirnling that 
differences in insider-outsider voting behaviour are significantly different. Again, 
using paired t-tests38 it was found that internalness and extemalness have a sta-
tistically significant bearing on the voting behaviour of insiders and outsiders. 
The procedure was perforn1ed as follows. MPC members were categorised as 
falling into three groups - insiders, outsiders, and a third group consisting of all 
MPC n1en1bers irrespective of type (All members). Then, for each n1eeting, 
the percentage of votes cast within each group for a change in the interest-rate 
(All changes), a tightening of the interest-rate (Tighter policy only) and an 
easing of the interest-rate (Looser policy only) was calculated.39 Results are 
shown in TABLE 5.4. Section A.1 catalogues the differences in voting behaviour 
between insider and outsiders in each category. At an average MPC meeting -
calculated by sunlffiing the percentages corresponding to the type of vote cast in 
each category across all meetings and dividing by the total nun1ber of n1eetings-
insiders voted to change the interest-rate 36.15% of the tin1e, con1pared to 50% 
for outsiders. This difference is significant at the 1% level. Correspondingly, the 
difference is not significant for decisions to tighten the rate, but highly significant 
when it come to voting to loosen policy. At an average MPC meeting, outsiders 
38 All calculations were performed using STATA 8. 
39 In TABLES 5.4 and perce11tages are calculated through pooling members votes- there is no 
attempt to distinguish between meetings when performing calculations. 
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FIGURE 5.3. 
MEAN INTEREST RATES FOR INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS AND ASSOCIATED DIFFERENCES 
chose to vote for looser policy 33.45% of the tin1e, compared with a rate of 19.19% 
for insiders. This difference is significant at the 1% level. Section B.l compares 
each group's propensity to vote for a change in the interest-rate on the side of 
tightness or looseness. Across the 'All n1ember' category, outsiders vote for looser 
policy significantly more than for tighter policy. This finding 1nakes sense, as for 
the san1ple period interest rates on average fell. Although insiders are just as likely 
to vote for a change in tighter policy as a change in looser policy, for outsiders 
this difference is significant at the 1% level. In short, FIGURE 5.3 AND TABLE 
5.4 den1onstrate that insiders are n1ore hawkish and less activist than outsiders. 
These differences are statistically significant. 
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Mean Percentage of votes for looser and tighter policy given the prevailing 
interest rate including Governor 
Section A.1 - Insiders versus Outsiders 
Significance level of 
Insiders Outsiders Difference* 
All Changes 36.1 50 1% 
Tighter Policy Only 17.0 16.6 NS 
Looser Policy Only .19.2 33.4 1% 
Section B.1 - Tighter versus Looser Policy 
Tighter Looser 
All Members 17.0 25.5 10% 
Insiders 17.0 19.2 NS 
Outsiders 16.6 33.4 1% 
Mean Percentage of votes for looser and tighter policy given the prevailing 
interest rate excluding Governor 
Section A.2 - Insiders versus Outsiders 
Significance level of 
Insiders Outsiders 
All Changes 37.2 50.0 
Tighter Policy Only 18.2 16.6 
Looser Policy Only 18.9 33.4 
Section B.2 - Tighter versus Looser Policy 
Tighter Looser 
All Members 17.6 26.2 
Insiders 18.2 18.9 
Outsiders 16.6 33.4 
Notes: *Significant differences arc indicated for 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels. 
NS indicates that d1e difference is not significant at the 10 percent level of significance 
All percentages rounded to 1 decinlal place. 
TABLE 5.4. 
Difference* 
1% 
NS 
1% 
NS 
1% 
1% 
TESTING FOR SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN THE PROPENSITY FOR INSIDERS AND 
OUTSIDERS TO CHANGE THE REPO-RA'l'E USING PAIRED t-TESTS 
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5.9 Estimating Members' Reaction Functions 
In this section I identify the deternlinants of insider and outsider voting behaviour 
using ordered logit analysis. 40 Reaction functions are independently estimated for 
insiders and outsiders using a variety of econon1etric specifications. As mentioned 
previously, voting data obtained fron1 Bank of England Minutes of Monthly Meet-
ings from between July loth 1997- 6th June 2003 is used. Three types of vote 
are identified 
1. No change: A vote for no change is defined as where an MPC men1ber prefers 
to n1aintain the interest-rate set in the previous period. 
2. Tightening: This is defined as where a n1en1ber votes to raise the interest-rate 
set in the previous period. 
3. Loosening: This is defined as where a men1ber votes to lower the interest-rate 
set in the previous period. 
A vote for Looser policy is coded -1, No change coded 0 and a vote for a Tightening 
of policy is assigned a value of 1. Specifications are geared towards competing 
ideas of how the n1onetary authorities set interest rates, reflecting views espoused 
in the recent literature on n1onetary policy making. Further, all explanatory 
variables are lagged by one month to take into account the data available to the 
MPC at the tin1e of a decision. This reflects a methodological concern raised by 
Orphanides (1998) and Tchaidze (2001) originally proposed for the estin1ation of 
reaction functions in the monetary policy rules literature. From a methodological 
perspective, it is best practice to use what Orphanides (1998) defines as real time 
data- nan1ely the actual data which the MPC was presented with and based its 
policy decision upon at each meeting. Clearly, it is a reasonable to assun1e that 
MPC reaction functions are best estin1ated using covariates in real tin1e, and not 
estimates of macroecononlic variables which have been revised after a n1eeting has 
taken place. In this chapter, as real tin1e data is not available, lagged data is 
used to proxy for what nlight be referred to as 'real tin1e' data- contemporaneous 
covariates are not used. Tchaidze (2001) identifies three key problen1s which 
should be avoided when estin1ating a n1onetary policy reaction function, nan1ely: 
" ... (i) the en1ployn1ent of conten1poraneous rather than lagged variables 
as indicators of a state of the econon1y; (ii) the use of cleaned up, revised 
40 Details of the procedures used in all estimations can be found in the Appendix to this chapter. 
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data; and finally (iii) a reliance on data which were not available at the 
mmnent of policy designing. The first ignores the so called "informa-
tion lag'' ,while the last two add (or in fact, subtract) substantial noise to 
(from) the fundamentals ... reliance on the information actually available to 
policy-makers in real time is essential for the analysis of monetary policy 
rules, 41 ( mnphasis added) 
Sinlilarly, Orphanides (1998) shows that using data which has undergone substan-
tial revision distorts understanding of past monetary policy decisions. This rule 
naturally extends to the estin1ation of reaction ftu1ctions using voting data. Ac-
cordingly, any analysis should be based on the data available to MPC n1embers 
at each meeting. Given the recency of the period under scrutiny, it is plausible 
to suppose revised estin1ates will not differ too greatly fron1 the originals. The 
econon1etric specifications are as follows: 
5.9.1 The 'Blinder' Rule 
The first specification is rooted in Alan Blinder's (1998) observation that 
"Central banks are often ten1pted to 'follow the markets,' that is to 
deliver the interest path that the n1arkets have en1bedded in asset prices., 42 
The reasons for such behavior are not difficult to con1prehend: 
"Central bankers are only hun1an; they want to earn high marks - from 
whomever is handing out the grades. While the only verdict that really 
matters is the verdict of history, it takes an amazingly strong constitution 
to wait that long. In stark contrast, the markets provide a kind of giant 
biofeedback machine that n1onitors and publicly evaluates the central bank's 
performance in real tin1e. So central bankers naturally turn to the n1arkets -
or rather, they have that evaluation constantly thrown back in their faces." 43 
The argument here is not, for instance, based on MPC n1en1bers following the 
n1arkets due to their faith in the efficient markets hypothesis. 44 MPC men1bers 
might not necessarily subscribe to the view that all inforn1ation regru.·ding future 
inflation and output will be fully en1bedded in asset and securities prices. Rather, 
41p.l. 
•12Blinder (1998), p.60. 
43 Ibid. 
44The seminal contribution is Fama (1965). 
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the in1plications of Blinder's argun1ent is that when setting the interest-rate, the 
MPC follows the n1arket lmowing that a positive appraisal of policy from market 
participants greatly cen1ents their reputation as a responsible and credible mon-
etary authority. The view from the Bank is that n1arket expectations do play 
an in1portant role in shaping n1onetary policy, as asserted by Brook, Cooper and 
Scholtes (2000): 
"The Bank's Monetary Policy Con1n1ittee (MPC) is interested in finan-
cial market participants' expectations if future interest rates. Knowledge 
of such expectations helps the MPC to predict whether a particular policy 
decision is likely to surprise market participants, and what their short-term 
response is likely to be to a given decision. Expectations of future levels 
of official rates also play a key role in detern1ining the current stance of 
monetary policy." 45 (emphasis added) 
In light of the previous assertions, a n1en1bers' decision to loosen, tighten or leave 
rates unchanged is regressed on a variable which can be reasonably supposed to 
capture n1arket expectations of the future level of interest rates, a specification 
which referred to as the Blinder Rule. The chosen instrun1ent is a measure 
of implied inflation based on the difference between yield Clu·ve estimates of UK 
zero coupon nonlinal and index linked bonds at the 60 n1onth horizon. 46 The 
series is constructed by calculating monthly averages of daily estin1ates originally 
calculated by Anderson and Sleath ( 2002). A 60 n1onth - as opposed to a shorter 
horizon is used as for reasons attested by Anderson and Sleath (2002): 
"For maturities of less than two years, estimates of both the real and 
nominal yield curves have not been thought reliable, and as a result have 
not been used by the Bank's Monetary Policy Committee, nor published in 
the Inflation Report or Quarterly Bulletin.,47 
For c01npleteness, FIGURE 5.4 plots the behaviour of 2 year nonlinal yields and 
in1plied inflation on a 60 n1onth horizon. It can be readily observed that both 
series move very closely together. The series used in Blinder Rule estin1ations 
corresponds with the dotted black line. 
45 p.392. 
46 These calculations have a basis in the Fisher equation. 
47 Anderson and Sleath (2002), p .9. 
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In this approach lagged forecasts of GDP and RPIX inflation are used to explain 
the voting behaviour of MPC members. The e specifications are chosen as they 
to quote Clarida et al (2000), 
.. . allow the central bank to consider a broad array of information (be-
yond lagged information and output) to form beliefs about the future con-
dition of the econmny a feature which ... [i ] highl reali tic. 
The choice of covariates thus compri e a forward-looking Taylor Rule information 
set. Forward looking variables for GDP growth and RPIX inflation are obtained 
from HM Treasury s Forecasts for the UK Economy. Published monthly this is a 
compendium of forecasts produced by city and independent forecasters. 49 For the 
4 p.l51. 
49 Cit forecaster included Abn Amro Hoare Govett Bank of Amer-ica Barclay Bank Bar-
clays Capital Br-idgewell BZW Capital Economic Charterhouse Cha e Manhattan Citi-
group Credit Lyonnais Credit Suisse Fir t Bo ton Daiwa Europe Ltd/DIR, D M Gr nfell, 
Deutsche flank Dr sdner Kleinwort B nson Economic Perspectives Friends Ivory and Sime 
Fortis Bank Goldman Sach Greenwich Natwest Hermes HSBC Economics f3 Strategy ING 
Financial Markets ISIS Asset Management Plc, James Capel J P Morgan L hman Broth-
ers Lombard Str et M ernll Lynch Morgan Stanley N atwe t Gro·up N atwest Market Nikko 
Europe Norwich Union IM Panmure Gordon RBSFM Royal f3 Sun Alliance Inve tments 
Salomon Brother Schrod rs Societe G neral S C B Warburg Standard Chartered UBS 
Warburg Dillon Read WestLfl Panmure Gordon and Williams de Bro . Independent fore-
casing organi ations included BSL Cambr-idg Econometr-ics CBJ CEBR DR! Economy. com, 
London Business School, EIU Global In ight Henl y ITEM Club LBS Liverpool niversity. 
NIESR Oxford Economic Forecasting, WEFA EC, OECD and IMF. 
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san1ple period, forecasts fron1 47 city institutions and 19 independent forecasters 
are used. Each n1onth city and independent organisations reported an average 
of 19 new forecasts and 6 new forecasts respectively. Two specifications are 
estin1ated. The first, labelled Taylor Rulec, uses the following variables: 
• Consensus forecasts of RPIX growth for the current calendar year as a percentage 
change on the previous calendar year (RPIXc) 
• Consensus forecasts of GDP growth for the current calendar year as a percentage 
change on the previous calendar year (GDPc) 
The second specification, denoted Taylor Rulep uses forecast data on a longer 
tin1e horizon, nan1ely 
• Consensus forecasts of RPIX growth for the next calendar year as a percentage 
change on the current calendar year (RPIXF) 
• Consensus forecasts of GDP growth for the next calendar year as a percentage 
change on the current calendar year ( G DP F) 
Consensus forecasts of GDP growth and RPIX inflation are referred to in the 
Minutes, in addition to being reported in the Bank's Inflation Report. If n1embers 
of the MPC use 'sin1ple' rules to determine interest rates, then either specifica-
tion n1ay both explain and predict MPC voting behaviour. I note that Tootell 
(1991a, b) also uses forward looking variables in the forn1 of Greenbook estimates 
of GDP growth and inflation as covariates- this is because 
" ... monetary policy affects the econon1y only with lags, the FOMC's 
expectations of GNP growth and inflation can be used to determine its 
votes." 
As noted previously, purportedly central to the decisions on interest rates are the 
Bank of England's quarterly forecasts of inflation and GDP, which are published 
in the Inflation Report. However, the quarterly nature of these forecasts make it 
difficult to incorporate into the econometric frmnework as the MPC make a deci-
sion on interest rates on a monthly basis. Even if the quarterly GDP and RPIX 
forecasts contained in the inflation report are interpolated to forn1 n1onthly vari-
ables, they have very low explanatory power in explaining MPC voting behaviour. 
These regressions are therefore not included. 50 A con1parison of Bank versus 
50 Even if the quarterly GDP and RPIX forecasts contained in the inflation report are in-
terpolated to form monthly variables (through using a HP filter, A = 5), they have very low 
explanatory power in explaining MPC voting behaviour. 
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Consensus forecasts for GDP and inflation are presented in PANEL 5.5. Current 
consensus forecasts of GDP and RPIX clearly exhibit n1ore volatility than fore-
casts on a longer tern1 horizon. The san1e applies to the quarterly Bank forecasts. 
Also, visual inspection reveals that consensus forecasts for GDPp track the Bank's 
quarterly forecasts on the 12 n1onth horizon n1ore closely than for the 24 n1onth 
horizon. This applies to RPIX.p forecasts too. 
5.9.3 Broad Information Set 
Prior to each MPC n1eeting, its n1mnbers are presented with of a wide range of 
data upon which to base a policy decision. This is reflected in the Minutes, which 
contains sections on the 'world econon1y', 'den1and and output', 'n1oney, credit and 
asset prices' and 'prices and .costs' .51 Accordingly, it is conjectured that MPC 
votes n1ay be explained better by a using a broad data set. The final specification 
uses the variables fron1 the Blinder Rule and the Taylor Rulep inforn1ation set 
in addition to the following variables: 
• 3 period moving average of the monthly annual change in the effective exchange 
rate (EER) 
• Quarterly growth rate in industrial production (Industrial production) 
• Monthly unemployn1ent rate (Unemployment) 
• Monthly annual change in retail sales (Retail sales) 
• Monthly annual % change in narrow money growth (MO) 
• Consumer confidence indicator, n1onthly levels (Consumer confidence) 
The additional variables are chosen as they represent potential sources of infla-
tionary presstu·e which the MPC n1ay take into account when setting the interest-
rate. 52 The behaviour of the variables used across all specifications is presented 
in PANEL 5.4. When contrasting the rules in proceeding sections I find it useful 
class the Blinder Rule, Taylor Rulec and Taylor Rulep specifications - as 'sin1ple' 
rules for n1onetary policy. In contrast, the Broad Inforn1ation Set is an exan1ple 
of an 'eclectic' rule, as it draws upon a wide and rich set of information variables. 
51 Full details of the variables used are provided in the appendix. 
52 This list is by no means exhaustive- for example, not included here are statistics related to 
the growth of input prices, NI4, average earnings and house prices. Estimations were carried 
out using these variables, but many proved to be insignificant. 
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arison of different econometric soecifications 
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Taylor Rulec 
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Marginal e.fficts Insiders -1 
0 
1 
011tsiders -1 
0 
8.76 12.53 3.62* 
-0.62* 
0.51* 
0.11* 
-0.68* 
1.47*** 
0.22* 
0.44 3.64 0.67* 0.19 
2.02 4.57 0. 72* 0.49 
-0.10* -0.03 
0.01 0.00 
0.09* 0.02 
-0.15* -0.1 
0.06* 0.0-1-
0.09 0.06 
11.28 15.12 
12.94 15.89 
9.24 15.26 3.55* 
5.90 10.63 3.38.1< 
-0.19 
0.06 
0.13 
-0.-1-9 
0.38 
0.11 
*/**/***Denotes significance at the 1%/5%/10% level 
2.20* 
1.54* 
-0.26* 
0.03 
'.23* 
-0.30* 
0.13* 
0.17* 
-0.49 
-1.27.1< 
3.30* 
4.23* 
-0.-1-0* 
.05 
0.3-1-* 
-0.82* 
0.36* 
0.47* 
1.89 0.54 ' 
0.46 0.43 
0.15 
0.16 
0.12 
0.43 
0.10 ... -1.38 
0.19 •• -0.69 
-0.01 ... 0.07 
0.002 -0.02 
0.004 ... -0.05 
-0.02 0.1 
'.01 •• -0.08 
0.004 -0.02 
0.28 
0.24 
-0.01 
0.004 
0.01 
-0.03 
0.03 
0.01 
0.07 &.ol 28.58 0.000 
0.69 O.JM 22.67 0.000 
0.32 0.17 
0.28 0.14 
0.61 0.39 251.5 0.000 
0.62 0.38 218.4 0.000 
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Blinder -461.8 -23 .9 -211.8 24.3 2 5.99 ·cs 
stimate both groups 
separate! 
Taylorc -592.2 -310.2 -272.8 18.5 3 .81 es 
stimate both group 
eparatel · 
TaylorF -521 .6 -264. -243.9 26.0 3 .81 yes 
E timatc b th groups 
separately 
Broad -389.2 -194. 39.2 10 18.3 
Jlo: Both groups hould not be estimated separate! · 
H 1: Both group should b e timated eparately 
LR test statistic calculated as c = -2(L(R) -L(UR)) where L(R) is tbe log likelibood t•alue for tbt restricted model (botb grotrps tstimated 
togetber) afld L(UR) is the mfll of tbe log -likelihood tl(lllles for botb groups estimattd separatt!J. 
TABLE 5.6: 
LIKEL!H OD RATIO TE T FOR ORDERED LOCIT E THIATIO t 
5.10 Econometric Results 
TABLE 5.5 reports th estimates and diagno tic for the four pecification out-
lin d above all of which are e timat d s parately for in ider and outsiders. At 
this juncture it i worth noting that a characteri tic common to limited dependent 
variable analysi - particularly ord r d logit e timation- is a difficulty in directly 
int rpreting parameter timate . This i b cau e unlik stimation procedur 
such as OLS, coefficient cannot be directly interpreted marginal effect . Ulti-
mately thi i a consequ nee of impo ing the con traint that the sum of probabili-
tie aero all categories are non-n gativ and urn to unity. The marginal effect 
associated with each category do not remain con tant as the values of re pectiv 
ind pendent variables chang but vary in te d. It is h nee commonplace to pro-
vid stimate of marginal effect holding independent variabl s at th ir means. 
Rather than adopt thi approach- whi h produces rather unfriendly m an val-
ue - and to make the r ults b twe n group dir ctly comparable (to correct for dif-
fer nee in ample mean cau d by the differ nt ample ize ociated with both 
groups) marginal effect are calculat d for all specifications through holding inde-
pendent variabl con tant at th following ( erningly s n ible) pr determined val-
ue : Implied inflation = 2.5o/c · MO = 7o/c · RPIX = RPIXF = 2.5o/c · GDP c 
= GDP F = 2.2o/c · Consumer confidence = O· Unemployment = 3.5o/c · EER 
= 2o/c · Industrial production = - 1 o/c · Retail sales = 5o/c . In comparing wo 
identical pecifications for in ider nd out ider the r por ed marginal f£ ct 
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show the effect of a change in an independent variable at a given point. 53 It pro-
vides a good general guide to the extent to which changes in explanatory variables 
drive men1bers' propensity to change the interest rate for a given category. FUll 
details of the estimation procedure are provided in the appendix to this chapter. 
Starting with the Blinder Rule, the effect of implied inflation is highly signif-
icant for both insiders and outsiders. Marginal effects show that an increase in 
implied inflation reduces the probability that both insiders and outsiders will 
lower interest rates, but raises the likelihood of leaving rates unchanged or tight-
ening policy. However, the reduction in probability associated with a loosening of 
policy is larger for outsiders than for insiders (n1arginal effects of 0.68 vs. 0.62). 
According to this specification, outsiders are more likely to lower interest rates 
than insiders for a given change in in1plied inflation. The n1arginal effects for 
tightening show the reverse - insiders are more likely to raise interest rates than 
outsiders for a corresponding change in implied inflation. This specification there-
fore points to asymmetries in policy preferences between the two groups. Insiders 
are comparatively n1ore hawkish than their externally appointed counterparts, a 
finding which confirn1s the analyses of previous sections. All of the n1arginal 
effects are significant, although both the Cragg-Uhler and McFadden n1easures 
or R2 (denoted R2 ( C-U) and R2 (M) respectively) are only moderately high. 
However, under both goodness-of-fit criteria, the Blinder Rule specification still 
performs better than either of the Taylor Rule specifications, to which I now turn. 
In Taylor Rule0 , consensus forecasts of RPIX growth for the current calendar 
year as a percentage change on the previous calendar year (RPIXo) are insignifi-
cant across both groups, although forecasts of current GDP growth do seem to play 
a role. Marginal effects indicate that increases in RPIX0 decrease the probability 
that both insiders and outsiders will lower interest rates (0.10 vs. 0.15), but raise 
the probability of leaving rates unchanged or tightening policy. The san1e applies 
to GDPp. Nevertheless, although the n1arginal effects across all categories are 
53 From a practical perspective, a caveat of holding independent variables at their means, or 
indeed any other values is that ( i) marginal effects are typically unique to those values and ( ii) the 
calculated change in probability associated with voting to loosen, tighten or leave the interest 
rate unchanged is at best only accurate for very (ideally infinitesimally) small changes in an 
independent variable. Indeed, as the magnitude of a given change, 8, in an independent variable 
becomes larger, so too does the inaccuracy of the estimated change in probability associated 
with a given category. One cannot therefore be confident, for example that a given change in an 
independent variable 8 multiplied by the marginal effects associated with a particular category 
will provide good approximations to changes in probability. 
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qualitatively sinlilar to those in the Blinder Rule, they are far less pronounced. 
F\n·ther, son1e of the n1arginal effects are not statistically different to zero. The 
final Taylor Rule specification, Taylor RuleF, which uses forecasts on a longer 
(12 month) horizon perforn1s better than Taylor Rule0 , with respect to both the 
significance and size of the n1arginal effects, and n1easures of pseudo R2 • This 
result n1ay indicate that MPC members are quite forward looking when setting 
policy, and use longer as opposed to relatively shorter forecasting horizons. 54 In 
both groups, the coefficients and n1arginal effects are generally highly significant, 
although for insiders, the n1arginal effects for no change are not significantly dif-
ferent from zero for RPIXF and GDPp. For outsiders, the marginal effects seem 
to be n1ore pronounced than for insiders for changes in GDPp. This suggests that 
the behaviour of GDP plays more of an influential role in setting the interest rate 
for outsiders. 
In the case of the Broad Inforn1ation Set the diagnostics suggest that it per-
fornls best in explaining the voting behaviour of MPC members. Both n1easures 
of R2 are n1oderate to high, and significantly higher than those under sin1ple rules. 
However, although for both groups, EER and GDPF have the wrong signs. Un-
employment, although statistically significant for insiders is not significant for 
outsiders. In both groups, the n1arginal effects are clearly donlinated by the effect 
of Implied inflation, where clear asyn1metries in policy can be seen as en1erging. 
The nature of the asynm1etry again points to outsiders being more dovish than 
insiders. The only variable other than Implied inflation which has statistically 
significant coefficients and n1arginal effects across both groups is MO, which also 
has the expected signs. TABLE 5.6 displays the results of likelihood ratio tests 
conducted to test the hypothesis that each specification should be estin1ated sep-
arately for insiders and outsiders. The hypothesis was accepted in every case. 
All specifications evidence a very strong link between implied inflation and 
interest rates. However, it might be the case that decisions on the interest-rate are 
not driven by implied inflation, but vice versa. Market participants n1ay just be 
extren1ely good at predicting future monetary policy decisions. Using data on the 
actual policy decisions taken by the MPC and rates of in1plied inflation, Granger 
causality tests suggest that the direction of causality runs fron1 in1plied inflation to 
the repo-rate. Full results are shown in TABLE 5.8. Using up to seven lags, the-
54 This suggests that policymakers practice inflation forecast targetting as opposed to just 
inflation targetting. 
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null hypothesis that the repo-rate does not Granger-cause changes in inflation is 
accepted in every instance. Conversely, the null hypothesis that implied-inflation 
does not Granger-cause changes in the repo-rate cam1ot be rejected for every lag. 
This result strengthens the case for a Blinder Rule, nan1ely that the MPC n1m·ely 
looks to the markets to set the interest rates. 
5.11 Predicting the Votes of MPC Members 
In this section the ability of each specification to predict the votes of insiders and 
outsiders is analysed. This procedure is in1plemented by calculating the fitted 
values in each category for each vote, and choosing the category associated with 
the highest value for each vote. As the fitted values are probabilities, this process 
n1m·ely involves choosing the category with the highest probability. Following 
Chevapatrakul et al (2001), directional predictions are forn1ally stated as 
(5.3) 
where no change in policy is predicted if P0 = max( Po, P1, P2 ), a tightening of 
policy is predicted if P1 = n1ax(P0 , P1 , P2) and looser policy is predicted if P2 = 
max(P0 , P1 , P2 ). In other words, the prediction is given by choosing the probability 
with the highest value. 
TABLE 5. 7 looks at the predictive perforn1ance of each specification. Part A 
details the in-san1ple voting predictions for insiders and outsiders baed on ordered 
logit estimations. Nun1bers in brackets (.) show the nun1ber of correct voting 
predictions within each category. Consider the Blinder Rule where insiders voted 
for looser policy 71 times (Actual Outcomes). The Blinder Rule specification 
predicted 40 votes for looser policy, of which 20 were correct. What imn1ediately 
becon1es apparent is the tendency inherent in all specifications to over-predict no 
change in policy. This comes at the expense of under-predicting decisions to loosen 
or tighten interest rates, an outcon1e which obtains for both insiders and outsiders. 
The Taylor Rulec specification perfonns particularly poorly, and predicts that all 
votes for insiders will be to leave policy unchanged. 
Parts B and C allow for the identification of the n1odel which perforn1s best 
in predicting the voting behaviour of insiders and outsiders. Part B shows the 
nun1ber of correct decisions expressed as a percentage of actual decisions. Con-
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A. Voting Predictions 
Information Set 
Direction Actual Broad Information 
of Decision Outcomes Blinder Rule Taylor Rulec Taylor Rulep Set 
Insiders Loosen 71 40* (20)** 0 (0) 30 (19) 45 (32) 
No change 228 277 (190) 356 (228) 307 (213) 280 (210) 
Tighten 57 39 {21l 0 {Ol 19 {152 31 {26} 
Outsiders Loosen 99 96 (60) 44 (18) 56 (35) 100 [75) 
No change 145 162 (92) 242 (119) 211 (114) 153 (112) 
Tighten 42 28 {11} 0 {0} 19 {9} 33 {25} 
B. Associated Percentages 
Information Set 
Direction Actual Broad Infom1ation 
of Decision Outcomes Blinder Rule Taylor Rulec Taylor Rulep Set 
Insiders Loosen 71 28.2* [50]** 0 [0] 26.8 [63.3] 45.1 [71.1] 
No change 228 83.3 [68.6] 100 [64.0} 93.4 [69.4] 92.1 [75] 
Tighten 57 36.8 [53.8) 0 (OJ 26.3 [78.9] 45.6 (83.9] 
Outsiders Loosen 99 60.6 (62.5] 18.2 [40.9] 35.4 [62.5] 75.8 l75] 
No change 145 63.4 [56.8] 82.1 [49.2] 78.6 [54.0] 77.2 [73.2] 
Tighten 42 26.2 [39.3] 0 [0] 21.4 [47.4] 59.5 175.8] 
C. All Votes • 
Information Set 
Direction Actual Broad Information 
of Decision Outcomes Blinder Rule Taylor Rulec Taylor Rulep Set 
Insiders Prediction 356 231 228 247 268 
Percentage (%) 64.9 64.0 69.4 75.3 
Rankin 3 4 2 1 
Outsiders Prediction 286 163 137 158 212 
Percentage (%) 57.0 47.9 55.2 74.1 
Rankin 2 4 3 
Notes: Actual Outcomes refers to the total number of votes cast by Insiders and Outsiders to loosen, leave unchanged or tighten 
the repo-rate. As an example, the total number of votes cast by insiders to loose11 the interest rate over the sample period is 71. *In 
A. Voting Predictions, numbers in columns show the number of in-san1ple predictions under each rule. ** Figures in round 
brackets (.) show the number of rome/ voting predictions within each category (Loosen/No Change/Tighten)). For instance, 
consider the Blinder Rule where insiders voted for looser policy 71 times (Actual Outcomes). The Blinder Rule specification 
predicts 40 votes for looser polic}', of which 20 were correct. 
* Part B shows the number of correct decisions expressed as a percentage of actual decisions. For example, consider the Blinder rule 
for insiders again, recalling that part A shows that of 40 predictions for looser policy, only 20 were correct. The Blinder rule thus has 
a ((20)/(Jl))X100=28.2% success rate in predicting a vote cast for looser policy. ** Figures in square brackets [.] show the 
conditional probability (expressed as a percentage) of a prediction made within a particular category being correct. This is calculated 
by dividing the number of correct predictions within each categof}' by the total number of predictions for that category. For 
instance, to use the Blinder rule for insiders again, the likelihood of a prediction for looser policy being correct given that the 
prediction is for looser polic}' is calculated as Prob(Correct1Loosen)x100=(20/40)x100=50%. 
• Part C pools all of the correct predictions together for each group (insiders and outsiders) irrespective of category (Loosen/No 
Change/Tigh.ten) and divides this number by the total number of votes cast by each group. For instance, the Blinder Rule 
specification for insiders predicts 231out of 356 votes correctly, which corresponds to a (231/356)*100=64.9% success rate. These 
percentages are then used as a ranking criterion for each specification, where a 1 denotes the best specification and a 4 the worst. 
TABLE 5.7. 
IN-SA:MPLE VOTING PREDICTIONS BASED ON ORDERED LOGIT ES'l'IlllATES 
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sider the Blinder Rule for insiders again, and recall that part A shows that of 40 
predictions for loosed policy, only 20 were correct. The Blinder Rule thus has a 
ｾｾ＠ x 100 = 28.2% success rate in predicting a vote cast for looser policy. Under 
this criteria, the Broad Inforn1ation Set perfornlS best. Further, it seems n1ore 
able to predict votes for change for insiders than outsiders. The Blinder Rule 
is better at predicting votes cast for looser for outsiders than insiders, with the 
reverse being true for votes for tighter policy. However, some care should be taken 
when interpreting these results. Note that although the Taylor Rulec enjoys a 
64% success rate in predicting votes for no change in policy for insiders, it does 
not predict any votes in favour of changing the interest rate, in either direction. 
All votes predict no change in policy. 
Numbers in square brackets[.] show the conditional probability (expressed as a 
percentage) of a prediction n1ade within a pcu·ticular category being correct. This 
is calculated by dividing the nun1ber of correct predictions within each category by 
the total nun1ber of predictions for that category. Again, the Broad Inforn1ation 
Set performs best - for exan1ple, the results show that a prediction by the model 
to tighten interest rates has an 83.9% chance of being correct. Finally, part C 
pools all of the correct predictions together for each group irrespective of category 
and divides this number by the total number of votes cast by each group. The 
Broad Information Set out-perforn1s the other categories. For insiders, 75.3% 
of predicted votes were correct; for outsiders the figure was comparable at 7 4.1 %. 
The more parsin1onious specifications are very bad at correctly predicting the votes 
of outsiders; for insiders this is not necessarily the case. This may be attributable 
to the finding in Chapter 4 that at any given MPC n1eeting, the interest rate 
preferences of outsiders are n1ore widely dispersed than for insiders (see FIGURE 
4.3). A conclusion that nright be drawn fron1 this is that ｯｵｾｳｩ､･ｲｳ＠ are more 
'eclectic' in their approach to setting n1onetary policy - the additional variables 
used in the Broad Inforn1ation Set are relatively more important to outsiders than 
insiders. This may for exarnple explain why the marginal effects for the extra 
variables cu·e, with the exception of Unemployment, higher for outsiders across 
all categories. 
5.12 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I have den1onstrated that internalness and externalness is a sig-
nificant factor is explaining the voting behaviour of MPC members. Insiders are 
170 
shown to be more hawkish than their externally appointed counterparts, prefer-
ring ceteris paribus higher interest rates than outsiders. Further, insiders have a 
greater propensity for leaving interest rates unchanged. On a more general level, 
prelinunary analysis of the tin1ing of MPC decisions also den1onstrates that if the 
interest rate is going to change, it is n1ore likely to be changed in an Inflation 
Report n1onth than at any other time. 
The results of ordered logit analysis provide insight into the econonuc factors 
driving men1bers' voting decisions. A first conclusion is the seenungly crucial 
role of forward looking variables in setting interest rates for insiders and out-
siders. Both the Blinder Rule and Taylor Rulep specification out-perforn1 the 
Taylor Rulec specification by a significant n1argin. This is reflected in the asso-
ciated measures of pseudo-R2 and in-sample predictions presented in TABLE 5. 7. 
Further, it is notable that whereas all parameters in the Blinder Rule and and 
Taylor Rulep are statistically significant, this is not the case for the Taylor Rule0 . 
Marginal effects in the 'simple' rule specifications have the expected signs with 
respect to theoretical priors for both groups. Yet compared to the simple rules, 
the Broad Information Set specification is clearly superior, a finding which ap-
plies to both insiders and outsiders. Each group appears to use a broad array of 
variables when setting interest rates, which has in1plications for the view that the 
Bank merely follows the market or uses Taylor Rules. However, when one looks to 
the parameter estimates for implied inflation in the Broad Inforn1ation Set, it is 
clearly seen to be the most influential variable. This suggests that although MPC 
members use an eclectic rule when setting monetary policy, n1arket expectations 
of inflation play a donunant role. 
Based on the results presented in this chapter, further research in this area is 
has the potential to be both fruitful and policy relevant. An key finding is that 
outsiders prefer systen1atically lower interest rates than insiders. This begs the 
question of whether the appointn1ents procedure is open to political manipulation 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer - does he, for exan1ple choose external MPC 
members on the basis of their being doves, or are such dovish tendencies attribut-
able to chance? A further finding is the extent to which monetary policy would 
differ if outsiders forn1ed the n1ajority of n1en1bers. Under such a regin1e, it is 
not in1plausible to suppose that n1onetary policy would be characterised by lower 
interest rates with a correspondingly higher rate of econonuc growth. It n1ust 
be emphasised however that the approach adopted in this chapter approach lies 
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Causality between the repo rate and market expectations of inflation* 
H 0: The repo rate does not Granger Cause changes in implied i1iflation 
Lags Obs __ F_-_S_t_atl_· s_tl_· c __ . __ ......._p_-v_al_u_e _ _ 
1 72 1.61 0.21 
2 71 0.18 0.83 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
70 
69 
68 
67 
66 
1.24 
1.19 
2.11 
2.00 
1.76 
H 0: Implied inflation does not Granger Cause changes in the repo rate 
Lags Obs F-Statistic 
1 72 44.33 
2 71 11.65 
3 70 6.06 
4 69 4.49 
5 68 3.44 
6 67 5.21 
7 66 5.21 
0.30 
0.33 
0.08 
0.08 
0.12 
p-value 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
*5 year market expectations of implied inflation based on nominal zero coupon yields for 
UK government bonds. Source: Bank of England 
TABLE 5.8. 
GRANGER CAUSALITY TESTS: REPO-RATE VS. IMPLIED INFLA1'ION 
well within the 'reaction function' genre. Put another way, the focus has been 
on detern1ining how MPC n1en1bers respond to changes in economic conditions. 
Other lines of investigation such as the propensity of MPC members to dissent 
and the effects of career backgrounds on such behaviour - lines of investigation 
associated with the 'partisan theory of politics' literature- form the focus of the 
next chapter. 
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5.A Appendix to Chapter 5 
5.A.l Ordered and Multinomial Logit Models 
A conm1on thread running through studies of monetary policy decision n1aking is 
the use of lin1ited dependent variable n1odels. Fron1 the n1athematical perspective, 
the logit model has the advantage being computationally less burdenson1e than the 
probit model, which is based on the cun1ulative norn1al distribution. This section 
provides a rudin1entary treatment of ordered and n1ultinomiallogit n1odels geared 
specifically to the case of 3 outcomes, reflecting the choice faced by n1en1bers of an 
MPC to tighten, loosen or leave interest rates unchanged. For n1ore con1plete ex-
positions of the ordered and n1ultinonliallogit n1odels see Maddala ( 1983), Hos1ner 
and Len1eshow (1989), Cramer (1991) and Greene (1992). 
5.A.2 The Ordered Logit Model 
For the ordered logit n1odel the choice between M n1utually exclusive alternatives 
has an implicitly logical ordering. 55 ｾ ＵＶ＠ For n1en1bers of an MPC faced with 3 choices, 
the ordered logit model may be expressed as 
(5.6) 
(5.7) 
Yi = 1 if y; > 'Y2 
55 This model is also referred to as the proportional odds model. It recently came to the 
attention of the author that it is possible in STATA to estimate a generalised version of the 
ordered logit model, which relaxes the proportional odds assumption. Created by Vincent Kang 
Fu of the Department of Sociology, University of Utah, it is available as the gologit module and 
can be installed from within STATA by typing "sse install gologit". 
56 It is important to note here the difference between ordered logit model and the ordered 
probit model. In the case of probit estimation, the cumulative density function, A, is normal, 
implying 
I 1 
A("Yi - xd3) = J27i (5.4) 
-oo 
where s is a random variable such that s = N(O, 1). However, the cumulative logistic density, 
<I>, is given as 
(5.5) 
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where Yi is a stacked m x 1 vector of -1 s, 08 and IS corresponding to n1en1bers' 
votes to tighten, loosen or leave interest rates unchanged given the rate set in the 
previous period. Xi is a m x h n1atrix containing h independent variables capturing 
the information sets of MPC n1en1bers at the tin1e each vote was cast, and (3 is a 
1 x h vector parruneter estin1ates. 57 The specification given above has likelihood 
and log likelihood functions given by 
m 2 
L(f3) = IT fi[<I>( Fj - ｸｾｦＳＩ＠ - ci>( Fj-1 - ｸｾｦＳＩ｝ｺｩＬｪ＠ (5.8) 
i=l j=O 
and 
m 2 
ln£((3) =I: I: Zi,i[ci>(!i- x:f3)- <I>(!j-l- x:f3)] (5.9) 
i=l j=O 
where Zi,i = 1 if the ith vote falls in the lh category, and Zi,j = 0 if not, across 
the j = { 0, 1, 2} outcon1es. Letting <I> denote the cumulative standard logistic 
function it follows that 
(5.10) 
In the case of three ordered outcon1es, the probability that Yi assun1es a particular 
value for the three categories is defined as: 
Looser policy: 
(5.11) 
No change in policy: 
- 0) = [<I>(12- x:f3)- <1>(11- x:f3)] 
1 1 
= (5.12) 
Tighter policy: 
(5.13) 
where 1 1 and 1 2 are en1body the lower and upper cut off points respectively. 
57The ordered logit model is a more parsimonious specification than the multinomial logit 
model, given there are fewer parameters to be estimated. 
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5.A.3 Marginal Effects for the Ordered Logit Model 
Marginal effects are con1puted by holding regressors at their n1ean values, and are 
given by: 
Looser policy: 
8P(Zi = -1jx) 
ax 
No change in policy: 
8P(Zi = Ojx) 
Tighter policy: 
a (1 - <I>( l2 - ｸｾＯＳＩＩ＠
ax 
_1--:--, - [1 - 1' ] {3i 
1 + e-(f3 xi-"Y2) 1 + e-({3 xi-"Y2) 
e-<13' xi-"Y2) 
-------=-2/3. 
( 1 + e-(13' xi-"Y2)) t 
(5.14) 
(5.15) 
(5.16) 
Unlike the linear probability n1odel, n1arginal effects vary across probabilities, and 
n1ust sum to zero across categories. 58 
58 These results also apply to the multinomiallogit model. 
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5.A.4 The Multinomial Logit Model 
In the MNL n1odel, choices between alternatives do not contain any implicit or-
dering. 
No change in policy: 
(5.17) 
Tighter policy: 
(5.18) 
Looser policy: 
I 
ef32xi 
P(Zi = 2) = I I 
1 + ef31 xi + ef32xi 
(5.19) 
ForM = {1, 2, ... m} observations, the likelihood function for three choices is given 
by 
m 
L(f31' (32) = II ｰｩｾｩｏ＠ ｰｩｾｩｬ＠ ｾｾＲ＠ (5.20) 
i=l 
with a corresponding log likelihood function expressed as 
m 2 
In L((31 , (32 ) = :L :L di,i In Pr( Zi = j) (5.21) 
i=l j=O 
where dt,j = 1 if the ith vote falls in the jth category, and dt,j = 0 if not, across the 
j = {0, 1, 2} outcomes. 59 
5.A.5 Marginal Effects for the Multinomial Logit Model 
For the n1ultinonliallogit model, n1arginal effects are given by 
(5.22) 
J 
where (3 = 2:: Pkf3 k is a weighted average of coefficients. For the case of three 
k=O 
outcon1es, and holding regressors at their n1eans, the n1ru·ginal effects of the qth 
59 Not considered here is the multinomial probit model, which relaxes the so-called IIA (Indepen-
dence of Irrelevant Alternatives) assumption. Previously, this model has been computationally 
too burdensome to estimate. However, packages such as STATA 9 now offer this option. For 
an exegesis of the model see Maddala (1983) more recently Weeks (1997). 
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variable on respective probabilities for each category are given by: 
No change in policy: 
<fJolq - 8Pr(Zi = Olx) = R ｾ＠ _ tR /3 ] = R [/3 -/3] ax 0 O,q k k,q 0 O,q 
q k=O 
[ /30 - , 1 , /30 - l 1q 1+e.Blxi+e{:J2xi ,q (5.23) - Po 1 1 
e.Bl xi {3 - ef32xi {3 
' ' 1 ' ' 2 l+e{3lxi+e{:J2xi 1q 1+e{3lxi+e{:J2xi ,q 
Tighter policy: 
<fJ1,q - 8Pr(Zi = llx) = p [/3 _ tR /3 ] = p [/3 -/3] ax 1 1,q k klq 1 l,q 
q k=O 
[ /31 • - , 
1 
, /30 •- l I l+ef3lxi+ef32xi I (5.24) A I I 
ef31 xi {3 _ e.B2xi {3 
ｬＫ･ＯＳｾ＠ ｸｩＫ･ｻＳｾｸｩ＠ l 1q ｬＫ･ＯＳｾ＠ xi+e{32xi 21q 
Looser policy: 
[ 2 ] 
aPr(Zi = 2lx) 
<fJ2,q - ax = p2 f321q - L Pkf3 k,q = p2 [f321q - ｾ＠
q k=O 
[ /32 - , 1 , /30 - l 1q l+e.Bl xi+ef32xi ,q (5.25) 
-
P2 I I 
ef31 xi {3 - ef32xi {3 
I f 1 f I 2 1+e/3l:ci+e/32tri ,q 1+e.Blxi+ef32xi ,q 
In practice, multinon1iallogit estin1ation in many instances delivers sinlilar results 
to the ordered alternative. This becon1es appru·ent when both ordered logit and 
multinonlial logit estimates for the Blinder Rule are used to construct probability 
response profiles for insiders and outsiders. Multinonlial estimates for the Blinder 
Rule are given in TABLE 5.9. The corresponding response curves for both esti-
mation procedures are shown in PANELS 5. 6 and 5. 7. For con1pleteness, I have 
also calculated and plotted the corresponding n1arginal effects - or the slope of 
the probability response profiles - using the formulas given above. Clearly, the 
results for both estimation procedures are virtually indistinguishable fron1 each 
other. It should be stressed, however, that ordered logit estin1ation is certainly 
n1ore appropriate when using MPC voting data, as it has 8.!1 implicit ordering. 
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Multinomiallogit estimation of the Blinder Rule 
Intercept 
Intercept 
Blinder rule - Insiders 
Tighte11i11g -12.65* 
Ma'l}11al e.ffects 
Loosmi11g 7.33* 
Marxi11al efficts 
Blinder rule - Outsiders 
Tighteni11g -9.99* 
Loose11ing 9.01* 
*Denotes ignificance at the 1% level 
mitted category= o ch0111,e 
Implied =? 
inflation ｾ＠
N 
__ea... 
0.45 
3.73* 
0.26 
-3.43* 
-0.37* 
2.88* 0.47 
0.2 * 
-3.68* 
-0.74* 
0.26 
0.26 
Should sions for insiders and outsidets be estimated s 
k&_-likelihood vahm 
Insiders Outsiders LR test 5 % critical 
Both G!oups only ｯｮｬｾ＠ statistic df value 
-458.4 -236.6 -209.2 25.282 10 5.99 
H 0: Both group 
H 1: Both groups hould be e timated separately 
167.80 0.000 
149.86 0.000 
Reject 
HO? Conclusion 
Estimate both 
es groups 
se aratel 
LR test statistic calculated as X tf 2 = -2(L(R) -L(UR)) where L(R) is the kg likelihood vaiHe for the mtricted model 
(both gro11ps estimated together) and L(UR) is the s11m of the log-likelihood values for both groups estimated uparate!J. 
TABLE 5.9 . 
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0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
ｾ＠ 0.6 
:.0 
«! 0.5 
.g 
d:: 0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
Ordered lop)t probabiliiJ' responseprojilts for Insiders and Outsiders based on 
changes in inflationary e>•pectations 
- o change - Insider 
- o change -Outsider 
- Lo sen - In ider 
- Loosen - Outsider 
- Tighten- In ider 
T ighten - Out ider 
Market expectations of inflation (%) 
Ordered logit marginal e.ffuts for Insiders and Outsiders based on changes in 
inflationary expectations 
1 ＮＭＭＭＭＭ ＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭ ＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭｾ＠
0 .9 
0.8 
0.7 
ｾ＠ 0 .6 
ｾ＠ 0.5 
"' 0.4 ｾ＠ 0.3 
'f} 0.2 
t! 0.1 
ｾ Ｐ＠
] -0.1 
ｾ＠ -0.2 
ｾ ＭＰ Ｎ Ｓ＠
ｾ＠ -0.4 
0- -0 .5 
0 (i3 -0.6 
-0 .7 
-0 .8 
-0 .9 
·1 ＫＭＮＭＮＭＮＭＬＭＮＬｲＭＮＬｾｲｯＭＮＭＮＭＮｾｾｾｾｾＭｲＭｲＭｲＭｲＭｲＭｲＭｲＭＮＭＮＮＭＮＭＮＭＬＭｾ＠
Market expectations of inflation (%) 
- o change -Insider 
- o change - Our· ider 
- Loosen- Insider 
- Loo en - Outsider 
- Tighten- Insider 
Tighten - Outsider 
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0 
-0.4 
<!.> 
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0 
-0.6 v; 
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- I 
Multinomiallogitprobabili(y responseprojilu for Insiders and Out:-iders based on 
changes in inflationary expectations 
- o change - Insider 
- o change - Outsider 
- Loosen - r nsider 
- Loosen - Outsider 
-Tighten - l11Sider 
Tighten - Outsider 
ｾｾｾｾＦｾｎｾｾｾｾｾｧｾｾｾｾｾｾｾＸｾｾｾｾｾｾｾＸｾｾｾｾ＠ｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾ＠
Market expectations of inflation (%) 
Multinomiallogit marginal efforts proftles for Insiders and Outsiders based on 
changes in inflationary expectations 
- o change - Insider 
- o change- Outsider 
- Loos n - Insider 
- Loosen - Outsider 
- Tighten- Insider 
Tighten - Outsider 
Market expectations of inflation (% ) 
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5.A.6 Measuring the Goodness of Fit 
Following Maddala (1983), define 
(5.26) 
where L(/31, {32 ) is the likelihood function n1aximized with respect to all of the 
paran1eters in the model, {31 , {32 , including the constant terms60 , 'Yl and { 2 , and 
L({1 , 12 ) denoting the n1axin1un1 of the likelihood function n1axinlized with re-
spect to the constant terms only. 61 The tern1 m denotes the total nun1ber of 
observations. However, this n1easure of fit suffers fron1 severely underestin1ating 
the n1easure of fit of the regression: even if the model has perfect fit, R2 n1ay be 
well below 1. For this reason, it is apposite to en1ploy McFadden's (1974) n1easure 
of goodness-of-fit, pseudo-R2 , denoted PM· This is defined as62 
(5.27) 
An alternative n1easure of goodness of fit, also referred to as pseudo-R2 is provided 
by Cragg-Uhler (1970), and given as 
(5.28) 
where the sru11e notational definitions used for McFadden's (1974) n1easure of R2 , 
PM are employed. 
An alternative approach is to conduct a likelihood ratio test. To test for the 
joint significru1ce of all explanatory variables in each model, calculate 
(5.29) 
which is distributed as a Chi-squared variate with q degrees of freedom and 8 
restrictions. This forn1ula lends itself to a more general setting, with the max-
inlized log likelihood values for unrestricted and restricted versions of the n1odel 
60In the case of the ordered logit model the constant terms can be interpreted as cutoff points. 
61 This implies restricting the values of all explanatory variables to zero. In the ordered logit 
model this is equivalent to just estimating cutoff points. 
62 This measure is also referred to as McFadden's likelihood ratio index. 
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corresponding to the denonlinator and the nun1erator respectively. As one nlight 
expect, the null of no joint significance against the alternative hypothesis that at 
least one explanatory variable is significant is tested. 
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Constructed variables 
Name DescriEtion Constructed from: Source Mnemonic 
3 period moving average UK sterling (jJ effective 
of the monthly annual 
EER 
change in the effective exchange rate index, not Datastream UKXTW .. NF 
exchange rate. seasonally adjusted. 
Industrial Quarterly growth rate in UK Industrial production 
production industrial production. volume index, seasonally Datastream UKIPTOT.G 
adjusted. 
Unemployment Lagged monthly UK unemployment rate, Datastream UKUN%TOTQ 
unemplo}•ment rate. season.'llly adjusted. 
Retail sales Monthly annual change in UK ret.'lil sales volume index, Datastream UKODDOlSG 
retail sales. seasonally adjusted. 
Monthly annual % UK MO money supply 
MO change in narrow money monthly calendar levels, Datastream UKMO .... B 
growth. current prices, seasonally 
adjusted. 
Conswner Consumer confidence UK consumer confidence 
Datastream UKCNFCONQ 
confidence indicator, monthly levels. indicator, seasonally adjusted. 
Consensus forecasts of Average of new monthly Hl\'11' No mnemonic. Forecasters' RPIX growth for the forecasts for RPIX growth Treasury's projections of movements is RPIXc curent calendar year as a provided by City and 'Forrrnsts for series ABMI, found in percentage change on the Independent forecasters. the UK National Accounts Table previous calendar year. EconO!!!J'· C2. 
Consensus forecasts of Average of new monthly I-ThiT No mnemonic. Forecasters' GDP growth for the 
estimates of current GDP Treasury's projections of movements is GDPc curent calendar year as a growth provided by City and 'Forecasts for series CDKQ, found in percent.'lge change on the Independent forecasters; the UK ONS Cotti/11//er Prices release, previous calendar year. Eco!IO!!!J '. Table 1. 
Consensus forecasts of Average of new monthly Hl\-lT No mnemonic. Forecasters' RPIX growth for the ne.xt 
estimates of future RPlX ｔｲ･｡ｳｵｦｽｾｳ＠ projections of movements is RPIXF calendar year as a growth provided by City and 'l'immsts for series ABJ\II, found in percentage change on the Independent forecasters. the UK Nation.'ll Accounts Table 
current calendar year. Eco!rOII!J'· C2. 
Consensus forecasts of Average of new monthly HMT No mnemonic. Forecasters' GDP growth for the next 
estimates of future GDP TreaSUf}'
1S projections of movements is 
GDPI' calendar year as a growth provided b}' City and 'Fo!?msts for series CDKQ, found in percentage change on the Independent forecasters. the UK ONS Co!JJIIIIJer Prices release, 
current calendar year. ErotrO!l!J''· Table 1. 
Implied RPI inflation Estimates of implied RPI 
Implied inflation based on nominal spot inflation using yield cun•e Bank of No mncmomic. 
rates at 60 months dat.'l based on calculations by England 
maturit)•. Anderson and Sleath (2002). 
TABLE 5.A. 
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES USED IN ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION 
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Chapter 6 
The Dissent Voting Behaviour of MPC Members 
6.1 Introduction 
Like all n1onetary ｰｯｬｾ｣ｹ＠ comn1ittees, the BoEMPC is obliged to reach decisions 
on the short-tern1 interest-rate, even in the presence of substantial disagreement. 
When a comn1ittee n1ember does not hold the view of the majority, a way of reg-
istering such difference in opinion is to vote against it, that is, to cast a dissenting 
vote. Consider the vote reported by the Financial Times on 25th, referred to at the 
beginning of Chapter 5. It was characterised by all outsiders dissenting for lower 
interest rates. Effectively, all Bank insiders found themselves on the winning side 
of the decision, and all outsiders on the losing side. In this chapter I compare 
the type and frequency of dissenting votes cast by insiders and outsiders. I not 
only evidence differences between the two groups, but explain why such differences 
n1ight arise, and in particular, why BoEMPC members might be incentivised to 
dissent. 
To survey the results, it is detern1ined that firstly, outsiders are much n1ore 
likely to cast dissenting votes than insiders. Interpreted differently, insiders have 
a significantly higher chance of being on the winning side of monetary policy deci-
sions. Secondly, whereas insiders dissent for tighter policy n1ore often than looser 
policy, outsiders dissent overwhelnlingly on the side of n1onetary ease. Also n1ea-
sured is the in1pact of career backgrounds on dissent voting, an approach used in 
studies of FOMC dissent voting. Specifically, binary logit analysis is used to es-
tinlate the effect of career backgrounds on n1en1bers' propensity to dissent on side 
of ease or tightness. The dataset used is highly truncated in that it uses only dis-
senting votes, and the analysis to son1e extent draws on Havrilesky and Schweitzer 
184 
(1990).1 When controlling for a n1en1ber's type, years spent working in the pri-
vate sector, the civil service and non-governn1ental organisations all contribute to 
a n1en1ber's propensity to dissent on the side of ease or tightness, although the 
effects are not highly pronounced. 
The chapter progresses as follows. I begin by relating the chapter to previ-
ous studies on dissent voting, a literature which falls into the 'partisan theory of 
politics' genre [Meade and Sheets (2002)]. I then1 develop son1e priors. In par-
ticular, I look to reasons why the frequency and type of dissent voting associated 
with insiders and outsiders n1ight be expected to differ. Amongst other things, 
I suggest that differences in dissent voting behaviour is partially attributable to 
the presence of n1en1bers' career concerns - sin1ply put, disagreeing with fellow 
n1embers may damage one's career path, especially if one is an insider. However, 
other factors may con1e into play, and for any individual n1en1ber, dissent voting 
behaviour may not necessarily be driven by any single factor in isolation, but by 
a con1bination thereof. Following this, I forn1ally define is n1eant by dissent, and 
proceed to evidence the dissent voting behaviour of BoEMPC members for the 
first five years of the MPC.2 As in Chapter 5, monthly voting data fron1 July 
lOth 1997- 6th June 2003 is used. The career backgrounds of MPC men1bers and 
associated econon1etric evidence relating this to dissent voting is then presented. 
The chapter concludes by addressing the in1plications of the findings for the future 
conduct of UI< n1onetary policy. 
6.2 Relationship to the Literature 
Previous studies of dissent voting in MPCs ( i) fall into the 'partisan theory of poli-
tics' genre and (ii) typically consider the case of the FOMC. The approach used in 
this chapter draws n1ainly on Belden (1989) and Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990). 
Belden analyses the record of dissenting votes from FOMC meetings with a view 
to identifying differences in the dissent voting behaviour of Bank presidents and 
Board men1bers. Bank presidents dissent more frequently than Board n1en1bers, 
with the latter group preferring to dissent on the side of ease, and the former on 
the side of n1onetary tightness. The reason for the observed differences, according 
to Belden, lay in the different appointments procedures for each type of n1en1ber. 
1 Meade and Stasavage (2004) draw on the literature on the career concerns of experts in 
explaining the dissenting votes of outsiders. 
2 During this period, Sir Edward George also presided as Governor of the Bank of England. 
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Board Governors are appointed by the US President, thereby lacking the inde-
pendence of Bank Presidents. Because Belden assumes that governn1ents have 
an in-built bias towards activist policy,3 the finding that Board Governors have a 
greater propensity to dissent on the side of monetary ease than Bailie Presidents is 
not unexpected. Further, Bailie Presidents are less influential in setting n1onetary 
policy than Board members - they feature on the losing side of decisions more 
often than Board n1embers. Like Belden (1989), Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990) 
is prenlised on the notion that all governn1ents have a time-consistent inflationary 
bias. FOMC n1embers whose career backgrounds are 1nore 'proximate' to central 
governn1ent are more liable to conforn1 to such bias, and the n1ore one confonns to 
it, the greater the propensity to dissent on the side of ease. Conversely, men1bers 
whose experiences are relatively further fron1 of central government are n1ore likely 
to dissent on the side of tightness. Havrilesky and Schweitzer n1ake assumptions 
about the kinds of career characteristics which lead to a men1bers having more of 
a propensity to dissent on the side of ease or tightness. As discussed later, their 
assumptions might not hold in the context of UK monetary policy. 
The latter point is worth elaborating on. Care should be taken when com-
paring the results of FOMC studies with BoEMPC studies. On the one hand, 
the distinction between insiders and outsiders has son1e parallels with that n1ade 
between Bank presidents and Board n1embers in n1any studies of FOMC voting 
behaviour. In this sense, I adopt an approach which belongs to the long tradition 
of studies exanuning the voting behaviour of US Federal Open Market Conunittee 
n1en1bers. However, this sinularity should not be stretched too far. As one might 
3The idea that governments have an inbuild inflationary bias does not convince everyone. 
Charles Goodhart (1997), a member of the MPC with an academic background, is a key example 
of someone who questions the wisdom embodied in writings on time-consistent monetary policy: 
"Whilst I have consistently supported central bank autonomy in setting inter-
est rates, to achieve an inflation set by the political authorities, I have at the same 
time had doubts about the virtues of the main theoretical analysis paraded in sup-
port of that step, i.e. the time-inconsistency argument. There is little compelling 
evidence that governments have sought consciously to use expectational inertia to 
trick people into working harder, in pursuit of a short-run electoral feel good factor, 
and, indeed little evidence, given to the long lags in monetary policy and the wide 
range of uncertainty surrounding the effects of such policies over time on nominal 
incomes and prices. Yet in most time-inconsistency models, the moneta1:y author-
ities can control prices instantly and perfectly! Absolute nonsense. Yet this model 
not only survives, but is highly influential. This is partly because it combines tech-
nical mathematical virtuosity with a fashionable cynicism about the motives and 
agendas of politicians." 
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expect, FOMC studies are geared towards the institutional nuances of the US Fed-
eral Reserve and US political systen1. I suggest that the notion of 'partisanship', 
despite its applicability to US studies is more difficult to apply to the case of the 
MPC. Firstly, the government plays a role in all appointments to the MPC, for 
both external and internal appointn1ents. Even insiders appointed from within 
the Bank by the Governor n1ust have the approval of the Chancellor of the Exche-
quer. Contrast this with the nature of the appointments procedure to the FOMC. 
All Federal Reserve Board Governors are appointed by the President. Contrast-
ingly, Bank Presidents are chosen without political interference, and the President 
has all but no say in the n1atter. Secondly, many approaches used to test for 
'partisanship'4 in FOMC studies cannot be applied here due to data linlitations. 
The entire san1ple period falls within the incumbency of the British Labour Party. 
Appealing to the partisan theory is thus rendered less attractive when con1pared 
to, say, US studies where the n1onetary policy preferences of individual FOMC 
n1en1bers are n1odelled as a function of the political affiliation of the individuals 
who appointed them. These studies typically cover periods which include different 
political adn1inistrations, Republican and Democrat. For exan1ple, Chappell et al 
(1993) conclude that 
" ... the power to make appointn1ents provides an important channel of 
systmnatic partisan infl.uence ... Democratic appointees favour easier nlone-
tary policies than traditional Republicans do, and supply-side Republicans 
prefer even easier policies than Den1ocrats do." (p.209) 
Nevertheless, in spite of such differences, this does not preclude the author fron1 
undertaking a thorough and systen1atic analysis of dissent voting for the British 
case. Further, the analysis of dissent voting in this chapter extends Gerlach-
Kristen (2002), who provides a descriptive breakdown of MPC voting behaviour. 
6.3 Rationalising Dissent Amongst Insiders and 
Outsiders - Some Priors 
The analysis in this section endeavours to rationalise, a priori, why rates of dissent 
amongst insiders nlight differ fron1 those associated with outsiders. It predicts 
4See for example Hibbs (1997). For more recent contributions on the partisan theory of 
politics, the interested reader is referred to Alesina (1987), Alesina and Sachs (1988), Alesina 
and Rosenthal (1995) and Boix (2000). 
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that the rate of dissent will be lower for insiders than outsiders. Previous chapters 
have evidenced large discrepancies in insider-outsider voting behaviour. Chapter 
4 presented evidence suggesting that whereas insiders vote as a bloc, outsiders are 
less prone to do so. Chapter 5 went onto den1onstrate that on average, insiders pre-
fer systen1atically higher interest rates than outsiders for any given MPC n1eeting, 
a difference which was shown to be statistically significant. In justifying the pre-
diction that insiders should dissent less frequently than outsiders, I appeal to the 
career incentives facing MPC 1nembers, the career backgrounds and experiences of 
MPC n1en1bers, the appointments procedure, term lengths of MPC n1en1bers and 
the inforn1ation sets used by men1bers to arrive at a decision. This list of reasons 
given here is by no n1ea11s exhaustive, but I feel sufficient to capture the main de-
terminants of dissent voting behaviour of BoEMPC n1embers. F\1rther, I suggest 
that for any individual men1ber, voting behaviour n1ay not necessarily be driven 
by any single factor in isolation, but by a con1bination thereof. To some degree, 
this builds on the n1ore generalised fran1ework of diverse interest rate preferences 
corresponding to (4.15) in Chapter 4. 
6.3.1 Career Incentives 
Whereas the career paths of internal appointees are linked to the bm1k, the san1e 
cannot be said for outsiders, whose future career paths 1nay all be linked to a 
plethora of different orgm1isations. Accordingly, insiders have an incentive to 'get 
on' with each other as they 1nay have to work with each other long after they have 
finished serving on the MPC. For this reason, I propose that insiders face n1ore 
pressure to vote as a group on the MPC than outsiders. This may explain the 
results shown in the appendix on measures of agreement in Chapter 4. Evidence 
that the career concerns of n1en1bers of n1onetary policy conmlittees can affect 
voting behaviour is well documented in Havrilesky a11d Schweitzer (1990). Cited 
therein are the conm1ents of Lawrence Roos, President of the St. Louis Federal 
Reserve Bank and n1en1ber of the FOMC, who n1aintains that: 
"If one is a young, career oriented president who's got a family to feed 
he tends to be more moderate in his opposition to Governors." 5 
5Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990), p.3. Also cited is the opinion of Henry Wallich, a member 
of the Board of Governors: 
"It is not a pleasant thing to have to keep dissenting ... One dissents less often than 
you would think. After all you are a member of a group and you want to get along 
with the other members." 
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Clearly, the suggestion here is that Governors exert a very real influence on the 
future career paths of Bank Presidents - Bank Presidents with aspirations of ad-
vancing their career further within the Federal Reserve System may feel under 
pressure not to vote against those individuals serving on the FOMC who may 
have a bearing on their future career. 6 For this reason, Havrilesky and Schweitzer 
propose that there is a degree of disutility associated with dissenting. 
Secondly, career progression within a central bank may be a function of behav-
ing like a 'central banker'. Arguably insiders act in a way consistent with their 
perception of what being a central banker requires. As central bankers are asso-
ciated with conservatism, 7 this leads to then1 acting conservatively when setting 
n1onetary policy. 8 In practice, tllis could lead to insiders preferring ceteris paribus 
6 There is also the possibility that sequential voting - which is the practice enjoyed by the 
MPC - may lead to different outcomes than simultaneous voting. For example, the government 
itself aired views to the effect that it would all other the things being considered prefer MPC 
members to vote sim't.tltaneously and not sequentially. 
"We remain to be convinced that the process of voting in the MPC is sufficiently 
robust. We recommend that the Governor and the MPC itself, gives further 
attention to the voting procedure and in particular to a system of simultaneous 
voting., (emphasis added by author) Response of the Government to the Report 
of the House of Lords Select Committee on the MonetaT'I.J Policy Committee of the 
Bank of England (HL Paper 34, Session 2000-01) 
This is not a moot point. In the presence of career concerns sequential voting may indeed have 
consequences for voting outcomes, as noted by Scharfstein and Stein (1990): 
" ... consider the case of a capital budgeting committee meeting, where the man-
agers are supposed to vote in turn on an investment project. Ideally the point of 
having several manages vote is to gather a wide range of information. However, if 
career concerns are present, this may not work very well. Once the first manager 
has voted, the others may simply echo his choice, regardless of their private beliefs. 
Thus a false consensus is achieved, and the information of the other managers is 
wasted., Scharfstein and Stein (1990), pp. 477-478. 
Although not fully explored here, the herding literature may offer a plausible explanation for the 
discrepancies in insider-outsider behaviour. Bank Insiders may simply 'follow the leader', so to 
spealc. 
7This is a view espoused in much of the theoretical literature on time-consistent monetary 
policy. Consider Rogoff (1986) who concludes that optimal monetary policy is delivered when 
central bankers are conservative, but not too conservative. 
8 The notion that people modify their behaviour in accordance with the roles or labels they 
are given is well established in the psychology literature. Consider Philip G. Zimbardo's well 
known prison experiments conducted at Stanford University in 1971. Here, participants quicldy 
assumed the roles of 'guards' and 'prisoners'. Although the experiment was planned to last 
for two weeks, it was stopped after a mere six days. The 'guards' directed increasingly cruel 
behaviour towards the prisoners, who began to exhibit depressive tendencies and behaviour 
associated with extreme stress. We note here that university students were the subjects of the 
experiment. 
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higher interest rates than outsiders, support for which is found in Chapter 5. It 
may also imply that when insiders dissent, they would prefer to do so on the side 
of tightness: it basically signals their credentials as 'conservative' central bankers. 
6.3.2 Career Backgrounds 
The prenlise that career backgrounds and experiences have a role in explaining 
the voting behaviour of n1en1bers of n1onetary policy conm1ittees is a then1e which 
has been well explored in the FOMC literature. Yet in appealing to the career 
backgrounds of MPC n1en1bers to explain their voting behaviour, one n1ust be 
careful not to apply the san1e priors as those used to explain those of the FOMC. 
Consider the effect of working in government as a civil servant. In studies fo-
cussing on FOMC voting behaviour, it is assun1ed that experience in governn1ent 
will be positively related to a n1e1nber's propensity to vote on the side of ease, as 
opposed to tightness, as in Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990) and Gildea (1990). 
The n1ore time spent working in governn1ent, the more one confornlS to the gov-
enmlent's in-build bias towards activist policy. Chappell et al (1993, 1995) find 
that where partisan behaviour does arise, it is to some extent attributable to the 
career backgrounds of FOMC n1embers, concluding that 
" ... experience in government, particularly at the Federal Reserve Board, 
is associated with significantly stronger preferences for monetary ease ... "9 
However, in the UK, civil servants have a long tradition of neutrality, so the effect 
of experience working in government on voting behaviour n1ay be hard to call. 
Thus, unlike the literature on FOMC voting, it is hard to forn1 priors regarding 
how n1embers will vote. Indeed, reported estin1ates fron1 the regression of career 
backgrounds, presented later, suggests that experience in governn1ent promotes 
dissent on the side of tightness, contrary to Chappell et al (1993, 1995). 
As a further example, FOMC studies assume that a background in or training as 
an academic economist leads members to behave less hawkishly. This is supposed 
to reflect the fact that many econonlists serving on the FO MC received their 
training in the heyday of Keynesianisn1, where policy was characterised by demand-
management, with less emphasis on supply-side measures. Acadenlic econonlists 
are thus assumed to be syn1pathetic to output, and are ceteris paribus n1ore likely 
9 Chappell, Havrilesky and McGregor (1995), p .130. Similar conclusions are also reached in 
Chappell, Havrilesky and McGregor (1993). 
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to act to stimulate demand via reducing interest rates. It is certainly also true 
that the in1pact of Keynesianism was n1ore pervasive in the UK than the US. One 
might therefore predict that econonlists with an academic background serving on 
the MPC are more likely to dissent on the side of monetary ease than tightness. 
Yet this rationale fails to reflect the enorn1ous influence of the literature on time-
consistent n1onetary policy on the econmnic community, in addition to for exan1ple, 
the in1pact of the Chicago school. It is worth recalling that Professor Alan Walters, 
who served as Chief Economic Adviser to Margaret Thatcher 1980-1984 and 1989, 
was an vocal proponent of supply side policies. More recently, Professor Patrick 
Minford, a well known UK British supply side econonlist was one of the so-called 
"six wise n1en" serving on HM Treasury's Panel of Forecasters. According to 
Seldon (1987), Minford was 
" .. .formally deeply steeped in Keynesian macro-thinking, but has propounded 
a micro-founded Rational Expectations theory based on the idea that ... economic 
expectations are based on the efficient use of available information." (p.l2) 
If anything, this den1onstrates that even if one does receive a Keynesian style 
training, one's views may shift seismically over time. 
In light of the preceding discussion on career incentives, however, I suggest that 
previous experience at the bank is n1ost likely to pron1ote dissent on the side of 
n1onetary ease. Other career backgrounds such as working in the private sector 
and experience in independent trans-national organisations may be ambiguous. In 
the case of private sector experience - if private sector experience is dominated by 
manufacturing it n1ay promote dissents on the side of ease, whereas the banking 
sector may pron1ote dissents on the side of tightness. 
6.3.3 Appointments Procedure 
The Chancellor has a potentially significant bearing on the direction of UK mon-
etary policy. In addition to powers to set and change the inflation target at will, 
the power of appointment represents a further vehicle for influencing the direc-
tion of UK n1onetary policy. This is relevant in two respects. In the first case, 
this an1ounts to the last word on the appointn1ent of and, if considered necessary, 
reappointn1ent of the Governorship of the Bank of England. This is particularly 
significant if one considers that the Governor of the Bank also sits as Chain11an of 
the Monetary Policy Conmlittee and has the casting vote in split MPC decisions. 
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The second issue pertains to the appointment and selection procedures for MPC 
members on a more general level, and is a consideration which is not restricted 
to the Bank of England MPC. For instance, in the case of the ECB, Dornbusch 
et al (1998) is notable for highlighting the way in which the selection procedure, 
regional or political affiliations of n1en1bers of the ECB Governing Council n1ay 
influence monetary policy decisions at the ECB. 
'[Firstly] the selection process that puts them in place n1ay be system-
atically biased, so that they are 'hawks' or 'doves' chosen to be just that. 
Secondly, regional economic conditions n1ay diverge significantly fron1 the 
average of the n1onetary zone, and this n1ay lead a particular board Ｑｮ･ｮｾ｢･ｲ＠
to respond in a differential way.'10 
Belden (1989, 1991), Chappell et al (1993, 1995) and Havrilesky and Gildea (1989) 
propose equivalent argun1ents with respect to the con1position of the US Federal 
Open Market Conmlittee. Belden (1991) describes the appointn1ents procedure 
for the FOMC: 
"Members of the Board of Governors are appointed by the President and 
congress and the Senate. Bank presidents, on the other hand, are appointed 
by the directors of each Federal Reserve district bank and accepted by the 
Chairman. No elected representatives participate directly in the choice of 
the Bank presidents." 
She later adds 
"If the lack of Senate confirmation does not result in bank presidents 
who have policy preferences that are different from Board n1embers, the 
issue [of how FOMC members are appointed) is n1oot ... But a difference in 
policy preferences is evident fron1 the record of dissenting votes." 
Whilst. BoEMPC n1embers cannot be construed as providing regional represen-
tation, 11 the shift to operational independence has not left the MPC inm1une to 
10Dornbusch et al (1998), p.25. 
11See for example Buiter and Sibert (2002): 
"The only criteria supposed by which potential MPC members in the UK are 
to be judged is professional competence and independence. They are not viewed 
as regional, industrial or sectoral delegates or representatives. Only the nation-
wide inflation objective and the nationwide subsidiary objectives are to be tal{en · 
into account by the Chancellor in their appointment and by the MPC members 
themselves in their voting behaviour." (p.lO) 
192 
political n1anipulation vis-a-vis the appointments procedure. As the power of 
appointment rests with the Chancellor, he n1ay appoint 'doves' or 'hawks' to be 
just that. 12 Indeed, the government plays an influential role in choosing all MPC 
n1en1bers. The precise extent of its influence arguably varies in relation to the 
type of n1en1ber being appointed. Whereas all outsiders are chosen directly by 
the Chancellor, two of the internal appointees serving on the MPC are chosen 
by the Governor of the Bank of England after consultation with the Chancellor. 
Cobhan1 (2000) argues that the appointn1ents procedure for MPC members is 
"opaque" and "incapable of securing public trust or market credibility" .13 He fur-
ther attests that the decision in June 2000 to appoint Christopher Allsopp rather 
than renew the contract of Charles Goodhart 
" ... n1ay have been designed to steer the MPC into keeping interest rates 
as low as possible for the next election." 14 
Evidence presented in the next section provides support for this conjecture - in 
practice, whereas Goodhart dissented only on the side of tightness (on 3 occasions), 
Allsopp dissented only on the side of ease (11 occasions), a case of a 'hawk' being 
replaced by a 'dove'. The Evening Standard spoke of Charles Goodhart being 
'forced to step down against his will', duly noting that the Treasury was 'standing 
by its appointn1ent' ,15 in spite of Allsopp's rejection by the Con1n1ons Treasury 
Select Conmlittee on the grounds of being ill-suited for the position. At the time, 
the debacle was reported as a dispute which 
" ... raises questions about Allsopp's credibility ... City economists were al-
ready speculating that he would initially be under pressure to vote with 
Bank chief Eddie George at the monthly meetings ... Despite a close five-four 
vote against endorsing his non1ination ... all were of the view that he was 
unsuitable." 16 
The opaque nature of the appointn1ents procedure is further captured in the follow-
ing exchange between Andrew Tyrie MP, n1en1ber of the Treasury select comnlittee 
and Richard Lan1bert, who joined the MPC in May 2003: 
12It is also a consideration which has a bearing on the credibility of the delegation. The 
interested reader is referred to Sibert (2001) for a formal treatment of this issue. 
13 Financial Times, lOth August 2000. 
1
'
1Ibid. 
15Evening Standard 24th May 2000. 
16Ibid. 
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Andrew Tyrie: " ... one thing has surprised n1e, which is that there was no 
formal interview process at all, as far as I can tell. If you were creating a 
systen1 in order to appoint people to something like the MPC, do you think 
that it might be sensible to have some kind of formal interview where you 
sit in front of someone at least for 20 n1inutes or so, or a couple of people, 
and have an exchange of views?" 
Richard Lambert: "I have not really thought through that. I do not 
really know the answer to that. My conversations, which were necessarily 
on the telephone, were lengthy." 
Andrew Tyrie: "Did it not cross your mind to wonder whether a coupl.e 
of calls to Japan was all there was to becmning a n1ember of the MPC?" 
The exchange continues: 
Andrew Tyrie: "Do you know of any other very important and challeng-
ing job which is appointed over the phone on a long distance call?" 
Richard Lambert: "I do not know enough about how government nlinis-
ters are appointed or civil servants are appointed to be able to answer that 
question." 
Andrew Tyrie: "You and I both lmow that pern1anent secretaries are 
interviewed before they take their post, that cabinet secretaries are given 
extensive interviews by the Prime Minister. You know that already." 
Richard Lambert: "Yes" 
Andrew Tyrie: "So that was a flippant reply from you." 
Richard Lan1bert: "Forgive n1e; I apologise." 17 
Given the opaqueness of the appointn1ents procedure I therefore tentatively sug-
gest that the appointn1ent of outsiders is a potential vehicle for packing out a 
17 Oral evidence of Mr Richard Lambert, taken before the Treasury Committee 
on Monday 16 June 2003, Questions 65-69. http:/ jwww.parliament.the-stationery-
offi.ce.co. uk/pa/ cm200203/ cmselect/ cmtreasy /811/3061601.h'tm 
194 
substantial portion of MPC with doves. It is arguably n1ore difficult to appoint 
an opportunistic or dovish Governor given the intense public scrutiny surrounding 
associated with such a decision - the credibility of the Bank would suffer 
6.3.4 Term Lengths 
Both the Governor and the two Deputy Governors serving on the MPC are ap-
pointed for tern1S of five years. This is longer than the three year tern1S given to 
all other MPC n1e1nbers, and increases reduces a n1en1bers independence fron1 the 
Chancellor. This is a point which has been seized upon by econonlists and politi-
cians alike. Michael Howard (2002), leader of the Conservative Party comn1ents 
that 
"One practical problen1 which has emerged is that the relatively short, 
three-year tern1 for MPC men1bers is often considered too short, while reap-
pointn1ent leads to relatively lengthy terms of office and also diminishes 
members' independence from the Chancellor." (emphasis added) 
Under this interpretation, MPC members which have shorter tenures to serve 
should vote in more partisan fashion. Those men1bers with a relatively longer 
term of office should exhibit n1ore independence, and are less prone to lower interest 
rates before an election. In other words, it n1ight be expected that n1embers with 
shorter tern1 lengths are more prone to exhibiting dovish tendencies. The fact 
that the two internal men1bers are appointed with three year terms is tempered 
by the fact that they are chosen by the Governor of the Bank in consultation with 
the Chancellor. For this reason, it is plausible to suggest that outsiders, all of 
who serve three year tern1S, will exhibit more dovish tendencies than insiders -
precisely what is seen in practice. Outsiders are the least independent of all MPC 
n1en1bers. 
6.3.5 Information Sets 
Different BoEMPC members will invariably be both exposed to and receptive to 
different sources of inforn1ation during their time on the MPC. Sushil Wadhwani 
(2002) is an exan1ple of an MPC n1en1ber to openly express doubts about the 
efficacy of the suite of Bank of England n1odels used in the forecast of inflation 
and GDP. These forecasts, which forn1 the basis of the Bank's Inflation Report, 
are purportedly integral to decisions on the interest-rate, and are supposed to 
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represent the 'collective judgen1ent' of the MPC. I suggest that Bank insiders 
may de facto have more faith than outsiders in the suite of in-house models used 
in the generation of the forecasts of inflation and GDP. Speaking in May 2002, 
Wadhwani, an outsider who served on the MPC between June 1999-May 2002 
attested: 
" ... the MPC has, in the past been criticised on account of its forecasting 
performance. I note that the actual outturn for inflation has always been 
lower than the MPC's two-year ahead forecast, with an average error of up 
to around 0.5% .... to the extent that policy was held too tight because of 
a biased forecast, a challenge for the future is to ensure that any relevant 
lessons fron1 the past.'' 18 
Furthermore, and in light of the budget of April 1 Th 2002 given by Chancellor 
Brown, the Inflation Report itself comes in for criticism: 
"In my opinion, the central projection embodied in the May 2002 in-
flation report probably assumes a higher pass-through into prices than is 
likely, and too large a 'balanced budget stin1ulus' to demand growth next 
year.'' 19 
With respect to the MPC's position on GDP growth, he later adds 
"Over the past few years, the MPC has ... had too gloon1y a view about 
the level of potential output in the economy. Although some adjustments 
about this view have been made, I would regard the current view about the 
level of potential output as still being too pessimistic." 20 
If insiders- who have an in-built n1ajority over outsiders- place their faith a suite 
of in-house econon1etric models at the Bank of England which have a tendency to 
over-predict the level of future inflation [Wallis (2002)] this n1ay predict a higher 
rate of dissents on the side of ease associated with outsiders. It may be the case 
that outsiders have n1ore of a tendency to follow private sector, independent and 
consensus forecasts, such as the kind seen in PANEL 5.5 in Chapter 5. For 
example, the twelve n1onth consensus forecasts predict a level of future inflation 
which is systen1atically lower that the Bank's 24 month horizon RPIX forecasts 
across the entire sample.21 
18Wadhwani (2002), p.l. 
19 Ibid, p.3 
20 Ibid, p.lO. 
21 Consider Goodhart (2001) goes much further than Wadhwani in criticising of the inflation 
and GDP projections in the Inflation Report. He suggests that nobody on the lVIPC believed 
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6.4 Dissenting Votes 
6.4.1 Defining Dissent 
The information provided in the Minutes identifies who the dissenting voters are 
at each n1eeting, and whether they dissented on the side of ease or tightness. This 
level of detail enables a n1eaningful analysis of dissent voting behaviour. Three 
types of dissent are identified: dissent, dissent for tighter policy and dissent for 
looser policy. There are important caveats to these classifications, which will 
becon1e clear in the following definitions. 
• Dissent: On this definition, a dissenting vote is defined as a vote against 
the interest-rate chosen by the majority of MPC men1bers at each 1neeting. 
However, this 'broad' definition of dissent n1akes no distinction between dis-
senting for tighter or looser policy. The ren1aining two definitions, which 
fall into the broader category of dissent are thus defined accordingly: 
• Dissent for tighter policy: This is defined as where a men1ber reveals a pref-
erence for a higher short-tern1 interest-rate relative to the actual decision on 
the short-tern1 interest-rate taken by the MPC. On this definition a men1ber 
n1ay vote for no change or a decrease in the current interest-rate but still be 
classed as dissenting for tighter policy if the actual rate chosen by the MPC 
is greater than their preferred rate. 
• Dissent for looser policy: Defined as where a men1ber reveals a preference for 
a lower short-tern1 interest-rate relative to the actual short-term interest-rate 
them: 
" ... the introduction of outside experts into a Committee process of forecasting 
is inevitably likely to generate some tension and disagreements." Goodhart (2001), 
p.62. 
He raises the distinct possibility that: 
" ... the actual modal forecast at the heart of the Inflation Report was believed 
in- as the most likely outcome- by no one on the MPC; it was itself an average 
over Members .... Take for example the assumption about the exchange rate, a key 
element in the forecast ... some on the MPC thought the use of uncovered interest 
parity (UIP) provided the best analytical basis for considering the future of the 
exchange rate; others assumed that it was dominated in practical forecasting by 
assuming a random walk (i.e. a constant future exchange rate). With the two 
groups being roughly evenly balanced the compromise was to assume half-way 
between the two, which nobody believed! Thuly a camel is a horse designed by a 
Committee."Ibid, p.63. 
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chosen by the MPC. On this definition a men1ber may vote for no change or 
an increase in the current interest-rate but still be classed as dissenting for 
looser policy if the actual rate chosen by the MPC is less than their desired 
rate. 
6.4.2 The MPC's Dissent Voting Record 
TABLES 6.1-6.3 docun1ent the dissent voting behaviour of the MPC. TABLE 6.1 
chronicles the voting record of insiders and outsiders on an individual and col-
lective basis. The first colun111 shows the total nun1ber of votes cast by MPC 
n1en1bers. As one would expect, the figures for individual n1embers vary accord-
ing to the different length of appointn1ents and the overlapping nature of men1bers' 
ternlS. Nun1bers in the last three colunms pertain to the nun1ber of dissenting 
votes cast, and correspond to the three types of dissent defined above. Figures in 
round brackets (.) express the nun1ber of dissenting votes cast as a proportion of 
the total nun1ber of votes cast. 22 
The pattern of dissenting votes is very different for insiders and outsiders. 
Outsiders dissented approxin1ately 27% of the time, compared with around 8% for 
insiders. This disparity is reflected in the votes of individual men1bers in both 
groups. Sir Edward George recorded no dissents - he was never on the losing 
side of a monetary policy decision during his thne as Chairman of the MPC. 23 
Moreover, the largest proportion of dissenting votes cast by an insider is 18%, by 
John Vickers. This level of dissent is relatively low by outsiders' standards. Just 
under one half of all of Buiter's, and one third of the votes of De Anne Julius and 
Sushil Wadhwani were dissenting. 
A further finding is that whereas the overwhelming n1ajoiity of dissenting votes 
cast by insiders are on the side of tightness, for outsiders the overwhelming ma-
jority are on the ｳｩ､ｾ＠ of monetary ease. Collectively, h1Siders voted to dissent on 
the side of ease just 1% of the time - the corresponding figure for outsiders is in 
the region of 20%. Mervyn King who dissented 16% of the tin1e typifies the kind 
of dissent voting behaviour associated with insiders - all of his dissents were on 
22 Calculate this by dividing the nwnber of votes cast in each dissenting category by the total 
number of votes cast in each row. 
23 It is certainly possible for the Chairman to lose a vote, and there is no reason to suspect 
that this might not happen in the future. 
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MPC Dissent by Member 
Dissenting Votes 
Votes Dissfi/11 for Tighter DisseJJt for Looser 
Insiders ｃ｡ｳｴｾ＠ Dissmt"' Poliry Poliry 
Eddie George 74 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Howard Davies 2 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Charles Bean 34 1 (3%) 0 (0%) 1 (3%) 
David Clementi 61 4 (7%) 3 (5%) 1 (2%) 
Paul Tucker 13 1 (8%) 1 (8%) 0 (0%) 
Ian Plenderleith 61 5 (8%) 3 (5%) 2 (3%) 
Andrew Large 9 1 (11%) 1 (11%) 0 (0%) 
Mervyn King 74 12 (16%) 12 (16%) 0 (0%) 
John Vickers 28 5 (18%) 5 (18%) 0 (0%) 
All Insiders 356 29 (8%) 25 (7%) 4 (1%) 
Exc/11dillg Govemor 282 29 ｾＱＰＥｬ＠ 25 ｾＹＥｬ＠ 4 (1%) 
Outsiders 
Charles Goodhart 36 3 (8%) 3 (8%) 0 (0%) 
Kate Barker 26 3 (12%) 0 (0%) 3 (12%) 
Sir Alan Budd 18 4 (22%) 4 (22%) 0 (0%) 
Stephen Nickell 38 9 (24%) 3 (8%) 6 (16%) 
Marian Bell 12 3 (25%) 0 (0%) 3 (25%) 
Christopher Allsopp 37 11 (30%) 0 (0%) 11 (30%) 
De Anne Julius 45 14 (31%) 0 (0%) 14 (31%) 
Sushi! Wadhwani 37 13 (35%) 0 (0%) 13 (35%) 
Willem Buiter 36 17 (47%) 9 (25%) 8 (22%) 
Richard Lambert 1 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
All O!ltsiders 286 77 (27%) 19 (7%) 58 (20%) 
All Members 
All MPC 111e111bers 642 106 (17%) 44 (7%) 62 (10%) 
Excl!lding Govemor 568 106 ｾＱＹＥＩ＠ 44 (8%) 62 (11%) 
3t The number of votes cast by each member is identical to the total number of meetings attended by each 
member. 
lj!Dissent is equivalent to the sum of dissents for tigbter poliry plus dissmts for looser polio•. Numbers in round 
brackets (.) show the corresponding percentage of dissenting votes cast by each member/group. For 
example, in the case of Willem Buiter, the percentage of dissents is calculated by dividing the number of 
dissents by the total number of votes cast and multiplying by 100 Q.e. (17 /36)x100 ｾ＠ 47%). All percentages 
are rounded to the nearest integer. 
TABLE 6.1. 
DISSENTING VOTES CAST BY MPC MEMBERS BY FREQUENCY AND TYPE 
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the side of tightness.24 Contrastingly, outsiders like Christopher Allsopp, DeAnne 
Julius and Sushil Wadhwani cast all of their dissenting votes on the side of ease. 
At this point, it is perhaps useful to compare BoEMPC and FOMC levels of 
dissent. Meade and Sheets (2002) report that over the period 1978-2000, only 198 
out of 2403 votes cast by FO M C men1bers were of the dissenting variety. This 
an1ounts to about 8% of all votes cast. Contrast this with the voting behaviour of 
Bank of England Monetary Policy Comnlittee n1en1bers. For the first five years 
of the MPC, 106 out of 642 votes cast were dissenting in nature - over 16% of 
votes cast. Crudely put, it would appear that MPC n1en1bers are twice as likely 
to dissent than FOMC n1embers.25 
TABLE 6.2 shows the percentage of dissenting votes for tighter (looser) policy 
as percentage of dissenting votes only. The percentages shown here differ from 
those given in round brackets in TABLE 6.1 in so far as values in the latter table are 
calculated as a percentage of all votes cast, irrespective of whether they are dissent-
ing or not. The figures thus have a basis in conditional probabilities. For exan1ple, 
since the category 'Dissents for tighter (looser) policy as % of all dissents' corre-
sponds to the probability of dissenting on the side of tightness (looseness) given 
a dissenting vote is cast. 26 Some of the results must be treated with caution. 
Three insiders -two with a 100% record for casting dissenting votes on the side of 
tightness (Paul Tucker and Andrew Large) and one with a 100% record on the side 
24For this reason, Mervyn King earned himself a reputation as a 'hawk' in the first five years 
of the MPC. An interesting question is were all twelve of Mervyn King's dissents on the side of 
ease, would he still have become the Governor of the Bank? 
25 Comparison with other committees is also of interest. Nobuyuki Nakahara (2002), member 
of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, attributes differences in the dissent voting behaviour 
of members of the monetary policy committees of the Bank of England and Banlc of Japan to 
individ'ttal accountability, attesting: 
"I heard that Dr. DeAnne Julius, a former member of the Monetary Policy 
Committee of the Bank of England, said that when members are not individually 
accountable, they lose the incentive to make public their position at the voting 
stage even if they had voiced opposing views during the debate, and that it will 
become easier for the majority, which would include the most influential individual, 
to carry the vote. To avoid this situation, the parliament holds individual hearings. 
Although the cmmection is not clear, since April 1998, deputy governors, though 
they are chosen from the staff of the Bank of England, are known to have cast 
eleven minority votes on eight occasions. As for the Bank of Japan, it was revealed 
at a recent parliamentary session that there had never been a division of views of 
the governor and two deputy governors." (emphasis added) 
26 In this sense, the percentages obtained for tighter and looser categories ru·e formally expressed 
as (Pr(TighteniDissent) x 100) and (Pr(LooseniDissent) x 100) respectively. 
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of ease (Charles Bean) each only cast one dissenting vote.27 Nevertheless, even 
when bearing this in mind, results show that five out of the six insiders who cast 
dissenting votes28 all voted on the side of tightness the n1ajority of the tin1e, the 
exception being Charles Bean. Contrastingly, of the nine outsiders shown to have 
cast dissenting votes, six voted on the side of ease on the n1ajority of occasions. 29 
Of these six n1en1bers, five voted on the side of ease 100% of the tin1e.30 Whereas 
the vast n1ajority of dissenting votes cast by insiders are on the side of tightness 
(86%), the opposite is true for outsiders, for whon1 the overwhelming majority of 
dissenting votes are cast on the side of ease (75%). 
TABLE 6.3 displays the results of paired t-tests31 confirming that the proportion 
of dissenting votes cast by insiders and outsiders on a meeting by meeting basis are 
significantly different. Tests were applied across both groups for each category of 
dissent voting. 32 Section A.l shows that although insiders dissent and dissent for 
looser policy significantly less often than outsiders, there is no significant difference 
in dissents for tighter policy between the two groups. 33 Section B.l con1pares 
each group's propensity to vote on the side of tightness or looseness. Clear-cut 
statistically significant differences arise between insiders and outsiders. Dissent 
for tighter policy is significantly higher for insiders than for outsiders. Further, 
dissent for looser policy is significantly higher for outsiders than for insiders. The 
lower part of the table omits the Governor from the sample. This is because 
the Governor fran1es the question on which a policy decision is based. The same 
qualitative conclusions hold as for when the Governor is included, although they 
are slightly less pronounced- the Governor has never dissented. 
27 No outsiders fall into this category. 
28 Namely David Clementi, Paul Tucker, Ian. Plenderleith, Andrew Large, Mervyn King and 
John Vickers. 
29 The six members are Kate Barker, Stephen Nickell, 1\IIarian Bell, Christopher Allsopp, De 
Anne Julius and Sushil Wadhwani. The remaining three individuals are Charles Goodhart, Sir 
Alan Budd and Willem Buiter. 
30In this respect, only Stephen Nickell does not have a 100% record on the side of looseness 
for the sample period under consideration. 
31 All calculations were performed using STATA 8. 
32In TABLES 6.1 and 6.2, estimates are calculated through pooling members votes- no attempt 
is made to distinguish between meetings when performing our calculations. 
33 The rate of dissent for insiders is higher than for outsiders. 
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Breakdown of Dissenting Votes 
Type of Dissenting Vote 
Insiders 
Eddie George 
Howard Davies 
Charles Bean 
David Clementi 
Paul Thcker 
Ian Plenderleith 
Andrew Large 
MetvynKing 
] ohn Vickers 
All Insiders :ll: 
Outsiders 
Charles Goodhart 
Kate Barker 
Sir Alan Budd 
Stephen Nickell 
Marian Bell 
Christopher Allsopp 
De Anne] ulius 
Sushil Wadhwani 
Willem Buiter 
Richard Lambert 
All 011tsiders 
AllMPC 
Members 
DissetJis for Tigbler Poliry as a Percentage 
(%)of Dissenting Votes 
0 
0 
0 
75 
100 
60 
100 
100 
100 
86 
100 
0 
100 
33 
0 
0 
0 
0 
53 
0 
25 
42 
Dissents for Looser Poliry as a Percentage 
(%)of Dissenting Votes 
0 
0 
100 
25 
0 
40 
0 
0 
0 
14 
0 
100 
0 
67 
100 
100 
100 
100 
47 
0 
75 
58 
xUnlike Table 6.1 it makes no sense to include a category which excl11des the Governor from the sample, 
as he has never cast a dissenting vote. All percentages arc rounded to the nearest integer. A zero 
appearing in both columns for any given member indicates no dissenting votes were cast. This only 
applies to Eddie George, Howard Davies and Richard Lambert. All other members dissented. 
TABLE 6.2. 
DISSEN'l'S FOR 'riGHTER AND LOOSER POLICY EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF DISSENTING 
VO'l'ES 
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Mean Percentage of Dissenting Votes including Governor 
Section A.1 - Insiders versus Outsiders 
Significance level of 
Insiders Outsiders Difference* 
All Dissents 8.0 26.0 1% 
Dissents for Tighter Policy 7.0 6.4 NS 
Dissents for Looser Policy 1.1 19.6 1% 
Section B.l - Tighter versus Looser Policy 
Tighter Looser 
All members 6.9 9.3 NS 
Insiders 7.0 1.1 1% 
Outsiders 6.4 19.6 1% 
Mean Percentage of Dissenting Votes excluding Governor 
Section A.2 - Insiders versus Outsiders 
Significance level of 
Insiders Outsiders Difference* 
All Dissents 10.1 26.0 
Dissents for Tighter Policy 8.8 6.4 
Dissents for Looser Policy 1.4 19.6 
Section B.2 - Tighter versus Looser Policy 
Tighter Looser 
All members 7.8 10.5 
Insiders 8.8 1.4 
Outsiders 6.4 19.6 
Notes: *Significant differences are indicated for 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels. 
NS indicates that the difference is not significant at the 10 percent level of significance 
All percentages rounded to 1 decimal place. 
TABLE 6.3. 
TESTING FOR SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN INSIDER AND OUTSIDER 
DISSENT VOTING BEHAVIOUR USING PAIRED t-1'ESTS 
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1% 
NS 
1% 
NS 
1% 
1% 
6.5 Career Characteristics of MPC Members 
I now turn to deternlining whether a·n1embers' career backgrolmds have a bearing 
on dissent voting behaviour. Although some judgement calls have been made 
in the construction of career variables, I distinguish between the varied career 
experiences and backgrounds of MPC n1en1bers34 .using a broad range of categories. 
My systen1 of classification covers only full time positions and secondn1ents held 
by MPC n1en1bers up to but not including tin1e working on the MPC. The time 
spent on the MPC is embodied in a binary variable for a n1en1bers type, which is 
en1ployed in the estin1ation procedure. Excluded from the criteria are all part-tin1e 
positions, special advisory roles and academic consulting. Consequently, all time 
served on the MPC- which technically constitutes a full-tin1e position working for 
the Bank of England - is purposely neglected. Career backgrounds are categorised 
according to years spent working in the following broadly defined areas: 
• Private Sector- refers to positions held in banking or the service industries 
and also covers manufacturing industries. 
• NGO - refers to non-governmental organizations. Specifically, this cov-
ers both national and international independent research organizations such 
as the National Institute of Social and Economic Research (NIESR) and 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD), and 
transnational institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS). 
• Government- denotes years spent working in the civil service. 
• Academia - refers to years worldng at a university in an academic capacity. 
• Bank - denotes the number of years employed at the Bank of England. 
Individual n1ember experience is displayed in TABLE 6.4. Other than Howard 
Davies and DeAnne Julius, all MPC men1ber have spent over half of their working 
lives within a single career category. No single n1ember has experience in more 
than three career categories. Sir Edward George, Ian Plenderleith, and Charles 
34 Also see Goodhart and Meade (2002) for a breakdown of the career characteristics of MPC 
members. Note that the system of classification used in this chapter differs slightly. Further, 
Goodhart and Meade (2002) base their results on data available on the Bank of England website. 
This data was felt to be somewhat limited in nature, and where necessary, career data was 
obtained from other sources. 
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MPC Member Career Histories Prior to Joining the MPC 
Years wotking 
Years at the Years in Years in the in Years working 
Insiders Bank Academia Private Sector Government inNGOs 
Eddie George 29 0 0 4 7 
Howard Davies 3 0 8 10 0 
Mervyn King 7 18 0 0 0 
Ian Plenderleith 32 0 0 0 3 
David Clementi 0 0 22 0 0 
John Vickers 0 17 3 0 0 
Charles Bean 0 18 0 7 0 
Paul Tucker 12 0 9 0 0 
Andrew Large 0 0 28 5 0 
Outsiders 
Willem Buiter 0 23 0 0 1 
Charles Goodhart 17 10 0 1 0 
De Anne Julius 0 4 9 0 7 
Sir Alan Budd 0 22 4 10 0 
Sushil Wadhwani 0 8 10 0 0 
Stephen Nickell 0 30 0 0 0 
Christopher Allsopp 4 31 0 2 2 
Kate Barker 0 0 21 0 6 
Marian Bell 0 0 16 3 0 ...... 
Richard Lambert 0 0 26 0 0 
Sautee: MPC member CV s, various sources 
Notes: The table covers full-time positions only. Consultancy or advisory roles taken on a part-time basis are 
neglected. 
TABLE 6.4. 
CAREER BACKGROUNDS OF MPC MEMBERS 
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Goodhart have spent most of their lives at the Bank; contrastingly, Mervyn King, 
Charles Bean, John Vickers and Willen1 Buiter have spent n1ost of their careers 
in academia. TABLE 6.5 builds on this analysis, and n1easures the percentage 
of insiders and outsiders to have worked in each category. A much greater per-
centage of insiders than outsiders have worked at the Bank of England (55.6% vs. 
20%). The san1e applies to experience in Governn1ent as civil servants ( 44.4% 
vs.40%), although the difference is less pronounced. Outsiders dominate in all 
other areas - by substantial margins in the case of Academia and NGOs, and by a 
less pronounced difference in the case of the Private sector. 
Related to career backgrounds of MPC n1embers is the suggestion that the level 
of expertise of MPC n1en1bers has through successive appointn1ents been 'diluted'. 
In June 2003, The Times aired precisely these concerns. 
" ... there is concern that the level of academic expertise on the MPC has 
been diluted by recent appointn1ents. When the MPC was established, its 
men1bers included acaden1ic heavyweights such as Sir Alan Budd, former 
Chief Economic Adviser to the Treasury, and Charles Goodhart of the Lon-
don School of Econon1ics. However, in recent years, the bias appears to have 
shifted to econon1ists with a less academic focus. These include Kate Barker, 
forn1er chief econon1ist of the CBI, and Sir Andrew Large, former deputy 
chairman of Barclays and now a Bank of England Deputy Governor." 35 
A typical governn1ental response to this type of criticism is found in the second 
report of the Lords Select Conmlittee on the MPC (2001), which asserts that 
" .. .it is economic expertise that would drive our choice [of MPC n1en1-
ber], it is the capabilities of the individual. The fact that we have someone 
who is an academic and whose principal subject has been the labour market 
[Stephen Nickell] must also be balanced by the fact that we also have some-
one who came straight from working with one of the biggest companies in 
our country and had a great deal of industrial policy expertise in that sector 
[De Anne Julius]. We choose the best people we can find with economic 
expertise" 36 ( en1phasis added) 
35 The Times, June 16th 2003. 
36Lords Select Committee on the MPC, Second Report, Response of the Government to the 
Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank 
of England (HL Paper 34, Session 2000-01), p 208. 
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Career characteristics of insiders and outsiders, June 1997-June 2003 
ｾ＠ ｾ＠ﾷｾ＠ ｾ＠i!1 fj 
ｾ＠ ｾ＠ * ｾ＠ a "& Ｎｾ＠ ｾ＠ ｾ＠ｾ＠ ｾ＠ ｾ＠ (j 
I11siders (o/o) 55.6 33.3 55.6 44.4 22.2 
Outsiders (0/o) 20 70 60 40 40 
Allme111bers (%) 36.8 52.6 58 42.1 31.6 
Source: MPC member CV s 
TABLE 6.5. 
MPC MEMDER CAREER CHARAC'l'ERIS'l'ICS 
Unfortunately, the notion of economic expertise says nothing about the relative 
hawkishness or dovishness of an MPC n1en1ber. It cannot generally be construed 
as a characteristic causing one to dissent more on the side of monetary ease than 
tightness. All one can say it that an MPC n1en1ber with relatively less exper-
tise than other n1en1bers is prima face liable to n1ade bigger mistakes than other 
men1bers. 37 However, to address whether the level of acadenuc expertise has di-
minished, it is possible to turn to PANELS 6.1 and 6. 2 shown in the appendix to 
this chapter. These reflect how the career backgrounds of MPC men1bers have 
changed over tin1e, using the criteria established in previous sections. It shows 
the level of experience for the average MPC men1ber at each 1neeting. It is readily 
seen that the average level of acadenuc experience- which nught be used to proxy 
acadenuc expertise - has not dropped substantially over the first five years of the 
MPC. However, experience at the Bank of England- has dropped n1arkedly, whilst 
Private Sector experience has risen. This is true for insiders and outsiders alike. 
6.6 Estimation 
To determine the effect of n1embers' career backgrounds on a propensity to dissent 
on the side of ease or tightness I estimate a regression of the forn1 
Zj = /30 + /31 Type+ /32Private sector+ /13Government 
+/13NGO + /33Academia + /33Bank + Uj (6.1) 
37Unless, of course, members free-ride on the the opinions and opinions of more expert mem-
bers. 
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where Zi = 1 denotes a dissenting vote on the side of tightness and Zi = 0 is a 
dissenting vote on the side of ease. In particular, denote 
Z = 0 if ih,t < i:naj,t (6.2) 
and 
(6.3) 
where ih,t is men1ber h's ideal interest-rate as reflected in their vote in meeting t 
and i:naj,t is the interest-rate chosen by the winning 1najority of MPC men1bers at 
a given n1eeting. 38 Type is a binary variable where a 1 is assigned if a n1en1ber 
is an insider and a zero if an outsider. Estin1ations are perforn1ed in EViews 4.1 
and results are shown in TABLE 6.6. p values are ｧｩｾ･ｮ＠ in round (.) brackets.39 
Results suggest that experience at the Bank of England and Academia have no 
in1pact on dissent voting behaviour - this is clear fron1 the high p-values associated 
with their coefficients. All other variables have a statistically significant effect 
on voting behaviour. Exerting by far the largest impact is the binary variable 
Type. A positive value indicates that insiders are n1ore likely to dissent on the 
side of tightness. This result is in line with the findings reported in TABLES 
6.1-6.3. Experience in the Private Sector and NGOs promote dissent on the 
side of monetary ease, whilst the coefficient on governn1ent indicates that time 
spent in the civil service promotes dissents on the side of tightness. All of these 
38This excludes all votes in cast agreement with the winning majority of MPC members for 
any given meeting. This occurs in instances where ih,t = i:naj,t. 
39 Given the limited number of observations, the econometric specification has been kept simple. 
In doing so, my purpose is to gain a broad feel for nature of the relationship between career 
backgrounds, a member's type and their decision to vote on the side of tightness or ease. It 
is noteworthy that whilst I have controlled for a member's type using an intercept dummy, 
interaction dummies have not been applied. This was imposed for two reasons. The first 
relates to the small sample size. It was felt that adding interaction terms this would use up 
significant degrees of freedom, resulting in a less than parsimonious specification. Secondly, I 
have assumed that the marginal effects of a given career background on a member's propensity 
to vote on the side of tightness or ease should a priori be the same. Marginal effects are not 
reported due to the negligible size of the parameters on career variables when compared to the 
coefficient for the type dummy. 
It has also been brought to my attention that the data sample may suffer from clustering. 
This arises when observations are no longer independent, and implies that the sample joint 
distribution function is no longer the product of the distribution functions for each observation. 
Conseque1itly, this results in a log-likelihood which is not true for the sample. In the context 
of my data-set, clustering might be thought to occur if some members dissent significantly more 
often than others. For example, consider the frequency of dissent voting behaviour associated 
with Willem Buiter, as compared to Charles Goodhart. The former dissented far more frequently 
than the latter. Due to the limited sample size, I do not adjust for cluster effects. For an 
informative discussion of the issue, the interested reader is referred to Wooldridge (2003). 
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MPC members' loosen and tighten dissenting votes explained by career 
backgrounds, June 1997-June 2003 
Intercept 
AII11JeiJJbers 0.62 
(0.004)* 
* p -values in brackets (.) 
No of obs = 106 
McFadden's R2 =0.44 
Private 
Type sector Govt. NGOs Academia 
0.57 -0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 
(0.000) (0.028) (0.047) (0.011) (0.22) 
Log likelihood= -44.7 
Likelihood ratio ·l(4) = 61.27 [p-value=O.OOO] 
TABLE 6.6. 
EFFECT OF CAREER BACKGROUNDS ON DISSENT VOTING DEHAVIOUR: 
BINARY LOGIT ES'l'IMATES 
Bank 
-0.01 
(0.26) 
variables are significant at the 5% level. Coefficients for these variables are all 
sin1ilar in n1agnitude, although the effect of a n1en1bers type exerts by far the 
largest influence on the decision to dissent on the side of ease or tightness. The 
rise in private sector experience in PANELS 6.1 and 6.2 coincides with a gradual 
decrease in interest rates, and is also seen lead to promote dissenting on the side 
of ease in the career characteristics regression. The increase in average Private 
Sector experience seen1S to be at the expense of experience at the Bank. 
6. 7 Conclusions 
At the outset of this chapter, I set out to explain the type and frequency of dis-
senting votes cast by insiders and outsiders. To rationalise a priori why any 
discrepancies between the two groups might arise, I appealed to career incentives, 
career backgrounds, the appointments procedure, tenn lengths and the inforn1a-
tion sets of MPC n1en1bers. I predicted that ( i) outsider would dissent significantly 
more often than insiders and ( ii) whereas insiders would dissent overwhelnlingly 
on the side of n1onetary tightness, outsiders would dissent on the side of mone-
tary ease. In all cases, argun1ents were backed up by a rich array of evidence 
ranging fron1 the past experiences of FOMC n1en1bers to spoken evidence given by 
BoEMPC men1bers at Treasury select committee hearings. 
I proposed that insiders have n1ore of an incentive to agree with each other 
because as members of the same organisation, they are n1ore likely to have to 
work with each other in the future- disagreeing too n1uch with one's peers n1ay 
be detrin1ental to future career advancen1ent. Insiders may also have more of an 
incentive to act like 'conservative' central bankers. This in1plies that if insiders 
choose to dissent, it will most likely be on the side on n1onetary tightness. In 
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tern1s of appointments and term lengths, outsiders have least independence from 
the Chancellor: they are both ( i) directly appointed by the Chancellor and ( ii) 
serve the shortest term lengths. If one is seeking reappointment, then voting for 
lower, as opposed to higher interest rates may secure a second term. It is im-
portant to note that even though the Governor of the Bank is appointed by the 
Government, his independence is somewhat reinforced through serving a longer 
tern1 length. F\1rther, given the opaque nature of the appointn1ents procedure, 
it is also possible that an outsider n1ay be appointed precisely because he or she 
is a dove. It is arguably more difficult to appoint an opportunistic or dovish 
Governor given the intense public scrutiny and attention surrounding the decision 
in the news media and financial n1arkets. Turning to inforn1ation sets, outsiders 
are more likely to dissent on the side of monetary ease in as far as they pay less 
attention than insiders to the Bank's suite of in-house forecasting models which 
( i) tend to over-predict inflation and ( i) have too pessinlistic a view about the 
level of potential output. This may also promote dissents on the side of monetary 
tightness by insiders. 
The predictions listed above were fully supported by the evidence. In prac-
tice, outsiders dissented significantly more often than insiders. Secondly, whereas 
insiders dissent overwhelnlingly on the side of n1onetary tightness, the reverse was 
found to be true for outsiders. These differences were found to be statistically 
significantly. I also presented evidence suggesting that the level of 'expertise' on 
the MPC was not diluted over time, using the n1ean number of years working in 
a university in an academic capacity as a n1easure. In short, the acadenlic focus 
on the MPC remains high. 
In the final section I tested for the impact of career backgrounds on n1embers 
propensity to dissent on the side of ease or tightness using binary logit analysis. 
This is an approach which is conlillonly applied in studies of FOMC n1en1ber vot-
ing. It was found that for the case of the BoEMPC, evidence to support the notion 
that career backgrounds in1pact on the propensity to dissent is weak. A problen1 
I encountered was predicting a priori the effects specific career backgrounds ex-
ert on dissent voting- particularly with respect to experience in government and 
acadenlia. It is not in1111ediately obvious why experience in the Private Sector 
and NGOs pron1otes dissent on the side of monetary ease, whilst time spent in the 
civil service prmnotes dissents on the side of tightness. Nevertheless, the effects of 
these variables are clearly n1arginal compared to the effects for the dunm1y variable 
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capturing a n1ember's type. It n1ay be the case that the san1ple size is too small 
- it is son1ewhat trtmcated in that it uses only dissenting votes, and votes cast in 
agreement with the n1ajority are ignored. 
The results of the analyses presented here have ramifications for the future 
conduct of UK n1onetary policy. I have evidenced clear asyn1metries in both the 
levels and type of dissent associated with insiders and outsiders. Monetary policy 
is delegated to comn1ittees for a number of reasons. Many of the argun1ents 
are founded on the benefits of heterogeneity - MPCs are assu1ned to reach better 
decisions because men1bers pool information and exchange different views. If 
career concerns are present, such inforn1ational pooling and exchange of views 
n1ight not take place. Some members may effectively be scared of speaking out. 
In the context of the BoEMPC, one solution to this problen1 would be to reduce 
the number of insiders sitting on the con1n1ittee. Whilst this n1ay increase the 
level of dissent, it is possible that it may increase the quality of the decision. 
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6.A Appendix to Chapter 6 
6.A.l Average Career Experiences of All MPC Members, 
Insiders and Outsiders per Meeting 
The following two panels plot the average career experiences of MPC Members 
over time. PANEL 6.1. focuses on the MPC as a whole, and is based on all 
MPC members, insiders and outsiders inclusive. The upper and lower graphs in 
PANEL 6. 2 (overleaf) show average career experiences for insiders and outsiders 
separately. 
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6.A.l. Average Career Experiences of All MPC Members, 
Insiders and Outsiders per Meeting (continued) 
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Chapter 7 
Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has endeavoured to examine aspects of the formulation of monetary 
policy by conunittee, and has adopted various approaches in pursuit of this ob-
jective. Techniques from gan1e theory and boundedly-rational n1odels of agency 
have been applied, in addition to the use of empirical and econometric analyses of 
MPC member voting behaviour. 
The literature review revealed several important facets of modern monetary 
policy n1aking. It was determined that n1onetary policy seldom falls under the 
aegis of a single central banker, and recent studies of n1onetary policy fran1eworks 
reveal that MPCs enjoy near ubiquity as vehicles for setting the short-term interest 
rate. Yet despite their relative abundance, it was also found that MPCs across the 
world vary considerably with respect to their size, n1en1ber composition, method 
of reaching a decision and voting rights. Even then, it is crucial to appreciate 
that MPCs invariably n1ake policy within a wider context of fulfilling particular 
policy objectives, which may differ from country to country. For exan1ple, con-
sider policy forn1ulation by the United States FOMC - Section 2.A of the Federal 
Reserve Act stipulates the objectives of monetary policy to be the achievement 
of economic growth in line with the economy's potential to expand, a high level 
of en1ployn1ent, stable prices and n1oderate long-term interest rates. No single 
objective is assun1ed to take precedence over any other. This is in contrast to the 
remit for the Bank of England MPC, which stipulates the pursuit of price stability 
in the form of an inflation target as a primanJ objective of UK monetary policy. 
All other considerations are secondary. 
By way of a first conclusion, I suggest that the behaviour of members of a n1on-
etary policy con1nlittee may differ as the result of the different incentives facing 
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them. In Chapter 3, it was argued that free-riding is a feature of n1onetary policy 
conmlittees. The n1odel demonstrated that when inforn1ation acquisition is costly, 
some MPC men1bers are incentivised to free-ride on the signals of other men1bers. 
It was found that in terms of policy outcomes, smaller, not larger MPCs are more 
likely to n1ake the correct policy decisions. In tern1S of policy recon1mendations, 
it was suggested that MPCs such as the ECB Governing Cotmcil should undergo 
a significant reduction in size. Further, n1easures should be taken to lessen the 
propensity of MPC 1nen1bers to free-ride, such as n1aking n1en1bers individually 
accountable to an external body. 
The role of incentives was found to be a key detern1inant of behaviour in Chap-
ter 4, where a n1odel was developed to account for how n1en1bers of a n1onetary 
policy conmlittee are able to reach a consensus, even when men1bers share initially 
diverse policy preferences. It was assumed for instance, that when career concerns 
are present, son1e n1en1bers are prone to heavily weight the opinions of individuals 
who are perceived to have a bearing on their future career path. Evidence was 
presented which showed that in the case of the US FOMC, some Bank Presidents 
faced considerable pressure to vote with Board members. There were clear in-
centives to listen to some n1en1bers, but not others. It was also suggested that 
the internal culture of an MPC was important - for instance, the more an MPC 
places a value on reaching a consensus, the n1ore likely its n1en1bers are to listen 
to the views of other n1en1bers or any individual1nember, such as the Chairn1an. 
This, it was argued, could account for the differences in dissent voting on the 
FOMC and the Bank of England Monetary Policy Con1mittee, where it was found 
that BoEMPC n1en1bers are twice as likely to dissent as their counterparts on the 
FOMC. 
As a second main conclusion, I suggest that the precise composition of a com-
nlittee - in tern1S of who the n1en1bers are, who appointed then1 and their career 
backgrounds - have a bearing on voting behaviour and ultin1ately policy out-
conleS.1'2 Evidence of this is found in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, where it is shown 
1This is one of a number of factors examined in Part III, where the focus is on the voting 
behaviour of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee. 
2In particular, the section of the literature review entitled Evidence Based Literature 
examined a corpus of studies of FOMC member voting behaviour which shed light on the rela-
tionship between the dissent voting behaviour of FOMC members and their type. It may be 
that the incentives facing Federal Reserve Banlc Presidents members when they vote may differ 
from those affecting Board members, duly noting that whereas the President of the United States 
directly appoints all Board members, the said individual has no influence in the appointment of 
216 
that on the Bank of England Monetary Policy Comnlittee, outsiders act very dif-
ferently to insiders. Con1pared to outsiders, insiders prefer systen1atically higher 
interest rates, are n1ore likely vote as a cohesive homogeneous group, and dissent 
significantly less frequently. The fact that both groups behave very differently in 
itself warrants further research. Further, as was concluded in Chapter 4, MPCs 
should be populated by individuals who are likely to listen to the views of others. 
This would ensures that the deliberation process is not marked by considerable 
disagreen1ents and that con1promise can be reached. 
At this point, it is perhaps worth reflecting on the con1ments of Lawrence 
Meyer (2001) who suggests the behaviour of n1embers on the many n1onetary 
policy comn1ittees around ｾｨ･＠ world may indeed differ as the result of, amongst 
other things, the different incentives facing then1: 
"Assun1e that the ECB Governing Council or the Bank of England's 
Monetary Policy Con1mittee replaced the Federal Open Market Con1mittee 
and made monetary policy in the United States- or vice versa. How would 
policy outcomes and, in turn, macroeconomic policy be affected? .. To what 
extent does the process followed in making n1onetary policy shape the details 
and effectiveness of the outcon1es? Does the nature of the governance and 
decision process n1atter? For example, does it matter whether ... there are 
outsiders as well as insiders on the [monetary policy] con1mittee; whether 
there is individual or collective responsibility for the decisions of the com-
mittee; and whether the committee is n1ade up only of centralized n1embers 
or also includes regional representatives?" 
The findings of this thesis go son1e way in addressing these issues, with many 
of the answers to these questions being in the affirmative. Policy outcon1es are 
seemingly affected by the structlu·e, con1position, and decision n1aking process of 
an MPC. The decision n1aking framework certainly has a bearing on policy out-
comes. It seems to n1atter whether there are outsiders as well as insiders on the 
con1nlittee. With reference to the UK experience, it is arguable that were the 
MPC con1prised of n1ore outsiders, interest rates would have been systematically 
lower, and the overall rate of dissent would be higher. In addition to this, the 
extent to which individual and collective responsibility is a feature of an MPC has 
a bearing on policy outcomes, especially if one considers that MPCs can be ei-
ther autocratically-collegial, genuinely-collegial or individualistic. One ultin1ately 
Federal Reserve Bank Presidents. 
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concludes therefore that in spite of the ubiquitous nature of MPCs, their struc-
ture, and the ｣ｯｲｲ･ｳｰｯｾ､ｩｮｧ＠ behaviolu· of their men1bers may vary substantially 
from one country to the next. This necessarily has ranlifications for the conduct 
of 1nonetary policy, a fact which is borne out by both the theory and evidence 
presented in this thesis. 
Future directions for research include more en1pirical studies of monetary policy 
frameworks, with particular emphasis on understanding how internal MPC culture 
differs fron1 one central bank to the next. There is also significant scope for 
n1ore econometric analysis - the Banlc of England Monetary Policy Con1mittee and 
the United States FOMC are not alone in publishing the votes of its members. 
For example, the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan has been doing so since 
its inception in 1998. Undertaking cross-country comparisons of MPC voting 
behaviour would therefore potentially represent a fruitful avenue of research. In 
terms of theory developn1ent, there is great scope for advancen1ent. An interesting 
line of investigation would be to consider what the optin1al composition of an 
MPC should be. Should it, for exan1ple, consist solely of insiders, or outsiders 
too? Further, what are the benefits of publishing the voting record? This is 
already considered by Sibert (2003), but is also linked to the issue of transparency. 
Recently there has been a trend for central banks to be more transparent. This 
mal(es it possible that in the future n1ore voting records will be published, analysis 
of which can only enhance our understanding of monetary policy forn1ulation by 
committee. 
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